

# The Second Defeat of Palestine

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## *In the Beginning*

*Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem . . . shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948.*

—UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) Concerning the Future Government of Palestine, 29 November 1947.<sup>1</sup>

*The reality of the situation does not permit the establishment of either a Jewish state or an Arab state. Such a solution could be implemented and maintained only by force. . . . It would signify denying one of the two peoples its national self-dependence.*

—Hashomer Hatzair Workers' Party  
Memorandum, August 1947<sup>2</sup>

*If we cannot find ways of peace and understanding, if the only way of establishing the Jewish National Home is upon the bayonets of some Empire, our whole enterprise is not worthwhile, and it is better that the Eternal People that has outlived many a mighty empire should possess its soul in patience and plan and wait. It is one of the great civilizing tasks before the Jewish people to enter the promised land, not in the Joshua way, but bringing peace and culture, hard work and sacrifice and love, and a determination to do nothing that cannot be justified before the conscience of the world.*

—Judah L. Magnes, Chancellor, Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 1929.<sup>3</sup>

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In the beginning, the entire world knew there were two national existences at issue. Those who today write otherwise—and they are numerous, with Joan Peters' *From Time Immemorial*<sup>4</sup> probably the best contemporary example—are either ignorant, lying, or being paid to misrepresent history.

With the Arab defeat in 1948, the conflict was transformed, at least for most observers in the West, into that between Israel and “the Arabs”—for the Palestinians were demoralized, scattered, and helpless. This was the period of the culmination of the first defeat of Palestine: Zionism had triumphed against many odds and in a larger part of Palestine than specified in the UN partition plan, and the Hashemite throne annexed the West Bank, while Egypt took control of the Gaza Strip.

Today, we are probably living through the second historic defeat of Palestine—the end to hopes for true mutual recognition and an honest two-state solution, though a faint and fading glimmer of hope remains. We are today living as witnesses to a crossroads in history: the end of one chapter and the quandary of how to begin another.

And pregnant in the final death of the partition approach is the possibility, actually the likelihood, that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will yet evolve in new, potentially cataclysmic directions.

As British journalist Alan Hart concludes in his recent book *Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker?*

What is likely to happen if and when the Palestinians are forced to conclude that politics and compromise do not get results? My guess is that Arafat will be swept aside by Palestinian radicals who, with the growing support of Palestinian and then Arab masses, will commit themselves to the first real Arab revolution . . . which will have as its objective the overthrow of the existing Arab order and its replacement by revolutionary Arab leaders who *will* be prepared to confront the West and Israel by all means, no matter what the cost. Such a struggle would probably not end until the region and possibly the world had been devastated by a nuclear holocaust.<sup>5</sup>

### *Emerging from the First Defeat*

Even in the 1950s, under the leadership of Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir, Egypt showed signs of wanting to find a way to make a deal with Israel, so long as something reasonable for the Palestinian people could be arranged.<sup>6</sup> At that time, a deal struck by Egypt, even one without Palestinian participation or consent, might have taken root. But new developments intervened and the

struggle became more deeply embedded in the fabric of regional politics and history.

With the 1956 and 1967 eruptions of what had already evolved into an ongoing struggle punctuated by cease-fires, the “Arab-Israeli” aspect of the conflict developed a greater reality of its own. The civil war in Palestine was subsumed under the larger heading of a poetic but delusive Pan-Arabism, and the notion of compromise based on the existence of two national movements was grotesquely transformed—by both sides—into a seemingly zero-sum outlook.

For the Jews there were recurring nightmares of a repetition of the European decimation of the Nazi era. Yet there was also Judah Magnes’ moral admonition, a kind of open wound gnawing at Zionism’s roots. For the Arab world there was humiliation born of the existence of a sovereign Jewish entity that had humbled and alienated the Arab world. For the Palestinian refugees there was the expected “return” for which they longed, in which they believed, and to which they clung in an expectation that justice and vengeance would prevail.

With UN Security Council Resolution 242, the inter-state aspects of the struggle were evident, while the first hints at a comprehensive settlement were suggested; but the Palestinian national question remained curiously submerged. Moreover, many Arabs continued to assume deep within their own psyches—though with little basis in any serious appraisal or understanding of either the Zionist movement or the Israeli reality—that the occupiers of Palestine would go the way of the Crusaders; it was but a matter of time.

With the advent of the PLO in 1964 there was something new—a Palestinian component with real Palestinian players of the next generation emerging, though still taking their cues from Arab leaders. It was Nasir’s Egypt that breathed life into the PLO, and it was Egypt’s foreign minister, Isma’il Fahmi, at the 1974 Rabat summit, who proposed the PLO as the “sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.”<sup>7</sup>

Nevertheless, the PLO and the Palestinian revolution have always been highly suspect for the conservative Arab regimes, which cling to power and privilege with decreasing legitimacy and thus through increasing surveillance, repression, and, whenever possible, co-optation. Then, as now, Jordan and other Arab states stood in opposition to a truly independent Palestinian movement and competitively did what they could—while paying lip service to Palestinian nationalism—to force the movement under their wing.

The PLO first became a symbol of the Palestinian struggle against Israel, and then of the Palestinian quest for self-determination in part of Palestine; but it also became a weapon in the inter-Arab struggle for dominance. Except for reminding the world of the injustice and the cause—though a cause rarely with a clearly articulated means of redress—the PLO was never a serious military, or even terrorist, threat to Israel. Rather, the PLO became the embodiment of an historic wrong, a moral weight threatening Zionism's ethical foundations, a unique claimant on world society which had midwived Israel's birth in partial atonement for the Nazi slaughter.

Somewhat more than one long decade ago, we were in the embryonic period of the movement for mutual recognition. Back then there was honest hope that a reasonable, just compromise could eventually prevail. The homelessness and suffering of the Palestinians had transformed them, propelling them to play a unique role on the world stage and giving them a voice within Arab politics. When Yasir Arafat appeared before the United Nations General Assembly in the fall of 1974, he did so as a protégé of world society. He was accorded the stature of a head of state. He symbolized the third world's quest for dignity, assertiveness, and justice. Even the Israeli establishment took note and—still then in the aftermath of the shock of the October 1973 war—openly began debating the serious issues involved in a real compromise with the Palestinian nationalists.

But virulent public opposition to the PLO increasingly became Israel's course, and the opposition heightened with the Likud's ascent to power. The basic issue was never the PLO as such, nor terrorism, for that matter. Rather, Israel had to decide whether to reopen the central questions of Palestinian nationalism and the basic historical debate over partition. And, except for a very marginal humanistic movement within Zionism, the answer in recent years has always been in the negative, even though liberal Zionists sometimes continue to masquerade as if they were in favor of partition in an attempt to assuage their own guilty consciences.<sup>8</sup> Sadly as well, at times terrorism, in one form or another, was the primary stimulus behind painful reappraisals that were attempted by some political factions in both Israel and the U.S. Whether renewed terrorism or some other form of struggle will serve to reopen the mutual recognition debate remains to be seen.

For the Arabs, meanwhile, behind-the-scenes intrigue continued, with constant maneuvering to make sure that neither Palestinian secularism nor democracy actually took root without Arab establishment control—in the West Bank or anywhere else. For if either of these potent forces were

actually unleashed in a free Palestine, what could the kings and potentates of Arabdom expect in their own realms?

King Hussein had hardly forgotten the lessons of his own civil war; nor was he about to share power honestly with a truly independent PLO. Public words did not indicate real policies; and Hussein, with Israel's acquiescence, kept as much control of those on the West Bank as he could, while carefully circumscribing Palestinian activity within his own kingdom.

Palestinian nationalism, in the eyes of those holding power throughout the Arab world, threatened to become a virulent cancer and had to be both used and controlled, a reality which partly explains why the Palestinians stood alone against the full might of Israel in the summer of 1982.

By that time, however, the die had been cast. The Palestinian revolution had been tamed into a movement begging for a small piece of Palestine. The PLO's leaders had been nurtured into the prevailing Arab state system and thus placed in competition with the other Arab power centers, most notably in Amman and Damascus, but also in Cairo and Riyadh. Moreover, the movement was itself to come to reflect the Arab state system—symbolized by the largely ceremonial and impotent Arab League—of which it had become a part. In turn, such developments led the PLO to incompetent representation, nepotism, corruption, and cult worship of the leader. Such a PLO was fit to take its place at the negotiating table and in the corridors of Arab power, but it was no longer fit actually to fight for Palestine.

The determined Zionists knew this all along, however much they chanted against terrorism and occasionally smiled at the notion of negotiations. The PLO had neither the might nor the political sophistication to achieve its new goal of a Palestinian state carved out of the occupied territories to exist alongside and in connection with both Israel and Jordan.

Meanwhile, Israel worked overtime and effectively to discredit any Arab initiatives which threatened to reopen the subject of a comprehensive peace and which might have gained significant world support—most recently the historic Arab summit agreement at Fez, Morocco in 1982. In Arab eyes, at least, the Fez summit finally offered Israel the peace and security it claimed to be seeking, but at the significant price of allowing fulfillment of Palestinian self-determination and return of Arab occupied territories—including East Jerusalem—to at least quasi-Palestinian sovereignty.

Coming in the wake of Israel's assault on Lebanon, Fez demonstrated the desperation and the impotence of the Arab establishment. Israel had not launched the Lebanese war to acquiesce in partition and mutual recognition; it had done so specifically to avoid that possibility.

*Witness to Another Defeat*

And so, by the mid-1980s, we are witness to what seems in all probability to be the second major defeat of Palestine—the collapse of mutual recognition as a Palestinian strategy for dealing with the reality of Israel, and the resurgence of Arab state actors—most importantly Jordan (with the help of Saudi Arabia) and Syria—in competition to control Palestinian politics and to check independent Palestinian political power. Indeed, by January 1986, King Hussein had finally taken the cautious step of sending to the Jordanian Parliament, in the words of the *New York Times*, “a new electoral law that reasserts Jordan’s responsibility for the Israeli-occupied West Bank and provides representation for Palestinian refugees in Jordan.”<sup>9</sup>

Yet it is precisely in this context where there is a convergence of at least short-term interests between the rightest elements in the Palestinian movement and the conservative Arab regimes—with Syria aloof from, but ever aware of, the equation. Both the Arab establishment and those still titularly leading the Palestinians know that the fading mutual recognition approach has been the only basis on which an agreement with Israel could be reached that could command substantial popular appeal and approval. If that vision is now lost, if the notion of an eventual sharing of historic Palestine and at least dignified access to Jerusalem is allowed to fade, the entire “moderate,” pro-Western political construct of the past decade crumbles, the internal Arab consensus that finally crystallized at the Fez summit shatters, the very nature of Arab accommodation to U.S. hegemony and Israeli might becomes even more suspect and discredited.

Consequently, the basic vision of mutual accommodation and peaceful coexistence is now being kept alive through American-sponsored, Israeli-nurtured, and Arab-promoted diplomatic artificial resuscitation. Meanwhile, these concepts themselves may well already have passed away as the result of developments on the ground in the occupied territories, internal political developments within Zionism,<sup>10</sup> and the strategies being pursued by both Jerusalem and Washington.

When today’s diplomatic chicanery loses all credibility and the realities of the future replace the dreams of the past, serious alternatives are sure to be sought more vigorously. Political fundamentalism will be elevated, the concept of armed struggle will be reborn, and the Soviet Union will look more inviting. Most importantly, leaders who can offer an alternative course will be embraced; those who cannot will be scorned.

Thus, in view of their pasts, the alliances they have created, and the class interests they have come to represent, neither Arafat nor Hussein has much of a choice in the immediate future but to exhaust every effort with the Americans and Israelis—however implausible to many of their followers—in an attempt to vindicate their increasingly hopeless course.

In such circumstances, negotiations in some form, though destined to be only theatrical, are far preferable for these leaders than an honest admission of a stalemate, i.e., failure. For in politics, as in love, hope does indeed spring eternal. So long as diplomatic efforts continue, those who have followed this course can continue to believe that if only the ball can be started rolling, it will develop a momentum of its own—even if the struggle is well understood to be an uphill one.

Yet today, especially in the psychological aftermath of Camp David, Lebanon, and Tunis, such logic increasingly lacks credibility and bears numerous signs of confusion, incompetence, and defeat. Nevertheless, in the eyes of those currently holding political power, the choices for Washington, Amman, Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Arafat's PLO may further deteriorate unless something is begun to buttress their sagging credibility—however theatrical, however unproductive such talks will be. For today's atmosphere of dejection and despair is increasingly dangerous to those in positions of authority. An image of progress with some imaginary hope, however feeble, is required to head off upheavals, coups, assassinations, or the taking of historically irrevocable decisions that would necessarily involve basic shifts in political course for many of the players.

It has all happened before, of course: governments, with Washington in the lead, choosing short-term diplomatic illusion over the far more difficult tackling of the basic issues. These basic issues can only be addressed by seeking that illusive, overall, comprehensive settlement so long debated by Middle East experts, journalists, and academics, . . . and now nearly moribund.<sup>11</sup>

Though now led by those far more attuned to public relations, the Israel of today cannot accommodate the Arab moderates—even though it could well be in their vital long-term interests to do so—except through theatrics and illusion. For it is in Israel's Labor party's interests, too, to keep a vision of settlement open as a method of deflecting potential American pressures, heading off further internal polarization, maintaining Jewish support in the diaspora for both Israel and Labor, and holding back the impending tidal waves of change which threaten Arab politics.

Even if one judges Peres, Rabin, and the Labor establishment to be sincerely interested in a real peace that would conform to minimum Arab

aspirations, i.e., to have undergone a metamorphosis as they have examined Israel's past and her anticipated future—and such a judgment admittedly requires quite a remarkable leap of faith—the realities of Israeli politics today make it nearly impossible to conceive of an actual agreement being reached by diplomatic means.

Indeed, Jewish civil war seems more likely than a settlement based on mutual recognition as that term has always been understood. Even “the Jordan option is really safe for Labor only as long as the Jordanians refuse to touch it,” is the conclusion reached in a recent, highly pro-Israeli analysis by Conor Cruise O'Brien. “Those who attribute [such] intent to Mr. Peres do not suppose that he would seriously persist with ‘territory for peace’—certainly not beyond Allon Plan limits—once he had attained his internal political purposes. . . . The reality is that Israel will stay on the West Bank, where its presence will continue to be challenged, from within and from without. . . . Neither the Jordanian option nor the Reagan Plan nor any variant of these has the capacity for coming to fruition.”<sup>12</sup>

Short of the kind of American-imposed settlement long publicly advocated by Nahum Goldmann<sup>13</sup> (and quietly whispered within Israel far away from American ears), Israel no longer has the ability to change course and accommodate Palestinian nationalism, even in its most moderate form.<sup>14</sup> Those who say otherwise have the burden of proof squarely on their own shoulders; and those who interpret some recently spoken words to mean otherwise have an obligation to point to real actions rather than rhetorical flourishes.

Negotiations, yes—probably on the horizon in one form or another as a means of soaking up dangerous disenchantment and frustration. Agreement, no—almost impossible short of an American decision to direct a settlement. Even given the new phraseology of Ronald Reagan's second-term administration, the record of American policies since his election speaks for itself:<sup>15</sup> the state of Washington thinking has improved only marginally since the days when the U.S. encouraged General Sharon to march on Beirut and then aggressively intervened in Lebanon to help Israel remold the Middle East.<sup>16</sup>

Whether the sheer act of beginning some form of negotiations can hold back the rage and dissatisfaction that has been building in the Arab world is difficult to predict. Suffice it to say that there is serious fear and escalating concern in Washington, Jerusalem, Cairo, Riyadh, and Amman; and the fear is such that the public presentation of the bleak situation has been increasingly sugar-coated and diplomatic circles are busy manufacturing multiple forms of camouflage to disguise political reality.



## II

*The Demise of “Mutual Recognition”*

It was out of the deeply traumatic embarrassment of the 1967 defeat, and while the Jewish world itself was being transformed into a Zionist-controlled monolith on matters relating to Israeli foreign policy,<sup>17</sup> that the roots of the original conflict re-emerged and the PLO, invigorated by new leadership, itself seized the reigns from those who had been humiliated by the might of the Israeli state. It was also out of the 1967 conflict—about which new evidence suggests direct American participation<sup>18</sup>—that the U.S. began the shift from a modicum of “evenhandedness” to what has become an all but *de jure* military alliance with the Jewish state.<sup>19</sup>

At first, the all-or-nothing aspects of the conflict predominated as the newly resurgent Palestinian movement substituted rhetorical bravado for actual power. But reality, however slowly, took hold and the contact between conqueror and vanquished in the occupied territories helped make the reality of a Jewish state understandable—however reluctantly acceptable—to many Palestinians, and hence to many Arabs.

It was the generation of the sons of those who had lost all of Palestine which now had grasped the leadership of the Palestinian national struggle in the guise of the PLO. The former generation—that with personal memories of Haifa, Jaffa, and the Galilee—could never bring itself to speak openly of compromise. Now it was the turn of the generation that came after, the generation that had watched and suffered. For them, accommodation was also painful, but not unthinkable: compromise would have been an achievement, not another defeat. Even now, when almost all seems lost, many of these Palestinian nationalists remain true to the course that put them at the mercy of American diplomacy and Israeli might. They still hope, after all that has happened, that somehow, in the end, the course which some call realism and others increasingly term “sellout” will prevail.

In the years following the “victorious” October 1973 war, it became progressively evident that the goal of the political elite within the Palestinian revolution had evolved from victory over Zionism to accommodation with Israel. Just as World Zionist Congress resolutions never precisely defined the borders of the new Jewish state, so too with the Palestinians. Nowhere, in so many words, did the idea of “peaceful coexistence” between Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have unambiguously quotable expression. And yet, at first secret meetings began between Jews and Arabs, and then between Israelis and

Palestinians, including members of the PLO. The concepts of mutual recognition and coexistence began to take hold.

Fortuitously, it seemed then, the territories occupied since the 1967 war had already conveniently defined a territorial reality for the birthplace of the new Palestine. In truth, the 1967 war had forced the Arabs to confront the reality that Israel might not crumble after all, and at best a part of Palestine might be redeemed. But for Israel, the stunning victory unleashed social, political, and messianic forces which by the 1980s had rendered the possibility of true accommodation with Palestinian nationalism almost unthinkable.

Tragically, newly flushed with power and territory, and increasingly frightened by the rising wealth, if not military power, of the Arab and Muslim worlds—a fear often manifested through heightened arrogance—Israel began to grow accustomed to its new status of hegemony. Moreover, the American connection became a source of growing intransigence as Israeli leaders found larger and larger amounts of economic and military aid being made available, and Washington began to expect Israel to take steps in the third world which America found difficult to take itself.

By the time of the arrival of the Reagan administration, the impotence and confusion of the Arab world and the growing power and assertiveness of the Israeli lobby in the U.S.<sup>20</sup> combined to make it possible for the U.S.-Israeli strategic alliance to become public, thereby further strengthening the hand of the Israeli hard-liners, who had all along rejected any compromise with Palestinian nationalism. The U.S. and Israel have interacted in recent years so as to enhance the imperialist, militarist, and anti-third world (including anti-Arab) factions in both countries. Even Israel's Labor party has submerged its pretensions toward international socialism and accommodated the rightest elements in the U.S. government and within American Jewry—as well as within Israel itself. “So extreme has become the rejectionist front in Israel that Peres is perceived as a moderate,”<sup>21</sup> noted one expert Washington analyst.

And yet, as the late 'Isam Sartawi once noted in an interview with *Le Monde*, “The Labor party is more dangerous for us than the Likud because the language and methods it uses are more acceptable to international public opinion. But asking us to choose between Begin and Peres is the same as asking whether we prefer to die by drowning or strangulation.”<sup>22</sup>

More recently, retired Israeli General Matti Peled, who once served on the Israeli Army General Staff, told this writer the following about Peres:

What he's doing is just unbelievable . . . He is formulating positions in a way

that is less obnoxious and many people fall for it, they think he really means it. [Yet] he's doing exactly what Begin did and I don't believe he has any other aim or goal. He has a different style. And he is willing to take a longer time to accomplish things. And so he is continuing the same traditional style of the Labor party. But he has absolutely none of the compromising attitudes which, say, were characteristic of Ben-Gurion. He is not going to compromise.<sup>23</sup>

While Arab and Palestinian intellectuals began to speak of the day "when the guns fall silent,"<sup>24</sup> Jewish youngsters were taught of the unyielding arrogance of the PLO Covenant, Arab duplicity and treachery, and the biblical rights of the Jewish people to Shechem (Nablus) and Hebron. A kind of reverse parallelism found the two protagonists moving away from each other even though war and historical circumstances had given them a possible way out of the deadlock.

The world at large also responded. There was a joint superpower-chaired international conference in December 1973 which ended the October war; and there was much talk of a "comprehensive settlement" which, as was widely understood then, had to include a Palestinian homeland in one form or another in the occupied territories.

By 1975 the American establishment had produced the Brookings Report, which rather clearly called for just such developments\*\* and which was to become the basis for the early policies of the Carter administration. Then the Europeans grew more forthcoming with encouraging attitudes and statements, culminating in the Venice Declaration in June 1980 which insisted that the PLO "will have to be associated with the negotiations."

With the advent of the Carter administration, there was hope indeed. The struggle for a reasonable, historic compromise escalated. The slogans "Palestinian homeland," "comprehensive peace," "mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO," were all in the open. There were superpower talks behind the scenes, leading to the 1 October 1977 Joint Statement. Most important of all, there was a commitment from the American president and secretary of state to an honest and real political settlement that tackled the root issues of the conflict.

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\*\* As summarized at the time, the Brookings Report contained the following recommendations:

- Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders with minor, mutually agreed modifications;
- Recognition of "the principle of Palestinian self-determination";
- Resolution, probably at a resumed Geneva Conference, of all outstanding issues, including Jerusalem, thus leading to peace between all of the parties;
- Implementation of the agreement in stages over a number of years;
- Arab recognition of Israel, conclusion of a peace treaty, and normalization of relations;
- Some arrangement for multilateral and bilateral guarantees for Israel's security, with the United States probably playing a unique role.<sup>25</sup>

But all that was soon to fade as the Zionist movement vehemently counterattacked, Soviet-American rapprochement degenerated after the Soviet Afghan adventure began, and the Arab world found itself uncertain, confused, leaderless, and unable to capitalize on its new wealth and leverage. Moreover, the American progressive liberals failed themselves, and the Carter presidency lost both momentum and credibility. The thirteen days at Camp David thus took on an aura of urgency within American politics far beyond the issues of the Middle East. In an effort to buttress his crumbling presidency, Jimmy Carter led Anwar Sadat (and all of us) into a Camp David from which we have yet to recover and for which Sadat was at first ostracized and then hardly mourned by his own people.<sup>26</sup>

In the aftermath of Camp David, the PLO's expulsion from Beirut, the American collapse vis-à-vis a Palestinian "homeland," and the Israeli assault on the PLO in Tunis symbolizing Israel's determination never to accommodate Palestinian nationalism, the vision of mutual recognition and any form of a two-state accommodation—including talk of a homeland associated with Jordan—has shrivelled nearly beyond recognition.

Today, the Palestinian revolution faces three choices—all bleak—in its second historic defeat: acquiescence, renewed struggle in an altered form, or the continuation of diplomatic illusion that only further delays the day of real decision. For with the dissolution of the mutual recognition option, the entire construct of the past decades' "moderate" diplomacy disintegrates; the very notion of a stable, peaceful coexistence evaporates.

As Palestinian scholar Dr. Hisham Sharabi wrote last year in an essay commissioned by, but not published in, *Harper's* magazine, it is ironic that "Israel's militant maximalist policy is a major factor fueling the fundamentalist movement and destabilizing the status quo throughout the Middle East.

"This is one main reason why the Arab elites seek, as a matter of self-preservation, to achieve political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict," wrote Professor Sharabi. "Indirectly, they stand to lose most from Israel's refusal to conclude peace."<sup>27</sup>

Another Palestinian scholar, Rashid Khalidi, who directly witnessed the siege of Beirut, has written specifically of the growing rift between the Palestinians and the Arab regimes who tenuously cling to power. "The focus of the PLO's bitterness was not Arab passivity but something worse; tacit complicity and even collaboration with the foes of the PLO," writes Khalidi.

In terms of the depth of heartfelt anger for their role in the war, those most

resented by the PLO and the Lebanese and Palestinian civilians besieged in West Beirut were not the Israelis, nor their American patrons, nor those Lebanese who supported them. They were rather the Arab regimes because of their universally perceived complicity in what was happening.<sup>28</sup>

For Sharabi the long-discussed two-state solution is “no longer possible.” He has gone on to prophesy that “in the new stage we are entering the Palestinians will probably be pushed off center stage, with the Palestine problem again becoming more and more the responsibility of the Arab states.” But what makes the situation so ominous, Sharabi correctly concludes, “what makes it so difficult . . . to entertain hope in the present context, is the structural character which the Arab-Israeli conflict has assumed in its new stage . . . As the conflict unfolds in this new phase, events seem to have a certain inexorable inevitability about them. Both sides look toward the future with the same sense of fatality.”<sup>29</sup>

One of the major themes of journalist Robin Wright’s new book, *Sacred Rage*, parallels Sharabi’s conclusion that the humiliation continually inflicted by Israel on the Palestinians and the entire Arab world is fueling a major radicalization of Arab societies.<sup>30</sup>

As for responsibility for today’s predicament, there is much to share. The PLO’s own incompetence as a political organization has to be noted, however much it chose the course of compromise. But, of course, Israeli intransigence has also been substantially to blame, as has American shortsightedness and duplicity, Egypt’s mistaken course, and the impotence of the progressive and liberal forces in the West, especially in the U.S.

### *Uneasy Alliance: Jordan and the PLO*

This second defeat of Palestine is not only the result of American policies, unyielding Zionist colonialism, and growing Israeli military superiority. After years of hesitation in the hope of focusing attention elsewhere, King Hussein and his entourage who now rule Jordan—which includes some Palestinian officials in the Jordanian government, who have chosen allegiance to the Hashemite throne rather than the PLO—have decided to put more of their cards on the table.

The Jordan-PLO relationship has always been an entangled and multifaceted one. King Hussein spent 1985 attempting an alignment with the most accommodating of the Palestinian nationalist leaders, but it was always an uneasy alliance at best. While a long-lasting Hashemite-Palestinian relationship could have, and may still result, also possible is

renewed Hashemite-Palestinian conflict. Memories of just a decade and a half ago remain vivid on both sides.

Admittedly, Hussein's choices have all been difficult ones, and he has substantial achievements to his credit during his lengthy reign. Jordan is being viciously squeezed by American promises and Israeli threats, not unlike what tragically befell Anwar al-Sadat.† American aid and intelligence assistance—and most important of all, American willingness to continue to support Hashemite power—may be in the balance, causing Hussein often to fall in line with Washington's demands. Israel's Tunis attack reverberated most loudly in Amman, where serious concern over the course of Israeli politics is more and more evident, as is the counter-reaction in heightened Islamic and fundamentalist feelings. Congressional refusal to consider further major arms sales to Jordan has made the astute Jordanians quite aware of the limited extent of American backing for Hussein.

An independent Palestinian democracy on his border could prove a most serious political threat to King Hussein's authoritarian ways—far more dangerous to Hussein's rule in Jordan than to Israel. This, of course, explains Hussein's attempts in 1974 to prevent the passage of the Rabat resolution, proclaiming the PLO the sole representative of the Palestinians, and his behind-the-scenes opposition to Palestinian self-determination, even on the West Bank.

Further right-wing evolution in Israeli politics may result in an Israeli-induced plot to “encourage” a Palestinian takeover in Amman—indeed a noted Israeli writer has publicly predicted just such a possibility.‡ If accomplished, of course, then the Jewish state would attempt to manipulate the new regime's politics as it has unsuccessfully tried to do in Lebanon and rather more successfully in the occupied territories. Indeed, Hussein's maneuvering is probably inspired more by fear of Ariel Sharon than of Yasir

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†To quote a Pakistani scholar's awareness of the parallels here: “The Americans and the Israelis successfully isolated him [Sadat] from the Arab world and then deserted him. Now the same kind of demands are being made on King Hussein and Yasir Arafat. . . Why should the Americans be trusted this time when they cannot get the Israelis to stop building settlements or even to agree to the principle of withdrawal for peace?”<sup>31</sup>

‡The senior correspondent of Israel's prestigious newspaper *Ha'aretz* has predicted the following: “We are now in ‘the Sharon era’. . . It is only a matter of time, and perhaps not too much of that, before Ariel Sharon takes over Herut, a party which evidently cannot function unless it is headed by a leader who is part demigod, part windbag. . . Knowing as we do that Sharon has never failed to do what he said he would do (please clip and save this passage), we know that Sharon will lead the country into a new war, this time against Jordan, in order to realize his old dream of establishing a Palestinian state in that land.”<sup>32</sup>

Arafat—hence Hussein’s willingness to deal so intimately with the Israeli Labor party, at such risk to himself.<sup>33</sup>

Meanwhile, failure to show sufficient deference to Washington may result in serious cutbacks in aid, arms, and political support for the Hashemite throne. Most important of all, Hussein needs American “insurance” against the day when those in Israel who continue to see Israel’s salvation in a Palestinian state on the East Bank may attempt to implement their long-dreamed-about scheme. It is not forgotten in Amman that the emblem of the Herut party, which is at the heart of the Likud coalition, is a map of both Palestine and Transjordan and its slogan is “Both sides of the Jordan.”

Yet, dancing to American tunes too openly could result in a Palestinian uprising—either spontaneous or one nurtured by Syria, or even Iran. At this point—even after King Hussein’s 19 February 1986 speech abrogating the 11 February 1985 agreement with the PLO—both Arafat and Hussein still very much need each other. But theirs remains an embrace face-to-face, each carefully on guard against the other.

Whatever the calculus behind Hussein’s shifts and maneuvers, it is more and more evident that the Israelis and the Americans have joined forces in an attempt to pry the Jordanians and the Palestinians apart and to set them potentially in opposition to each other.

It was telling that on the very day last fall when Israel attacked PLO headquarters outside Tunis, Hussein simply followed his preplanned script. He went up to Capitol Hill, read the slogans about direct negotiations with Israel (which the Jewish lobby had previously written into legislation in order to force Hussein’s hands if he wanted congressional approval for his new arms package), and quietly departed. Apparently hoping not to antagonize his congressional benefactors or the White House, by sticking to his prepared text Hussein simply continued his attempts to reinforce his American connection, insufficiently appreciative of the larger reality that it is Syria’s Asad who has earned the true respect and fear of Washington with a tough, no-nonsense attitude and a strategy of military buildup. Yet in the end, of course, the American military package was unceremoniously withdrawn in January under intense Israeli pressure, leaving the King humiliated and more insecure than ever.

With a growing entourage of well-paid American public relations agents, Hussein has obviously concluded that he must play the diplomatic game by American and Israeli rules, largely for fear of what may transpire if he does not and even though doing so earns him whispers of hatred and pledges of possible harm.

Of course the way in which Hussein abrogated his newest year-long temporary alliance with Yasir Arafat was marked by an assault on the PLO for inconsistency and for its refusal to accept American terms. While there is little doubt that the beleaguered PLO does indeed continue to have gross failings, for Hussein to abandon Arafat as he did was interpreted by some Palestinians as but a further sign of Hashemite inconsistency and double-dealing.

By ending his 1985 initiative as he did—and without equal time devoted to American failings and Israeli duplicity—the King let the Americans off the hook and played into Israeli hands once again. He may have also brought another Hashemite-Palestinian confrontation that much closer.

It was in 1984 that Hussein unleashed a torrent of remorseful commentary about American failings in a front-page *New York Times* interview that raised eyebrows throughout the world. His candor then about American responsibility for the diplomatic mess in the Middle East and Israel's relentless determination to deny even true autonomy to the Palestinians won the King some measure of support. But this time, in focusing solely on the PLO, Hussein attempted to upstage and discredit the only leader the Palestinians have and the one many of them think they cannot do without. And he did so in a way that allowed Washington to cover up the Reagan administration's serious blunders, while supporting Israel's clever attempts to bury the PLO once and for all.

Hussein's waffling is, of course, the result of the increasing pressures being heaped on him to conform to American dictates and Israeli Labor party designs, as well as the ever-lurking shadow of Ariel Sharon. The King has been searching for an avenue of escape and a policy of hope for some time. But in so doing, he seems instead to be drawing the noose around his own neck ever more tightly while giving even his supporters the impression that he is simply twisting in the political wind in desperate fear of a future that seems likely to be even more dangerous than the present.

### III

#### *What Arafat Should Do and Why*

The litmus test of Israeli sincerity today is willingness to hold negotiations with Palestinian nationalists, i.e., with the PLO, and to discuss a comprehensive peace. That is why the question of the PLO at the negotiating table has taken on such a life of its own. And that is why the



terms “partition” and “comprehensive peace” remain so powerful, and so controversial.

Yet, whatever the public rhetoric of Peres, Israel has in fact chosen another course and continues to constantly evade all opportunities to approach such negotiations honestly and forthrightly. Thus, within the Arab world, there is considerable opposition to the idea of Israeli-Jordanian negotiations, or even Israeli-Jordanian/Palestinian talks, while there is considerable support for the policy of the Arabs standing their ground, willing to conclude a comprehensive peace but unwilling to allow themselves to be further manipulated and deceived.

While the Arab leadership remains insecure and wavering, both intellectual and popular opinion within the Arab countries seem to appreciate that united, the Arabs may eventually stand a chance of achieving an honorable settlement with Israel, but divided, they are sure to continue to be outmaneuvered, forever unable to resurrect the dying formulas of mutual recognition, territory for peace, and all the UN resolutions, including 242.

Indeed, it is Israel’s liberal moderates who are today growing desperate for some kind of negotiations to reinforce their own sagging credibility and to keep Shimon Peres in power. Otherwise, they face a future in which it becomes Israel’s destiny to be ruled by the right-wing demagogues within their midst—including the likelihood that Sharon and Kahane will attain power. In such a future, it will also be Israel’s destiny to subjugate perpetually, or be forced to expel, the Palestinian population.

For the true moderates on both sides, there is simply no diplomatic replacement for these dying formulas, all of which center on “mutual recognition” and territorial partition. There is only today’s diplomatic smoke screen and further Israeli and American manipulation toward what is rightly perceived as a likely Camp David II.

The Arabs, and the PLO in particular, are well aware that they must find a new course that evades both. Truly progressive Jews and Israelis should seek to do the same. Otherwise, the honestly moderate position is sure to collapse further, and deceptive, unstable political arrangements are likely to be concluded.

The future course of the struggle for Palestine should now become the focus of an open, wide-ranging debate for all Palestinians and for Jews who have come to appreciate that only by reaching a just compromise with the Palestinian people can there be real security, as well as moral vindication, for Israel. Outside powers have not only proven unable to resolve the

conflict, but they have usually contributed to its continuation and often switched horses when self-interest dictated.

Today, Israel's economic and psychological situation, as well as its international standing, make possible long-term strategies that may not previously have been foreseen. Palestinian options go beyond acquiescence and capitulation to today's conditions. If a reasonable historic compromise cannot be achieved now with the contemporary balance of power and with the current outlook in the U.S. and Israel, then ways of altering today's realities need to be discussed and new plans formulated.

But there is yet a major preliminary step whose time has definitely come. The PLO of Yasir Arafat, the PLO which has for so long, but also so inadequately, championed the mutual recognition approach, has an obligation to itself and to history to clarify fully its position. Most of all it has an obligation to the people it has led, to the cause it has served, to the memory of so many who have suffered and died.

Though the PLO of Yasir Arafat has taken significant steps and made important gestures<sup>34</sup> (and has done so under exceedingly difficult conditions), it has at the same time seriously failed to elucidate for world public opinion—especially for public opinion in the United States and Israel—that peaceful coexistence in the context of mutual recognition has become its real, though minimal, goal. Moreover, the movement has seriously failed to offer thoughtful analyses of the benefits to be derived by both Israel and the U.S., as well as by the Palestinian people and by the Arab states of the region, from such a historic compromise. Political success requires a careful marshalling of available resources and arguments, and an ability to use incentives and disincentives so as to maximize support for one's own goals. This the PLO has not managed to do with sufficient boldness, clarity, stamina, or shrewdness.

Though the PLO has achieved significant accomplishments in the past, many of its current representatives have proven to be either incompetent or corrupt, and the organization as a whole has shown itself grossly incapable of handling the all-important public relations aspects of contemporary international diplomacy.

Constantly outmaneuvered both politically and in the press, the PLO has failed to build a large, committed, and active constituency of supporters beyond the Palestinians themselves. Moreover, it has confused and alienated many who are sympathetic and who have wanted to be supportive.

For all of his talents in working within the Palestinian and Arab contexts, Yasir Arafat has been a public relations bonanza for Israel among Western audiences. Thus, to be fully candid, he has been a public relations

disaster for his people. His style, manners, and language have made it very difficult for his message to be conveyed effectively. And he has refused to enlist the assistance of those Palestinians who have the capabilities he lacks. Moreover, in recent years, Arafat has presided over the very disunity and internal conflict of which he has warned and for fear of which he formerly justified his political ambiguity.

Admittedly, in defeat there is a scattering of former supporters and competition to align with other factions. Yet the defeat in this case is as much a product of faulty PLO (and Arab) diplomacy as the cause of the organization's fracturing.

Consequently, the historic responsibility to clarify today's situation before finally having to admit failure and acknowledge the need to reconsider totally the future course of the Palestinian struggle falls to this man who has led the PLO for nearly a generation.

If there is in Israel a willingness to go beyond Machiavellian posturing and enter into a negotiating process that may still offer a way out of future conflict—however skeptical many analysts, including this writer, may be—then it is now up to Yasir Arafat to put Israel to this ultimate test.

Arafat should do so not in opposition to any other Arab state but on his own, on behalf of the Palestinian people in and outside of Palestine, and not as a subordinate of Jordan. The great error of the 11 February 1985 agreement with Jordan was not in coming together to acknowledge the ties between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples, nor in suggesting the possibility of linking the new Palestinian state to Jordan in some way if this would make things more possible for the Israelis. The great mistake of that agreement was in enhancing the confusion of the diplomatic situation so that Israel and the U.S. could further exploit the differences between the Jordanians and Palestinians.

The 11 February agreement only led to further discord within Palestinian ranks; unending debate over "kosherized" Palestinians to join a Jordanian delegation; fumbling over meetings between a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and American and British officials; and finally, King Hussein's unilateral abrogation. It would have been far preferable for Jordan and the PLO together to have held their heads high, specified their willingness to negotiate directly with Israel (with formal recognition to be the end result of a successful negotiating process), and insisted that each party be the sole determinant of its own representatives and positions.

To have allowed itself to stumble into the confusion that resulted from the 11 February agreement is only a further sign of the confused state of

today's PLO and its susceptibility to manipulation by other parties with their own motives.

What is needed today from the Palestinian side is a clear strategy toward an understandable goal and public relations clarity. This needs to be coupled with an appreciation that there are times when politics is more theater than substance, more manipulation for starting position than actual engagement at a negotiating table. Moreover, the competition is not simply between the PLO and Israel; it is also between the PLO and the various Arab state authorities, including, of course, His Majesty King Hussein.

What is needed is a Yasir Arafat willing to come before the world—the Security Council of the United Nations is a ready and desirable forum—to offer in precise, clear terms an historic settlement based on mutual recognition, mutual security, and a carefully phased process of implementation. If at all possible, this should be done in coordination with both Jordan and Syria so that it is firmly understood that no single party will break ranks and accommodate Israel's desire further to divide the Arab side. Whatever the personal and political divisions that separate Yasir Arafat and Hafiz al-Asad, Syria must be included since it has been a party to the conflict for many decades and has a legitimate claim both to its occupied territory as well as the future political constellation of the region. But if unity is impossible, Palestinian initiative is far preferable now to Palestinian impotence and confusion.

Of course, the real culprits in this overall situation are Israel and the United States. As Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi noted in October 1985 after Israel's Tunis bombing, "The Israelis could not have failed to calculate that this action would liquidate the Jordanian-Palestinian peace initiative. . . Let's face it. The moderate Palestinians stretched out their hand and had a bomb placed in it."<sup>35</sup> With King Hussein's 19 February 1986 statement, the Israelis have gotten their way once again—an outcome the U.S. worked hard to accomplish.

So of course it is the U.S. and Israel, the two real rejectionists when it comes to a comprehensive and just Middle East peace, who should be contemplating new attitudes and policies, and it is they whom history should primarily fault for having blocked, so far, an honorable peace. In the short term it may seem that Israel has succeeded in its quest for regional dominance, territorial expansion, and Palestinian subjugation, and that U.S. interests have been furthered by encouraging Israel on that course.

Yet, however much the real responsibility is theirs, these two parties have made their choices and neither shows serious signs of any basic re-evaluation. They will have to live with the consequences, which in the

long run could prove most difficult, and potentially disastrous. It is the U.S. and Israel who have created today's deadlock and who perpetuate the conflict. Together, it is they who are determined to negate Palestinian nationalism, to keep the Arab world divided and insecure, and to maintain Israeli hegemony throughout the region. In time, history will accurately record this period. But for now, it is the imperialists, the colonialists, and the militarists who also dominate the presentations of the issues of our day—at least in the West, and especially in the U.S.

Consequently, and admittedly unfairly, it is the weakest party in the equation, the PLO, upon which the difficult burdens of clarity, honesty, and statesmanship now fall. There is considerable power in justly presenting one's case and marshalling world public opinion. And there is respect for those who know how to pursue their cause with dignity and skillful diplomacy.

A clear and unambiguous position, one that is thoughtfully and properly represented throughout the world, is what Yasir Arafat owes himself, and all of us. He is on a cliff with a parachute admittedly packed by partners who waver between ensuring his survival and doing him in. Yet it is time for him to jump. History demands the test. The ominous possibilities of the future require a final determination whether there could have been another course than what the future now seems to hold.



1. In John Norton Moore, (ed.), *The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Volume III, Documents* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), 313.
2. *The Road To Bi-National Independence for Palestine, Memorandum of the Hashomer Hatzair Worker's Party of Palestine* (Tel Aviv: August 1947), 76.
3. Judah L. Magnes, *Addresses by the Chancellor of the Hebrew University* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1936), 62.
4. Joan Peters, *From Time Immemorial* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984).
5. Alan Hart, *Arafat—Terrorist or Peacemaker?* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984), 465–66. Hart's book is, in the view of this writer, the single most important book to appear about Arafat and the peace process in many years. It deserves extremely careful reading.
6. See Elmore Jackson, *Middle East Mission* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983).
7. See Isma'il Fahmi, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). See also Mark A. Bruzonsky, "Sadat's Tragic Mistake—An interview with Isma'il Fahmi, Egypt's Former Foreign Minister," *Worldview* (Sep-

- tember 1979).
8. A good example is Leon Wieseltier, whose article appeared in the *New Republic* (11 November 1985): 16, 25: "The principle of partition," Wieseltier admits, "is still the only just and practical basis for a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians." Yet Wieseltier joins the popular bandwagon in denouncing the PLO and concludes that it is "the Arabs, in short, [who] have made Israeli liberalism seem refuted by reality."
  9. "West Bank Is Linked to Jordan Voting Plan," *New York Times*, 26 January 1986, 7.
  10. Thomas Friedman, "No Illusions: Israel Reassesses Its Chances for Peace," *New York Times Magazine*, 26 January 1986. Friedman's article, which appeared after this article was originally written, offers an insightful analysis of the changes that have occurred within Israel. In it he quotes former Jerusalem Deputy Major Meron Benvenisti saying that "American diplomats are like men speaking Latin. They have no understanding of the real emotions and attachments that have developed here. They prefer to use this old antiseptic, clinical diplomatic jargon when the reality is polluted and messy. They are so much in need of a convalescence from Begin and Sharon that they want to believe that Peres is a good guy and we can go back to the good old days of territorial compromises. They are totally divorced from reality."
  11. *New York Times*, 31 January 1986, 3. The imperative of a comprehensive settlement was articulated recently by a ranking Syrian who helped negotiate the 1974 Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement. "If there is no general settlement," stated Major General 'Adnan Tayara, "we will wait for 10 years, 100 years, forever, to liberate our territory."
  12. Conor Cruise O'Brien, *Atlantic Monthly*, October 1985.
  13. Nahum Goldmann was a unique Zionist statesman who died in 1983. While in the U.S. at the time of Israel's founding, he worked behind-the-scenes to delay Ben-Gurion's announcement of the state in hopes of reaching a last moment accord with the Arabs. He later served as president of both the World Zionist Organization and the World Jewish Congress, maintaining close contact with senior PLO officials throughout. During the 1970s, Goldmann began publicly advocating an imposed solution that would require both the Arabs and Israel to acquiesce in a solution based on mutual recognition. These views were usually expressed in private, as Goldmann had access to leading public officials throughout the world, though his views were widely debated, and often condemned, within Zionist circles. For a general representation of his publicly expressed views see "The Time for Peace," *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Winter 1975); and "The Psychology of Middle East Peace," *Foreign Affairs* (October 1975).
  14. Friedman, "No Illusions: Israel Reassesses Its Chances for Peace," 34. This is the central theme of Friedman's article. He concludes that the possibility of partitioning the territory west of the Jordan between the two nationalisms ended some time ago when basic changes took place within Israeli society. He concludes that, "The only peace process with a future is one in which peoples on both sides can be convinced, educated or cajoled to take their eyes off the map for a moment and to take a few small steps toward each other. It is also the only approach that can create options which now seem unavailable."
  15. See Juliana S. Peck, *The Reagan Administration and the Palestinian Question, The First Thousand Days* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984).
  16. See Mark A. Bruzonsky, "An Atmosphere of Despair and Defeat: Speaking Truth First to Ourselves, Then to Power," *Israel & Palestine* (April/May 1985): 6.
  17. For background about how Zionism became dominant in the U.S. against considerable opposition see Melvin I. Urofsky, *American Zionism From Herzl to the Holocaust* (New York: Anchor Books, 1976). See also Alfred Lilienthal, *The Zionist Connection II—What Price Peace?* (New Jersey: North American, 1982).
  18. See Mark A. Bruzonsky, "American-Israeli Aggression Documented: U.S. Pilots Aided Israel in '67 war," *Jerusalem Star Weekly*, 16 February 1984; see also Mark A. Bruzonsky,

- "Confessions of a Spy," *Middle East International* (23 March 1984).
19. For background on these developments see George Ball, "America's Waning Moral Authority," *American-Arab Affairs* (Spring 1985); and George Ball, *Error and Betrayal in Lebanon* (Washington, D.C.: Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1984). See also Stephen Green, *Taking Sides: The Secret History of American Relations with a Militant Israel* (New York: William Morrow, 1983).
  20. The most important book published in recent years on this subject is Paul Findley's, *They Dare to Speak Out* (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill, 1984). See also Mohamed El-Khawas and Samir Abed-Rabbo, *American Aid to Israel: Nature and Impact* (Vermont: Amana Books, 1984).
  21. Donald Neff, "A Very Narrow Window of Opportunity," *American-Arab Affairs* (Spring 1985): 41.
  22. *Le Monde*, 6 February 1981.
  23. Interview with Matti Peled, American Colony Hotel in Jerusalem, 26 December 1985.
  24. This was the theme of a conference held in Tel Aviv in November 1977 by *New Outlook* magazine and attended by people from throughout the world committed to the mutual recognition approach. The theme was taken from the book of the same title published in 1974 by Egyptian intellectual Mohamed Sid Ahmed.
  25. From Mark A. Bruzonsky (ed.), *The Middle East—U.S. Policy, Israel, Oil and the Arabs* 3rd edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1977), 91. For further discussion of the unique importance of the Brookings Report and the insuperable obstacles associated with the Jordanian option, see Mark A. Bruzonsky, "America's Palestinian Predicament," *International Security* (Harvard-MIT: Spring 1981), 93–110.
  26. The most penetrating analysis of the Camp David meeting and aftermath has been published only in Arabic in a book by Sadat's friend of over forty years and foreign minister who resigned on the final day of Camp David, Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel. An interview in English with Kamel by this author was featured in *The Middle East Journal* (Winter 1984): 85–98. See also Zahid Mahmood, "Sadat and Camp David Reappraised," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 57 (Autumn 1985).
  27. Hisham Sharabi, unpublished paper commissioned by *Harper's* magazine, 1984.
  28. Rashid Khalidi, *Under Siege: PLO Decisionmaking During the 1982 War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
  29. Sharabi, *op. cit.*
  30. *Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam*, (New York: Linden Press/Simon & Schuster, 1985).
  31. Mahmood, 85.
  32. *Ha'Aretz*, 4 April 1984.
  33. There is even one school of political thought that sees one possible Israeli goal being to so induce Hussein into separate talks with Israel that he is assassinated or overthrown, leading to a Palestinian takeover in Amman and the assertion by Israel that with Palestinian rule in the three-quarters of mandate Palestine on the East Bank of the Jordan River, the Palestinians have their state. Should such a development occur the Israelis might then persuasively argue, in many circles at least, that since reaching a peaceful accord with moderate Arab leaders has proved impossible, it is no longer reasonable for Israel to be pushed to give up more territory, especially when the Palestinians now have their own state in what was Jordan.
  34. Alan Hart's book is the single best source of detailed information on Arafat's peacemaking attempts.
  35. Quoted in *Time* magazine (14 October 1985): 43.