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Arabs combine efforts for un

AMMAN (Agencies) — His Majesty King Hussein bade farewell to Prince Abdullah Bin Abdul-Aziz, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince, First Deputy Premier and National Command Commander, upon his departure from Amman on Wednesday.

Prince Abdullah, on a two-day visit to Jordan, conducted talks with the King. His Royal Highness Crown Prince Hassan and Jordanian officials on recent developments in the Arab arena and the possibility of achieving Arab solidarity, the Jordan News Agency reported.

Prince Hassan, Prime Minister Mudar Badran and other court government officials accompanied the party.

Prince Abdullah was winding up visits to four Arab capitals in an attempt to smooth over sharp differences on the Palestinian commando mutiny and the Lebanese-Israeli troop withdrawal accord.

Official sources here said his talks with King Hussein focused on pending Arab problems in general and specifically included strained relations between Syria and more moderate Arab states.

Before coming to Jordan Prince Abdullah visited Libya, Syria and Iraq to talk to their leaders about convening an Arab summit in the near future.

Syria and Libya have rejected the US-sponsored withdrawal agreement. Syria has refused to withdraw its estimated 50,000 sol-



King Hussein and his party bid farewell to Prince Abdullah on Wednesday (Petra photo)

diers from northern and eastern Lebanon until Israel withdraws its estimated 28,000 troops from southern Lebanon.

'Secret negotiations'

The Kuwait News Agency (Kuna) reported from Washington that the Lebanese government had allegedly begun "secret negotiations" with Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on troop withdrawals from the Bekaa Valley.

Kuna said the report, carried on NBC Television programme, was attributed to unnamed sources in Washington. No further details were available.

In Washington, Lebanese Foreign Minister Elie Hossain said in a meeting on Wednesday with President Ronald Reagan that the United States is working with the Soviet Union on a plan for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.

Mr. Salem gave no details, but he said, "after a deal with Syrian President Hafez Assad will drop his opposition to an agreement with Israel and order a pullout once he is given full guarantees.

Meanwhile in Kuwait, the newspaper "Al-Naba" reported on Wednesday that Washington has offered to introduce modifications to the US-Middle East peace proposals to join the peace process with Israel.

The US proposals, issued last September by President Carter, envisage self-government for the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in association with Jordan, in return for the cessation of hostilities with Israel.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), however, rejected the Reagan Initiative as unacceptable and insufficient, citing a number of Arab governments to talk the United States into accepting some parts of the proposals.

The PLO wanted an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza with Arab Jerusalem as its capital.

Mutiny still going strong, Fateh dissidents insist

AMMAN (AP) — Mutinous Palestinian commandos on Wednesday denied claims by Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat that their rebellion had been thwarted.

Arafat told reporters in New Delhi on Tuesday that Libyan Leader Col. Moammar Qadhafi was "trying to interfere in our internal affairs" by supporting the rebels, but that the situation is under control now.

In spite of Arafat trying to declare he has everything under control nothing is finished, as you

Revelations on Kissinger sold out before printing

Editor's note: Seymour Hersh's new book on US foreign policy during the Vietnam War and the involvement of Henry Kissinger in the manipulation of this policy has become a fierce controversy in the United States even before the book's publication. The book Hersh talks about how Nixon and Kissinger undermined the 1948 UN Resolution 242 on the Middle East question.

The book also accuses Mr. Morarji Desai, former prime minister of India, of acting as a CIA agent who was paid \$20,000 a year. Commenting on this

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Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat that their rebellion had been thwarted.

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"trying to interfere in our internal affairs" by supporting the rebels, but that the situation is
r control now.

In spite of Arafat trying to declare he has everything under control nothing is finished, as you
see," said the spokesman for the rebels, Jihad Saleh, in his Damascus office.

aleh claimed that in fact, the rebellion against Mr. Arafat and other Fateh leaders was
ing. But he denied that the rebels were demanding that Mr. Arafat be replaced as PLO
rman and head of Fateh, the largest faction in the PLO.

aleh said the rebellion was mainly over what was seen as a drift by Mr. Arafat away from the
ical programme adopted in 1980 by Fateh's Congress, and a willingness to negotiate with the
t. The rebels are calling for, among other things, a complete end to any negotiations and a flat
sal to accept the troop withdrawal agreement between Israel and Lebanon, declaring the PLO
ld stay in north and east Lebanon.

aleh said that they were seeking a new Fateh congress that would reject Mr. Arafat's
erate politics, as well as any negotiated settlement of the Palestinian question. He added that,
e the two sides were in contact indirectly through other factions of the PLO, there would be no
ct negotiations on ending the rebellion until Mr. Arafat endorsed their programme.

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fierce controversies in the United States even before the book's publication. In his
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UN Resolution 242 on the Middle East question.

The book also accuses Mr. Morarji Desai, former prime minister of India, of
acting as a CIA agent who was paid \$20,000 a year. Commenting on this to AP Mr.
Desai said "anybody who said this must be mad." The book, published by Summit
Books, will appear in US markets on 13 June.

Star special reporter MARK A. BRUZONSKY filed the following report on the
book's explosive revelations.

WASHINGTON — Pre-release publicity over
Seymour Hersh's startling journalistic tour de
force about the manoeuvres of Henry Kissinger
in the Nixon White House is beginning to cause a
ripple of headlines in this country.

Eleven days before the book's release in this
country both The New York Times and The
Washington Post on 2 June carried major stories
about the book and its many revelations about the
Kissinger-Nixon era in American foreign policy.

In the following days Hersh himself has ap-
peared on numerous television programmes:
sometimes being directly challenged by still-loyal
Kissinger aides such as Lawrence Eagleburger,
currently the under secretary of state for political
affairs.

On ABC's popular "Nightline" Hersh, Eagle-
burger and Winston Lord, another former Kiss-
inger aide who is currently president of The
Council on Foreign Relations, bitterly discussed
the book's validity and conclusions. And on the
NBC Evening News the same night a major story
was broadcast about Hersh, the book, and the
controversy it has created.

Kissinger: Hersh is "slimy liar"

Meanwhile, Kissinger himself in a highly un-
usual comment, has termed Hersh a "slimy liar",
even though in a number of important cases per-
sons interviewed by Hersh have come forward to
support the book's credibility.

Interest in Kissinger here remains extraordi-
narily high — which explains why a major pub-
lishing house was willing to invest hundreds of
thousands of dollars to allow prize-winning in-
vestigate reporter Hersh to spend three and a half
years digging into the Kissinger saga of power and
deceit.

Titled The Price of Power: Kissinger in the
Nixon White House, Hersh's 699 page volume is



Mark Bruzonsky

meticulously documented. It is the result of over
1000 painstaking interviews and countless hours
of intense research.

During the past year, two cover stories in the
Atlantic Magazine were devoted to early publica-
tion of parts of this highly unusual journalistic
feat. The Book-of-the-Month Club has designated
the book an alternate selection even prior to its
publication. First printing in hard-cover is sch-
eduled for 100,000 and it appears orders are so
large that another printing is already being or-
dered. Very few books are accorded such treat-
ment.

In short, Hersh's massive expose is a rare do-
cumentary about the inner workings of the Am-
erican political system as it formulates and exe-
cutes American foreign policy — which so often
is hostage to domestic politics, misinformation

Continued on page 13

Now ... !!
Full Coverage of
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Old airport to take flights

AMMAN (Star) — The old Amman International Airport
will remain in service for flights to Egypt, the Transport
Ministry has decided. A report in Ad-Dustour daily new-
spaper said that the decision had been made after the transfer
of all flights to the newly opened Queen Alia International
Airport had created too much pressure on the new terminal.

The old Amman airport had been supposed to close to
civil aviation on 26 May, when the new airport opened. It is
now receiving Alia and Egypt Air flights to Cairo. Ad-
Dustour also reported that the authorities were considering let-
ting it be used again by Middle East Airlines for flights to
Beirut, and for the Aqaba and Damascus routes.

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Book on US foreign policy creates controversy

Continued from page 32

about world affairs, and personal lust for power and glory.

There were numerous moments during their first years in power when Nixon and Kissinger turned aside nearly all considerations other than what seem in Hersh's retrospective to be narrow personal or political motives. Kissinger's undermining of Secretary of State Rogers' Mid East plan and his "tilt" toward Pakistan allowing the regime of Yahya Khan to brutalize what was then East Pakistan are prime examples.

Nixon ordered Pentagon: Bomb Palestinians

But probably the harshest revelation in relation to American Mid East policy in Hersh's investigation is the Nixon-Kissinger decision, probably taken on 8 September 1970, to use planes from the American Sixth Fleet to "destroy the Fedayeen."

It was on 6 September that the PFLP hijacked a Swiss and two American passenger planes and took them to an airport 30 miles outside of Amman. Three days later a British airliner was seized. With the PFLP threatening to destroy the planes and kill the over 500 passengers unless all PLO members held in Swiss, German, British and Israel jails were freed, the situation was the centre of world attention.

As Hersh reports, "The hijackings did more than jangle nerves in Washington. Nixon, deciding that the time had come to destroy the Fedayeen, ordered American Navy planes from the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean to bomb the guerrillas' hideaways. The strike was meant to be purely punitive, a warning blow. Nixon's goal was not to save the American hostages, but to demonstrate America's willingness to challenge the PLO."

In attempting to ascertain Kissinger's exact role in this unprecedented decision to use American aircraft to attack Palestinian targets, Hersh writes, "There is no evidence that Kissinger raised any objections to the order, which the president himself verbally gave to Laird (then secretary of defence)."

But Laird did. "We had bad weather for 48



Nixon wanted to destroy the Fedayeen



Kissinger: Hersh is a slimy liar



As Hersh reconstructs the events and thinking of those days, "Nixon and Kissinger totally misread the situation, and the showdown they expected never took place. But if it had begun, and if China had decided to intervene on the side of West Pakistan, as Nixon and Kissinger convinced themselves it would, the United States has ready to do battle allied to China and against the Soviet Union."

This entire episode brought out the very "worst" of the Nixon-Kissinger White House. "The basic Nixon-Kissinger goal," writes Hersh, "was, of course, to protect the prospective opening to China, but there were other factors.

Nixon hated Prime Minister Gandhi and viewed her as a deceitful 'bitch,' a view that Henry Kissinger was careful to emulate. Nixon had visited New Delhi on his private tour around the world, and had been treated there with little ceremony, to his everlasting dissatisfaction. He remembered best a dinner with a leading Indian politician who was a vegetarian and did not drink. In Pakistan, however, it had gone much better. Yahya Khan, with his patrician manner and his military background, knew how to throw a party with plenty of scotch.

Decision to risk great power conflict

Indira Gandhi had visited Washington in early November determined to warn the White House that war between India and Pakistan was becoming inevitable if Yahya Khan did not stop his genocide in East Pakistan. But both Nixon and Kissinger seemed unwilling to accept Gandhi's approach or assessment: and even went out of their way to insult her by keeping her waiting 45-minutes before their scheduled meeting.

Pakistan attacked eight Indian airfields on 3 December and it took India but 2 weeks to defeat Yahya Khan's beleaguered army. But it was during these two weeks that the Nixon White House took the decision to risk a major great power conflict, according to Hersh's account.

"The most critical step took place at a White House meeting on 12 December, when Richard Nixon decided to risk war with the Soviet Union to salvage his policy. 'It was symptomatic of the internal relationships of the Nixon administration,"

role in this unprecedented decision to use American aircraft to attack Palestinian targets, Hersh writes, "There is no evidence that Kissinger raised any objections to the order, which the president himself verbally gave to Laird (then secretary of defence)."

But Laird did. "We had bad weather for 48 hours," Laird recalled years later, with a grin. "The secretary of defence can always find a reason not to do something. There's always bad weather."

When asked what the president hoped to accomplish with the bombings, Laird told Hersh. "He probably wanted to show the Russians that, by God, they couldn't tell what he might do."

Though Laird was reluctant to discuss the incident in full detail, Hersh did find out that in a conversation with a former government official soon after the Nixon order Laird had expressed "shock at the presidential order and at Kissinger's role in urging its execution."

"As the official remembers the conversation," Hersh continues, Laird said, "Conducting an air operation would have been incredibly dumb," and he explained that he had been forced to move quickly to prevent the White House from going around his office to that of Admiral Moorer (then chairman of the joint chiefs of staff), who would have been only too willing to do what the president and Kissinger wanted.

"Laird telephoned Moorer and said, according to Hersh's carefully reconstructed account: 'Tom, I've gotten this order... we're just going to have terrible weather out there for the next 48 hours.' Laird managed to stall for days, although Kissinger telephoned to find out why it was not carried out. The White House seemed to accept the explanation of bad weather, and eventually rescinded the order. Nixon had changed his mind."

Though neither Nixon nor Kissinger ever revealed the order to bomb the Fedayeen in their own memoirs, Hersh did discover that Kissinger once described the incident to at least one of his senior associates, depicting it solely as an example of Nixon's irrationality and not mentioning his own role in encouraging the president.

Mel Laird has continued to refuse to give further details about the incident, joking that "if I'm going to be insubordinate on a direct order, I'm not going to tell anybody about it."

What would have happened to the 500 plus hostages had planes from the Sixth Fleet attacked Palestinian bases is of course unknown. After the



Khan held the key to Nixon's re-election

attack order was rescinded the US continued to refuse to negotiate with the Fedayeen. Instead steps were taken to threaten a military rescue operation. A carrier task force in the Mediterranean was ordered to deploy off the coast of Lebanon and some army units in Europe were placed on "semi-alert."

Plans were leaked to the American press from the Pentagon that American paratroopers might be airlifted into the Middle East. These plans, Hersh speculates, might have caused the Palestinians to take the decision to destroy the aircraft on the ground on 12 September while shifting the hostages to a hideaway.

Prize-winning investigative journalist

The author of this unique and probably unprecedented investigation of American foreign policy-making as it really occurred, Seymour Hersh, first came to national prominence more than a decade ago when as a New York Times reporter he exposed the My Lai massacre. The story of how American troops slaughtered hundreds of Vietnamese civilians shocked and angered large segments of the American public and contributed to support for the then expanding peace movement.

Hersh is the only four-time winner of the George Polk Award for his reporting on international affairs.

Widely respected for his integrity and journalistic determination to seek out the truth, Hersh has provided insights into both the man Henry Kissinger and the system of American foreign policy-making rarely before achieved.

More than a 'tilt' toward Pakistan

In his 20-page chapter on "The India-Pakistan War", Hersh insists that support for Pakistan was determined almost solely on cold war and geopolitical grounds, though Nixon did have a personal hatred for Indira Gandhi.



Desai: A CIA informer?

"For Nixon and Kissinger, there was no issue," Hersh concludes. "Yahya Khan held the key to Nixon's re-election: Their conduit to the Chinese would not be challenged."

Even when twenty American assigned to the consulate in Dacca cabled the state department in a highly unusual mass formal dissent from official policy, neither Kissinger nor Nixon reconsidered.

"Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy," the cable from Dacca read. "Our government has failed to denounce atrocities... while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the (West Pakistan) government... private Americans have expressed disgust. We, as professional public servants, express our dissent with current policy and fervently hope that our true and lasting interests here can be defined and our policies redirected in order to salvage our nation's position as a moral leader of the free world."

The response of the White House was to transfer out of Dacca the top American official, Archer Blood, and to ridicule the American ambassador in India who had also cabled that the US should "promptly, publicly and prominently deplore this brutality... it is most important these actions be taken now, prior to inevitable and imminent emergence of horrible truths."

According to the thoroughly documented Hersh account, Nixon and Kissinger were prepared to risk war together with China against the Soviet Union. "There was an appalling ignorance in the White House of the realities of South Asia... it was a series of misjudgements."

White House actions and attitudes lead, according to Hersh, "to a disastrous war with India, the end of Yahya Khan's regime, and the emergence of an independent Bangladesh led by the Awami League." But in the process, there was also a decision by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger to risk world war in a South Asia showdown with the Soviet Union.

House meeting on 12 December, when Richard Nixon decided to risk war with the Soviet Union to salvage his policy. "It was symptomatic of the internal relationships of the Nixon administration," wrote Kissinger.... "that neither the secretary of state nor of defence... attended this crucial meeting, where, as it turned out, the first decision to risk war in the triangular Soviet-Chinese-American relationship was taken."

Hersh adds that both Nixon and Kissinger have subsequently written that they left that meeting convinced that a great power struggle might take place. Dressing up what was in effect his own decision in the mantle of patriotism and presidential mystique, Kissinger wrote in his memoirs, "History's assessment of Nixon, whatever its conclusions, must not overlook his courage and patriotism in making such a decision, at risk to his immediate political interest, to preserve the world balance of power for the ultimate safety of all free people."

But according to Hersh, "Kissinger stated it incorrectly. Nixon was willing to risk world war for his immediate political interest: For the safety of his 1972 summit in Peking," which, Hersh adds, Nixon saw as his ticket to another term in the White House.

Rare brand of Journalism

There might be a tendency, especially among foreign analysts, to discount such journalistic investigations and evaluations of the processes and personalities behind the making and conduct of American foreign policy.

But Seymour Hersh's book is far more than a causal or sensationalist study. Hersh is one of the rare breed of American investigative journalists who have the capacity and the reputation to take on such a challenging assignment.

He must be forgiven if at times his analytical assessments seem to go somewhat beyond the factual information he presents. After spending more than 3 years on this single effort, coupled with his working for The New York Times during much of the period in question, Hersh's effort deserves serious thought and careful reading. In all likelihood, Hersh's version of what really happened and why is probably closer to the truth than the combined efforts of Nixon and Kissinger in their memoirs to dominate how we evaluate what happened during those tumultuous years.