

# Looking Closely at the Saudi Principles

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American interest in the Saudi eight-point "peace plan" goes far beyond current politics, the Camp David arrangements or considerations of oil supply and petrodollar power. Much that the Saudis have suggested is compatible with long-standing American policy. Indeed, this is one of the major reasons the Saudi principles were essentially tabled at the short-lived Fez summit.

The following comparison of the eight points in the Saudi "plan" with United Nations Resolution 242, the Rogers Plan, and the Brookings Report, clearly shows these historical linkages.

Resolution 242, of course, represented the international consensus in the aftermath of the Six-Day War and has remained a central theme in U.S. policy ever since. The Rogers Plan was outlined in a speech by Secretary of State William Rogers on 9 December 1969 and remains one of the few concise enunciations of overall U.S. policy for the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And the Brookings Report of 1976 remains the most important bi-partisan statement of U.S. interests and aspirations in the Middle East. A number of prominent American Jews who were later to be associated with both the Carter and now the Reagan Administrations participated in the study group from which the Brookings Report emerged.

SAUDI PLAN	RESOLUTION 242	ROGERS PLAN	BROOKINGS REPORT
1. Israeli evacuation of all Arab territories seized during the 1967 war, including the Arab sector of Jerusalem	<p>"Inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war."</p> <p>"Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied."</p>	<p>"The Security Council resolution endorses the principle of non-acquisition of territory by war and calls for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war. We support this part of the resolution, including withdrawal."</p> <p>"We believe that while recognizable political boundaries must be established and agreed upon by the parties, any changes in the pre-existing lines should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to substantial alterations required for mutual security."</p>	<p>"Israel undertakes to withdraw in agreed stages to the June 5, 1967 lines with only such modifications as are mutually accepted."</p> <p>"... each national group within the city should have substantial political autonomy within the area where it predominates."</p>
2. Dismantling the settlements set up by Israel on the occupied lands after the 1967 war.	(no settlements at time of resolution)	(few settlements in 1969 and they were not recognized to be major problem since policy was to call for return to approximately 1967 lines)	(With expectation of Palestinian self-determination and creation of some form of Palestinian entity in West Bank and Gaza, implication settlements to be removed or minimized)
3. Guaranteeing freedom of religious practice for all religions in the Jerusalem Holy Shrine	(Agreed in all plans and by Israel)		
4. Asserting the rights of the Palestinian people and compensating those Palestinians who do not wish to return to their homeland.	"Just settlements of the refugee problem"	<p>"There can be no lasting peace without a just settlement of the problem of those Palestinians whom the wars of 1948 and 1967 have made homeless. We believe its just settlement must take into account the desires and aspirations of the refugees and the legitimate concerns of the governments in the area."</p>	<p>"The Palestinians for the most part believe that they have a right to self-determination. For a peace settlement to be viable, indeed for it even to be negotiated and concluded, this right will have to be recognized in principle and, as part of the settlement, given satisfaction in practice."</p> <p>"Moreover, a peace settlement should include provision for the resettlement of those Palestinian refugees desiring to return to whatever new Palestinian entity is created, for reasonable compensation for property losses for Arab refugees from Israel and for Jews formerly resident in Arab states, and for sufficient economic assistance to the state or entity in which Palestinian self-determination is realized, from its neighbors and from the international community, to enable it to survive and to develop."</p>
5. Commencing a transitional period in the West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip under United Nations supervision for a duration not exceeding a few months.	(No timetable discussed)	<p>"It is our hope that agreement on the key issues of peace, security, withdrawal, and territory will create a climate in which these questions of refugees and of Jerusalem, as well as other aspects of the conflict, can be resolved as part of the overall settlement."</p>	<p>"Withdrawal to agreed borders and the establishment of peaceful relations carried out in stages over a period of years, each stage being undertaken only when the agreed provisions of the previous stage have been faithfully implemented."</p>

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6. Setting up a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital	"Just settlements of the refugee problem."	"We believe its just settlement must take into account the desires and aspirations of the refugees and the legitimate concerns of the governments in the area."	"There should be provision for Palestinian self-determination, subject to Palestinian acceptance of the sovereignty and integrity of Israel with agreed boundaries. This might take the form either of an independent Palestinian state accepting the obligations and commitments of the peace agreements or of a Palestinian entity voluntarily federated with Jordan but exercising extensive political autonomy."
7. Affirming the right of all countries of the region to live in peace.	"Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force."	"We support Israel's security and the security of the Arab states as well."	"The Arab parties undertake not only to end such hostile actions against Israel as armed incursions, blockades, boycotts, and propaganda attacks, but also to give evidence of progress toward the development of normal international and regional political and economic relations."
8. Guaranteeing the implementation of these principles by the United Nations or some of its member states.	"For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones."	(refers to Res. 242)	"It would be desirable that the UN Security Council endorse the peace agreements and take whatever other actions to support them the agreements provide. In addition, there may be need for unilateral or multilateral guarantees to some or all of the parties, substantial economic aid, and military assistance pending the adoption of agreed arms control measures."

Israeli attempts to prevent the Saudi plan from achieving either American or European endorsement are consistent with long-standing Israeli efforts which have sought to discredit both the Rogers Plan and the Brookings Report and to interpret Resolution 242 not to mean withdrawal to approximately the 1967 borders. Only the vehemence and vituperation of the Begin government's efforts are new, and this style may yet prove counterproductive.

The proper course for the United States at this point in time is to allow the Sinai aspect of the Camp David arrangement to reach its conclusion in April, to restrain Israel from taking any provocative actions in Lebanon, to

encourage the moderate Arab states to achieve at a future Arab summit a flexible Arab consensus based on the Saudi plan, and to work with our European allies to enlist their support for the next steps in the Middle East peace process.

Of course there will be expressions of reluctance from some quarters and threats from others. But steady, determined and bold American efforts at this point in time could well lay the necessary foundation for a major American peace offensive in mid-1982. This would be the most fitting tribute to Anwar Sadat. And it would be a clear sign that the Reagan Administration had come into its own pursuing the national interests of the United States.

