TALKS resume at Camp David today between Cyrus Vance, U.S. Secretary of State, Mustafa Khalil, Egyptian Prime Minister, to whom the portfolio of fore gn affairs was recently added, and Moshe Dayan, the

of overcoming the obstacles to the signing of the The three men will consider new possibilities draft Egyptian-Israeli treaty Israeli Foreign Minister.

It does not take a seer to predict that the talks adaptability and lack of real understanding of will fail because of Israeli intransigence, lack of the Egyptian situation.

Whereas Egypt appears to want a settlement,

Let us begin with the settlement falks as they brael appears to want surrender

started. The initiative came from President Sadat when he paid a surprise visit to Jerusalem November 1977 and addressed the Israeli Knesset, stressing that Egypt wanted an overall peace which would mean an opportunity to improve both its and Israel's economies which were subordinated to arms purchases and military preparations.

He said he was not making a surrender to "A just, honourable peace for all parties concerned including a Palestine nationhood is what we should all aim at." Sadat said.

Israel but asking for peace from a point of strength and self-confidence.

ers and other members agreed. Talks were to be held in Genesa under the co-chairmanship of the U.S. and Russia. Sadat believed that the ball of the provisions of the UN Security Council's What Sadat wanted was an exact application took talks with Israel and with full American resolutions 242 and 338 to which the superpowwas in the American court and that if he underparticipation, a settlement could be achieved.

The U.S. was responsive to this new turn of summit talks at Camp David which culminated policy and the result was the Carter-Sadat-Begin

in the signing of two instruments, the Camp

To the Arab world the accords were unacceptable because they did not achieve full justice for the Palestinians or settle the status of Jerusalem.

Egypt, however, found them acceptable. The previous Egyptian defence treaties with other present problem is that Israel inserted a clause which gave the Israel treaty precedence over all Arab states.

cannot totally leave the Arab fold nor can it look forward repudiate its commitments to the Arab collection had thing. This was asking the impossible because Egypt

talks have collapsed and it is on this point that they will collapse again. Secondly, Israel retuces to fix a timetable for elections and self-rule of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza although it agreed to this in the Camp David It is on this clause of the proposed treaty that

Accords.
With President Carrer apparently Jacking the stalemate is the best even the most fervent sup-porters of this always-suspect settlement can look forward to. As things stand, that might be until after the next elections in America -will to face up to Menachem Begin

WASHINGTON: American muscle withers in the face of Israeli stubborness

When Carter's

U.S. Defence Secretary Harold Brown's recent swing through the Mid-east came at a time of greatly heightened American anxiety about both the political and the military situation in the

serious reappraisals in Washington about the international balance of power and long-term American interests throughout the Mid-east. Brown's trip was just the beginning in a concerted American attempt to reassure friends and caution foes in that part of the world.

Beyond Iran, a new uneasiness over Turkey can be detected in Washing-ton. "Fear of what is happening in fovernment," Ambassador L. Dean own, President of Washington's Mid-cast Institute, indicated in a Turkey is shaking many people in the

ernment as well. There is much a ware-ness in the State Department of the whiteminal risks involved in the tepa-rate peace strategy decided on air the White House key than a year ago and consummated at Camp David Issu Sep-Of course the Arab-Israeli problem continues to worry the American gov

agreements now appear to be highly questionable, even though new talks are wheduled to begin swin between Camp David framework Eyptian Prime Minister Musiapha

progress in litrachi-Egyptian bilateral relations, there is wiscoprised anniety among Mid-east experts in the U.S. Even if there should be further both in and out of government, that to threaten the U.S. sentere Mid-cast Arab lyrach conflict will conti-Settlemen!

on the Camp David approach, largely off any other option. There is simply no absence the property of is likely to be supported by fation continues to gamille nearly Congress, the press and public spita because domestic resisters has des-Nevertheless the Carter

heavily invested in the Camp David "Process" no one on the Presidents Mid-east team seems willing to som-And with Carter's credibility to

Iran's withdrawal from the American strategic picture has occasioned Bruzonsky what remains analyses the of America's shambles of Mark strategy

began to cave

... the first

grand design

ever, senior adviser to the President, when, asked him a few days ago if the U.S. was prepared to pick up from a pivisable failure of the Camp David government officials working on the Acting under the new orders, how-We have no other options, Camp David is going to work and the Preuapproach and try wimething clic, the reaction was immediate and blunt dent diesn t want to hear from the skeptics and detractors because he i Mid-cast vitualing

hera continuely statisted by Prime Minister Begin every time the American can government has attempted to live dent's newest gag restrictions, a high-tanking specialist desting with the Mid-east jandicased much the represente But the work before, at the State Department, and before the Press monte att String prepareutin 4

INACH Problem

dear and determined outries in dealing In this situation, Brown's revent And he sund was one of Anghalism Hop in Saudi Arabia was seen as necessary tugive assurances of America administration to fullish and despair over the mability with the lunch government

Since October, American muscle to when the newly re-elected President will have the strength and the political Sophistication to fulful the promises he continues to make to the Arabi about Brookings Report type comprehenwe willement of the entire Arab.

around total intransgence has with cred. And at this point it weems highly directionable whether (aster will ever agish I'd Sickfu at sigressory in tacing down Begin derivation for the size of Ruide the Camp David princess boldly The messapable results is that since coming to office Carter has been hastly and reversely bythest in his striggets.

And state Camp David, Carlor has

'Disintegration'

Another example of Carter inep-titude came in December when the President attempted to partray location as responsible for allowing the

be a full partner in the negotiations.

up to its promise to President Sadat to definitions of the Camp David process has reduced his credibility with all

menti kinding hope to any possibility. have some kind of entertainment, the fixactis were serious about the otherwise he fans will thow bottles all Palestinian autonomy idea. — disap-...over the field. It all gives an illusion of something Roing on and of movement," Brown down to Begin

exhibited toward

added. But what everybody is really waiting for is the second half to begin." L'alixtunately this may ned be perceible ntil 1981 when the White House may again, with Carter or without him, have enough freedom from internal dimentic publical prevaules to son-front the Arab lataets predament Meterudy once again

pen until 1981 because of Carter's extremely weak positional position, the delay "could be disastrous" he feels Though Ambaseador Brown con-

margnal shifts in treaty language. Car-ter has in deversions let down his freede in Jordan and Saude Arsha Unable to admit the failure of most of his grand design for an Arab-livael. ons while having largely yielded in short-term practice to the Israeli goal overall lack of confidence and ingly muttered around Washington the reverse side of the coin from the peace, Carter is, apparently, still pur of playing the political and public opinion game in the same league with Israel of putting off the real names while how mystical "process" -- the partal little Carter has to show for his comudwould never have ke uself be cornered "spinelessness" (to use a term increas these days) of the Carter administra tion in dealing with Israel has become to do now But a sharp, determined, self-confudent Mid-east team capable breaking Egypt off from the dispute expected in a last dakh offers to force both Jordan and Saudi Arahia sate the Process to he actual But when present to juvily their hopes they do no large to negative by salang. "Well, what else may be right that there's not much clic But if cems a rather holion hough Of course, having allowed the wrus sumg his original policies with fartion to deteriorate to this posse the Rivadh and Amman over support Strong pressures can still Camp David like this

time he backed

officials continue

ness, and it seemstather dealers that

Carter would actually take steps of 1' S - Saudi relations no matter h

if anything to other at this point, few feally expect this tasts, to sourced and the moderate. As an leaders to save Carter now from the deserved on seven

both in and out of government, that the Arab-Israeli conflict wil continue to threaten the UN's entire Mid-east prehensive settlement can be strategy until a much more com-

Recurse them yields that had had been often open. There is saught for the handward had because no other policy, honever had needed to be the had needed to b Congress, the press and public opia on the Camp David approach, largely Nevertheless, the Carter administ-tion continues to gamble nearly all

front the President with the gnawing doubts that exist throughout the Department of State and the academic community over the wisdom of adherng to the separate peace approach. And with Carter's credibility so heavily invested in the Camp David "proxess" no one on the President's Mid east team seems willing to son-LOBKS

intended to be strictly secret meetings with top State Department and National Security Council officials, the nalists ccase President demanded that even off-the-record conversations with jourranks in early February in what were nalists, the White House has taken a Faced with cautious expression of doubts now meetings symbolised an and then to jour-

admission by Carter that he had not even been successful in consuming his own top people about his policies. Furthermore, the leaking of the meet-ing and of the substance of what the complete allegiance of some of the top that the President does not have the President had to stay was dear proof

unhkely

"We have no other options, Camp David is going to work and the Presi-dent doesn't want to hear from the

skeptics and detractors because he's But the week before, at the State

dent's newest gag restrictions, a high ranking specialist dealing with the Department, and before the Presi-Camp David agreements

and despart over the inability of the Carter administration to follow a with the Iwach government dear and determined course in dealing In this situation, Brown's recent And he some was one of syspanion

countries over the Camp David "prostop in Saudi Arabia was seen as necessars to give assurances of Americal sullingness to respect the difference that have arisen between the two ceu" to settling the Arab-Israeli con-All this seems especially true in the

the Kingdom. Church's call for a "fundamental reasfor the Camp David collapse and wake of Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Frank Church's sessment" of American relations with and

new Arab-Israeli impasse increasingly American initiatives to break the Not only are the top rungs of the Carter administration wedded to the Camp David "process" and thus but 1980 Presidential politics makes shifts in their Arab-Israeli strategy: unlikely to make important policy

further assurances. But Washington is going into one of its cyclical holding patterns and the task is going to be to convince the Arabi to wait until 1981 There will be rhetoric There will be

Camp David," one top government official laments. "That's where every-"Any self-respecting President should have slugged it out with the Israelis on the settlement issues after

thing began to unravel."

Not only did the promised letterexchange detailing Israel's commit-

sophistication to fulfill the promises he a Brookings Report-type comprehencontinues to make to the Arabs about when the newly re-elected President will have the strength and the political

sive willement of the entire Arab. The incoapable reality is that since

entity control of the second and the second

up to its promise to Prevident Sadat to can government has attempted to live And plane Shing Boold, Shrive has been continually slapped by Frime Minister Begin every time the Ameri-

definitions of the Camp David process has reduced his credibility with all also with many of his own administra Sadat's reluctance to go forward) and Carter's compliance with Israeli 7 parties (including Egypt

Department, confides. White House undercuts the State continual crisis," nent official, aware of how often "Just having Carter as President is a one State Depart-5

State Department attempts to make deties of how the Mid-east game is played between competing domestic the Camp David "process" instance of the White House undersures has resulted in instance after mining what little coherency exists in political forces and international presfig-leaf for a separate Egyptian-The confrontation in September and Carter's insensitivity to the subeli deal more than

Camp David was probably Carter's most serious failure of will since the October, for instance, over what kind of moratorium on occupied West Bank settlements had been agreed upon at 1977 U.S.-USSR

Withered

ment to halt settlements for at least five years not appear, but the moratorium itself — which was the only aspect of the framework agree-

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Peared Palestinian autonomy idea -- disapments lending hope to any possibility the Israelis were serious about the

ing down Begin during his litel term as gan birasie id act aggressively in tacered. And at this point it seems highly questionable whether Carter will ever guide the Camp David process holdly around brack intranssponce has with

with there won the a second term

.Disintegration

December 17th signing deadline to pass. No matter how objectively cor-President attempted to partray larger his understanding of the situation with rect Carter was, his sense of timing and public opinion were miserable.

ingly one-sided and wavering was par-

(about our ability to stand up to Car-ter) after the way the American press entersed Carter's attempt to blane the impuse on us" is the way one thereof official has put it — an illustra-ters of official has put it — an illustraand outlast this bunch of "White ingly weak." edded, President Carter is "embarras general sense, Stevenson recently Adlai Stevenson's phrase. And in a House bush leaguers, to use Senator the Israelis added self-confidence that tion of how Carter has actually given

Carter's actions in December were actually described by one State since Camp David. committed by the Carter White House reviewing the multitude of errors childish contest with Begin." "Genius Department official as a "disgustingly ifestation," the official concluded after and insanity are close to the same man-

Ambassador Dean Brown offered a rather interesting comment on the curof the Carter Administration, former rent situation when interviewed early In another highly critical aversment

time at the Super Bow. ous negotiations of Khalil and Dayan were likened by Brown to "the half-The trips of Atherion and the vari-You have to

Another example of Carter in titude came in December when

The resultant campaign by Israel to portray Carter as emotional, increas-

"Don't think we are not optimistic

do. "The Arabs may be compelled to

of everyone " re-evaluation of the errors of its ways. "Supported on the one hand by both the moderate and hardline states." only economic and political pressures will bring about a serious American "King Hussein might be the one" who Brown adds. they'd scare the hell out Arabs have reluctantly concluded that will finally have to tell Carter that the

Carter is currently viewed as the worst Meanwhile, Israeli officials seem to be in widespread agreement with Yosel Goell when he wrote in the Ierusaliem Part on December 22 "Mr.

Since October, American muscle to

Though Ambassador Brown con-curs with the view that little may hap-pen until 1981 because of Carter's Though Ambassador

tion" in U.S.-Arab relations he naited in the interview, which will be pub-lished won in full in the Saudi Gazette delay "could be disastrous" he feels There could be a "serious divintegra-The moderate Araba states might

our sources that Kennedy's going to knock him off. And we know where Kennedy stands on this saue! One desk-level State Department official working on Mid-east affairs sadly concludes that the only way for say." according to Brown, "What the heck is this" First of all, is Carter going to make it? We hear from every one of

an all-encompassing Arab-Israeli cet-tlement would be tough action by the obsession and the need to get on with to seriously rethink its Camp David the Arabs to get the U.S. government

president

injure us so much economically and politically so as to compel us to do what we've been saying we want to

And, Ambassador Brown

Confrontation

over the held otherwise the fans will throw bottles all have some kind of entertainment.

again, with Carter or without him, have enough freedom from intened diamental publical pressures to con-front the Arab laraeti prediminancint going on and of movement. Brown added. I had what everything we really waiting for rathe econolidation begin to into to a pick the some and to be gin. until I 4x1 when the White House may

With Israel hanging tough, hoping for a Teddy Kennedy or a Frank does the issue of a target date for

Richardson of the National Associasamply unable to afford the risks of a major confrontation with the Jewish state and her American supporters. Church in the White House, Carrer is tion of Arab Americans (NAAA) months go by "The gravity field of the and this will become even truer as the 1980 Presidential election will now

result in a larger measure of Arab wil-lingness (based on firm American mined to attempt to push Israel into some kind of posture which might And even if Carter became deter

Carter can be expected to get the

weight igainst VII Leven behind the Senate at best doubtful, the administ ration will not want to encourage become the White House's priorit Should the Araclelobby throwits

It all gives an illusion of something



proportions on his agenda of foreign and domestic issues and in the pos-sibilitythal he will, after, be a one-term is any hope in regard to Mr Carter, it bes in the possibility of the Arab-srach dispute assuming marginal

boms as large in Israeli thinking as tions in the West Bank Gaza "November 19k0, the date of the

assurances of both the direction and likely outcome of negotiations) to participate in a gradual overall peace pro-

cess. Carter's track record in dealing

even with many government officials so miserable that he lacks credibility

working on the Mid-east problem with Israel and with American Jewry is

Recently for instance. Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders spoke in New York before the Council of U.S. Mid cast policy on Foreign Relations and as one parsaid all the right things but he didn't in the meeting recalls, Hall

SALT has no

the reverse side of the coin from the (amp David Rivadh and Amman over support for toughness now exhibited toward

Part of the inaccapable logar same much hand encourages and urges or 1.5. Saudi relations no matter hos permanentiv damage (5 Jordanian Carter would actually take steps to new and it werns rather dealers. That But it seems a rather history toug!

really expect this tasts, to succeed and the moderate. Arab leaders to save Carter now from the deserved image of ineffectuality as Sadat saved him in if anything to offer at this point beavy-handedness with the minderate Araba But unce the White House has bitte

Begin government would even seri-ously consider a true, overall peace process whose price would inevitably cernable reasons at this point who he to allow the Palestinians to evolve Stated bluntly, there are less

Lacking the earlier threat of Ameri-can sanctions from a vigorous and unchastened. Presidents, domestic braeli politics, lack of United Arab tence all argue for no brach acquies cence beyond verbal activities in going beyond a separate peace deal strength and White House incompe politically

Incapable

with Egypt

David formulations, Israel has carefully prevented any seeds from sprout While the seeds of an evolution

Only a determined and sophisti-cated White House that was both wiling and able to play tough domestic lesired direction against relentless

srach counter-efforts

roughing up everyone else sensitivities while at the same time it is incapable of worthing Egyptian anxious to nudge f gypt into the treats. the Begin government is defin-White House Furthermore. hinks this is a description of the Carter And hardly anyone in Washington

Brookings Report-type comprehen-All this is not to say the situation is hopeless from the point of siew of moderates on all sides who want to see

be better expended on preparing the climate for what might become possible in 1981 when new political windows in time may open. operative skills. Efforts might instead ment which lacks both leader-hip and on a hopeless Carter and on an mettectial State Depart coming two years should not be wasted It is to say that all efforts for the

when that they cannot mount Demoractic incimination but may have tray an image of competence dent who will be takking part to pe when that they cannot mount unlike attack on a discounted free will probable de aconfect the Republic The reluctant conclusion to

natived and a project base built with and many lew

'Systematic torture? Naturally, there's not a word of truth in it."

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