

## We Want the Israelis to Understand Us

*An interview with Ashraf Ghorbal conducted by Mark Bruzonsky, Worldview associate editor, on the eve of Israel's recent election.*

**It's quite clear that during the last few years Egypt has decided that its major foreign policy initiatives would be made with the United States and that you are attempting to solidify your relationship with the U.S. and expecting certain things from us. I would appreciate it if you could be specific about these expectations: economic aid, military aid, and most especially the political initiatives you are expecting from the U.S. in the next year or two.**

To start with I think we have reason to rejoice that at least the state of polarization has ended and that the U.S. and Egypt have become much closer. An ambassador is always lucky when he has a visit from his head of state once during his tenure. I have been lucky in having, so far, two. And you notice I say "so far." I still hope to continue here in Washington for more years and to help President Sadat also continue his visits to the U.S. We definitely look forward to a visit by President Carter, who has received an invitation from the president.

We also face and know the realities. As has been said by President Sadat, the U.S. has 99 per cent of the cards in its hands. The relationship that the U.S. has with Israel is a unique relationship, a special one. You provide Israel with all kinds of support—political, military, economic, moral. And thus it is very essential that we have close relations with you if we are to convince you of the soundness of our thesis, of our point of view. We expect that you will claim equally a major role in convincing the Israelis of that soundness.

We are not naive in the sense that we do not believe that you are going to side with us against Israel. That is not in the cards, nor is it our intention. But we understand, and we expect, that the weight of our arguments, convincing as they should be, should be carried forward by the U.S. toward Israel. Then your weight will be felt. The Israelis understand the equation well. Fine, that's exactly what we want if we are going to make peace with each other, which is our intention. We want the Israelis to understand us, as we are trying our best to understand them and to co-live. Unfortunately, we still find in the Israelis the philosophies of gain; territory speaks louder than anything else to their mind. We do not believe it is

the case. I think that the U.S. believes it is not the case. And thus we expect that you, the U.S., will deploy your own efforts with Israel, your weight with Israel. Go make her understand.

Economically, again, as we come closer together, we have been grateful for the level of assistance that the U.S. has been giving us. We would like it maintained for a number of years, until we are out of the jungle of economic difficulties that we are in. Our Arab colleagues, brothers, have been helping us tidy our short-term debt situation. You have given us some assistance there. We expect that you will keep the level of assistance of \$1 billion, as it is now, for at least three or four more years.

Militarily, again we are realistic. We're realistic in the sense that we do not expect that you go overboard vis-à-vis the past. But we would expect that you would start to build up a relationship based on the trust and confidence that is developing. We can't have trust and confidence on one side and lack of confidence on another side—trust and confidence in that the peace is really our intention.

We are ready to do it. We have made a lot of compromises in order to achieve it. And lack of trust—saying that if we give you x, y, and z, you'll turn around and use it on Israel—it just doesn't fit with the equation. But we understand that there we have a psychological problem. We bear with that psychological problem. We try to convince you. And I believe that the time has come for all of us, we who are in the area, you who are outside the area but deeply involved in the area, to get rid of these psychological barriers, these complexes, and get into a more sound relationship.

We have not been receiving any assistance from the Soviet Union. Yes, we have been trying to get it from other sources. But you are a primary source. If you are going to play, as you tend and as you must play, a very effective role, politically and economically, you must also help militarily.

**There's the question of expectations. When King Hussein was here a couple of weeks ago, he stated quite clearly that those Arab leaders who were leading public opinion to think that there would be major progress this year were playing with fire. Many of us think he was addressing President Sadat, who has**

publicly indicated a great deal of optimism, saying that much can be expected from the U.S. Do you share the worry that your expectations of what is possible from the U.S. could backfire in the sense that public opinion in Egypt could turn against Sadat if he can't deliver?

Well, each one of us has his own constituency, and you must deliver to your own constituency the promises you make, the expectations you have and they have. It is an obligation that each leader has to his country, wherever he is. I think King Hussein appeared kind of gloomy because of what he saw as Israeli intransigence. I talked with King Hussein and he said, "Look at what comes out from Israel. It just doesn't give an indication that these people understand the lesson, understand the realities, are willing to really go to peace and make the gamble to peace as we are all willing—with excellent odds for both of us."

The Israelis, unfortunately, are trying to bank on the unknown—that maybe somehow, somewhere, something will change that would render the situation different, and thus they can hold onto the territory forever. That is what we call gambling, gambling on the unknown, on the negative, while you have the ingredients here to make the peace in a positive, effective manner and with chances that have never been as good as today. King Hussein, I think, toward the end of his visit here was more optimistic than when he came. I think the result of his talks with President Carter and with the secretary of state and congressional leaders gave him better hopes.

**Let me ask the same question in a somewhat different way. An Egyptian journalist recently told me that President Sadat's optimism, almost an excessive amount of optimism, was mainly designed for American ears, a subtle form of pressure on the Americans. But he stressed that the Egyptian Government is not fully counting on the U.S. to deliver and is, in fact, preparing other options for itself. What might these other options be?**

Leave it to the press people, they always know the secrets, more of them and faster than the officials. Sadat may be giving, as we his representatives, an added degree of optimism. But it is what we call the logical reading of the situation. Any man in his senses, whether he is on the Israeli side or on the Arab side, should not fail to see what are the beautiful chances today that we should not throw away for the unknown. Let's do it. We can do it.

**Didn't we have the same beautiful chance in 1971 and 1972, and didn't you rely then on the Americans to deliver?**

No, the Americans then were totally polarized toward Israel to the degree that, when the whole world in June, 1973, voted in the Security Council to order a total withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab-occupied territories, the only negative vote was that of the United States.

**When President Nixon took office we had the Scran-**

**ton mission, we had the Rogers Plan. Today what President Carter is saying is being compared to the Rogers Plan. What makes you so optimistic that things have changed? What makes you so optimistic that the Israeli policies and the Israeli forces within the U.S. are going to be defeated this time?**

Several things. Nixon and Rogers did not continue on the same line as they started. The Rogers Plan was introduced, but then it disappeared. Second, the polarization then was much deeper and further than now. I was told by people in the State Department that the U.S. is the lawyer for Israel and the Soviet Union is the lawyer for Egypt.

Today the situation is different. Why? Because you have become more enlightened. Why? Because we saw to it that you got to be more enlightened in the October, 1973, war. You were sold a bag of winds (forgive the expression) by the Israelis, that "never mind, just freeze the situation, the Arabs will yell, scream, and sign on the dotted line." We did not yell or scream or sign on the dotted line. We kicked the Israelis off the Canal and off the Bar-Lev line, and they ought to have learned from that a lesson that there is no such thing as defensible lines in occupation, that there is a real powderkeg of an explosion in occupation.

I think you have learned the lesson, and I think Henry Kissinger was immediate in grasping the proper reading and the chances. And we have moved since the October war to teach the lesson, but also to sue for peace immediately from the 16th of October. I was there in Parliament when the president spoke, President Sadat, and opened up the road to Geneva—way, way in the beginning, when the war was at its peak and when the Egyptian forces were advancing in Sinai and we had opened up our communications to you. I think you have learned the lesson. And I think some of the Israelis have. I hope the rest will.

This is what has happened and what has changed. And mind you, today we say the Arab world is not weak—is not meek, is not poor, and is not unsophisticated. It knows how to handle war, it knows how to handle oil, it has enough money to buy the most sophisticated weapons, and it knows how to handle them. With all of that we say we don't want war. We want to go to peace because war is sick, it's not going to achieve anything for the Israelis or us except destruction.

**Let's talk about that peace. This is what President Sadat said when he was here a short time ago: "I didn't say at all [that peace] will be postponed for the next generation. I am for full peace, permanent peace, and then everything will be normalized. For instance, the issue of the boycott automatically will be finished because whenever we sign the peace agreement everything is going to be normalized. For instance, now Israeli cargo passes the Suez Canal. But after the peace agreement, sure, the Israeli ships can pass the Suez Canal because we have solved the whole problem."**

**I think with this paragraph President Sadat opened a new dimension to the possibility of a full peace. And I'd like you to elaborate on it if you can. The president**

indicated that within five years of an agreement that might be signed at Geneva a full, complete peace is what Egypt is working for. Does this peace include the concepts of open borders, trade relations, tourists visiting each other's country, and possibly at some point even an exchange of diplomatic representatives? Is that the kind of peace President Sadat is talking about? You know the Israelis are very, very concerned that this hasn't been spelled out.

I'm glad that you recorded what Sadat said, because I think what he said is very important, very significant in giving the true temperature of what our intentions are. In building the two disengagement agreements Henry Kissinger helped us build with the Israelis we were determined to make of these a beginning of the establishment of real peace—is it working, is it do-able, and is it possible to continue this way? And I think it proved that it is.

So we go forward now for the whole works, which is the total peace, which is the full peace, which when it gets to be established, then like any peace between countries that have had a state of war for a long time it starts to bring them into an atmosphere of normalization. And normalization leads to what could be expected between states that have normal conditions between them. What is impossible today will not be impossible tomorrow, but will become possible. And I think President Sadat gave you the temperature, examples of what could be done, examples of what could be expected.

Now I certainly would like the question to be asked of my counterpart, Simcha Dinitz: "Here it is, the Egyptians are committing themselves not only to full peace but beyond a full peace to what a full peace will lead in terms of normalization...."

**What can I tell Ambassador Dinitz? Can I tell him that your concept of full peace includes the things I outlined—trade, open boundaries, tourists, journalists?**

I just told you that what is impossible today because of the existence of the state of war with them would, as a result of full peace, then become possible and then would become achievable.

**Including these elements?**

But I would like to hear from the Israelis, from Simcha Dinitz himself, and from Peres, or whomever will be the leader of the Israeli people, that they commit themselves equally vis-à-vis their own obligations about withdrawal and about the existence of a Palestinian-Arab state side by side, living in peace and harmony with the Israeli state. I would like to find an equal commitment in the same kind of language that I am saying. I hope they do. If they do, then I can say that three-quarters of the job to be done at Geneva has been done.

**Would you say that the analogy between France and Germany might apply to the Middle East? There was a time when France and Germany were total antagonists without any relations.**

Why not? If we talk about peace, we are not double-talking. We know what peace entails. And we know what peace leads to. It is only normal to expect what normal



(Credit: Embassy of Egypt)

conditions will lead to. But don't expect me to say I love and hug and do everything when I am being pushed by the other side continuously through the determination to talk about the annexation of certain parts of the Arab world, the negotiating of the territories, the giving up of some but definitely not of all. There is no such thing as fulfillment of all obligations on one side with no equal fulfillment of obligations on the other. The *quid* requires a *pro quo*, and we are ready with the *quid* fully. Are the Israelis ready with the *pro quo* fully? I hope so.

**Your foreign minister, Mr. Fahmi, has repeatedly stated that Israel must alter some of its Zionist principles, such as the Law of Return, in order for there to be a full peace. What is your opinion of Zionism? Do you agree with the foreign minister on that point?**

Well, let me go back one step and repeat what I said. We are seriously prepared to achieve full peace, and we expect the Israelis are too. The Israelis go into every minute detail like the Code Napoleon about the obligations on the Arab side. We would like to be assured that they will not sign a peace agreement today that, because of *force majeure*, they will have to renege on.

What will the *force majeure* be? *Lebensraum*. How? Because of the influx, continuous influx, into little Israel. They will say, "We have no more room to hold all these people and thus we need to go into a larger space in the area to hold more people." When you contract the peace, then you must do whatever you need to do in terms of action and policy commensurate with that contract.

**It sounds like you are saying that Zionist ideology must change.**

I am saying that the Israelis must have another look at lots of their policies. One of the Zionist ideologies was for a state from the Euphrates to the Nile. Now are the Zionists going to keep that kind of policy, or are they

going to adopt another policy in order to live in peace, which they would sign freely, as we would sign? What do they want? Do they want peace or annexation? If they want peace, and for them to respect it and for us to respect it, they will have to do certain things, as we will have to do certain things.

**Let me ask it somewhat differently. I had breakfast this morning with the deputy finance minister of Saudi Arabia, Dr. Mansour al-Turki, and he said, on the question of Zionism, that, No, he did not oppose and his country did not oppose the concept of a Jewish state, which he understands is now widely supported. But he did oppose the expansionist nature of what he thought to be Zionism. If that definition is wrong, if in fact Zionism is the concept of a Jewish state willing to live within set boundaries, then it is possible for the Arab world to make peace with a Jewish state of Israel. Is that also your view?**

That's exactly the same view. As I said, we are ready for a full, complete peace with Israel, and Israel is a Jewish state. We're not quarreling with that. But not a growing, expansionist Jewish state. Let us not forget that we want to get the Israeli army receding from the Arab territories it presently occupies and into the June 5 [1967] lines, and that these lines be respected. We do not want to subscribe to a policy that will see these armies again leaving these lines. And as a consequence, yes, we will live in peace and in harmony with the Jewish state, but not with an expanding Israel.

**So we are talking about a clarification of Zionism at the Geneva conference, not a total giving up of what Zionism is to many Jews?**

If we have the positive elements that would fit in with the making of peace, there is no quarrel.

**Let me return to the problems of Sadat and your expectations. A well-known American journalist visited your country a couple of months ago, and he returned to write this about the situation: "Nearly everything seems to be going sour. His economic open door policy has brought in no massive productive investment—only play things for the rich that mock the poor. The army is strangled for weapons. Sadat is welching on his promise of democracy. If his greatest gamble of all falls through—his reliance on the U.S. to wrest Sinai from Israel and get him peace—Sadat will have failed utterly and will not even be in a good position to recoup by starting a war. This year there is real doubt in Cairo whether Sadat will stay in office into next year. One admirer said he may find himself hanging from a lamp post." This is a rather bleak forecast for the future. I wonder what your comment is.**

He just looked at things very gloomily and with great nervousness and emotion. Sure, we had problems on January 18 and 19 of this year, as a result of our trying to take some stringent economic measures that have been recommended to us by international organizations and even by our friends in the Western countries and some Arab countries as well. But it has been abused by some segments that wanted to topple the regime.

Well, the regime did not get toppled. The regime is strong, sound, and Sadat proved that, the government proved that. Sadat came here as the first Arab leader to come to America, to be invited. And, I think, we in Egypt are still in the forefront to take the necessary steps to bring about peace. We have remedied the financial situation. Our Arab friends have given us \$2 billion to tidy our short-term debt. You have helped us. Other European countries and Japan have extended help too. I think, as far as the economic problem, we are getting out of the woods, as I say, into a clearer situation.

**Before you go on let me give you another summary. This one from C.L. Sulzberger of the *New York Times*. He writes: "Today Egypt is flat broke. If Mr. Sadat succeeds in all he forecasts he can retire early with a clear conscience. But the program outlined is Herculean. Is Sadat Hercules?"**

Well, I don't think it is Herculean. That is an exaggeration of the situation. The problems are immense. But the solutions are there. They have already started. People forget that we have a tremendous built-in capability—the Canal, the oil wells, the great huge industrial capabilities that only needed a few things to produce and to export. And I think most important, if peace is achieved, then much of the money that is being invested in defense could be directed and channeled to economic developments and economic programs.

Let us not forget that Israel has an even more Herculean problem, where inflation is over 30 per cent and where devaluation (that has not taken place in Egypt) has been taking place continually in Israel, regardless of the fact that the U.S. has been giving Israel a budgetary \$2 billion and nonbudgetary monies through all the millions, the hundreds of millions of dollars that are sent by the United Jewish Appeal and other agencies.

**You think Israel's economic problems are even worse than yours?**

Worse. And I can assure you they are in a much more difficult situation than we are. The only thing they have is that they are banking on continuous support from the U.S. And there they ought to be warned, because they detect, I think, as we detect, that people are saying, "Why should we invest all that money in arms, which will be wasted. Let's bring them to peace and invest it all in economic and regional development." I think that is the case.

So, in short, it's a gloomy description of the situation. It is seeing one incident and putting it in huge, big dimensions. It is seeing it from one side and not from both sides. And I think we have passed that stage. The most important thing now is to get to Geneva, to get to achieve in Geneva what we want, and the economic problems will disappear as well as the security problems.

**During Sadat's visit here, for the first time he emphasized the Egyptian role in Africa. In fact by some estimates, 30 to 40 per cent of the time spent in conversation did not deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict. What is it that Egypt sees happening in Africa that requires a shifting of Egypt's attitudes and maybe even of Egypt's military capabilities? Re-**

**cently you began sending pilots to Zaire, and tremendously anxiety has been expressed about what is happening in Ethiopia.**

Mark, let me backtrack for a second. I want to answer, in addition, one point about the last question. I said what we need to do in order to achieve what we want. But if we don't, then the economic situation in both Israel and Egypt and everywhere will deteriorate. And the security situation not only between them, but in the whole region, will really explode. And the energy crisis there is going to be an even bigger inflammable crisis.

**That sounds like a threat.**

No, no. This is not a threat. But if you have no progress in the Middle East, you're going to have an explosion. And if you have an explosion, everything explodes. There isn't an assurance that one thing is out of the equation, the rest is in the equation. We are all in it together. That's why I say that it is very important that we get on with the job of making the peace. It has never been so achievable, and the chances are immense. Why would we, because of stubbornness on one side, throw the whole thing into flames—the economy, security, and what not?

**We're not all in the same boat yet. In fact, the Israelis do have a legitimate worry that a peace with Sadat's Egypt today may not be a peace with whoever runs Egypt if Sadat does not continue. How do you reassure them?**

How are we to be assured about the ones who will sue for peace, contract for the peace in Israel? How are we sure that Menachem Begin would not come in and then say, I disagree with everything that Peres has done and I am going back to the old theory of the Euphrates to the Nile?

**Is the only choice to rely on U.S. guarantees?**

Well, this is why we say guarantees for both sides.

**A treaty with Israel and assurances to you that Israel would not be allowed to expand?**

That could be one way. And we are serious about peace. The peace is not being signed by Sadat and Peres alone. The peace is the commitment of the country. Is the country ready? Yes, the country is ready on our side. There isn't such a thing as a Sadat policy that is different from the country's policy. What Sadat is saying is what the country is saying.

**If you are serious, it appears to many observers that you were rather unsuccessful in attempting to convince the Palestinians that it was time they alter their ideological opposition to living with the Jewish State of Israel. You did not succeed in that policy, and yet your president insists that the Americans open a dialogue with the PLO, the same PLO that refuses to follow the positions that you've outlined. How is this consistent?**

You are not reading the Palestinians right. You have not read—and if you've read, then you've not read carefully—the decisions of the National Palestinian Council. There you have seen what they have said, that they are ready to go to all the conferences and the

meetings at the international level that deal with the Palestinians' future.

**But we've both read the Palestine National Covenant. We know what the covenant says.**

Sure, I've also been reading about the Zionist Covenant. Now, how do you want me to read it?

**What Zionist Covenant?**

Well, the Euphrates to the Nile. The Zionist Declaration.

**That's not on paper.**

Well, sure it is on paper.

**When I was in Egypt I was told that there was a map in the Knesset that shows Israel wants to expand from the Euphrates to the Nile. I went to the Knesset and asked for it. It's not there.**

Tell them to take it out from the Library.

**But the PLO Covenant is there.**

Has there been a repudiation of what the Israelis have been saying about the annexation of territories until this minute? No, there hasn't.

**The Israelis have not formally annexed any territories except for eastern Jerusalem.**

But what are they doing with the settlements in the different Arab territories?

**According to the Labor Party platform, the Israelis are now prepared to discuss withdrawal from all of the occupied areas.**

How about the rest of the parties? How will I know that the rest of the parties would not come in after the elections and be the governing and ruling party later? We can go into an endless discussion. What I say is this: I think the Palestinians have moved immensely. They're talking about agreeing with a resolution of the U.N., of the General Assembly, which spells out their rights in the proper form. They are not going to be treated simply as refugees—refugees could be settled anywhere according to some other resolutions of the United Nations. But this is a nation. And for the first time, thank God, an American president speaks about the right of that nation to establish a homeland.

**Well, he called them refugees.**

Yes, but still he talked about homeland. He's made progress, and America's made progress. I'm not going to deny that. But that doesn't mean the end of the road. The U.S. must still continue the road in giving them their full rights, in recognizing them, in entering into a dialogue with them, in bringing them to Geneva to give them their rights, but equally to convince them of their own obligations.

What is their obligation? It is to live side by side with an Israeli Jewish state in Palestine within the June 5, 1967, boundaries. That's what we have been saying. And that's what we hear from many Palestinians that they are ready to do. But they ask, what is the *quo* if they give the *quid*? *Quid pro quo*. There isn't one without the other. Israel asks for recognition from the Palestinians and the Palestinians ask this same question of the Israelis. I think it could all be settled very easily. Bring

the two together. They sit opposite each other. They'll talk to each other. They'll make peace with each other. And that is the purpose of going to Geneva.

**You disagree, then, with two American policies, as I understand it. You disagree with Secretary of State Vance, who has stated that before the PLO can come to Geneva it must change its charter. And you also disagree with U.S. policy of upholding Resolution 242. Apparently you agree with Crown Prince Fahd that 242 must be changed.**

You are getting me into trouble, I see, with a lot of people. No. Let me say this: You can do it in Geneva or you can do it before Geneva. Let's have the Israelis do exactly the same thing we ask from the Palestinians. Before they go to Geneva let the Israelis say, "Yes, I recognize the existence of a Palestinian national state that has the right for a state in Palestine equaling the West Bank and Gaza."

But what Israel says is what? "These people do not exist. There is no room for the Palestinian state in between my borders and Iraq. There is only room for one state, which is Jordan, and they can disappear within Jordan." Israel says two diametrically opposed things. She says peace should not be imposed from outside, and yet before the Palestinians sit at the table she has imposed her conditions on the Palestinians. There has to be give and take. If she doesn't want anybody to impose conditions on her, she should not impose conditions on others. And I think the issue, frankly, Mark, is less complicated than what the Israelis say. And I think in the final analysis they'll come to it.

**They'll be forced to it, or they'll come to it?**

They will come to it. Because in the final analysis we, too, have been set upon by a lot of people to recognize the fact of Israel, to make peace with Israel. And we have been saying that now. They, too, must make peace with themselves. And they must make the decision that the only way that a Jewish state can live in the area is to live with the area and not against the area or on top of the area. How to co-live with us, the Syrians, the Lebanese, the Jordanians, and above all the Palestinians, who will share with them formerly mandated Palestine and who must live in peace and harmony together.

**Let's go back to Africa. What is it about what's happening in Africa that has caused such a change in Egyptian policy? What is it you are afraid of?**

Well, we need security. We want to feel sure that we are not being surrounded by enemies.

**By whom, the Soviet Union? Who else could threaten you?**

Look at what's happening with Qaddafi attacking us, sending people to destruct and kill. Apparently Qaddafi has found an ally in the Soviet Union, which has been giving him assistance. We don't want this. We want the best of relations with the Soviet Union. We want the best of relations with our Arab brothers. We have no reason to quarrel. But we don't want to continuously rise up every morning to find a bomb exploding in the heart of Cairo. You do not want it in your country, we do not want it in ours.

**And the Israelis do not want it in theirs.**

Exactly. This is why I say that we should go to peace with Israel and that Israel should not keep the situation aflame. In Africa, too, we want Africa to be for the Africans. We don't want meddling from outside into the affairs of the area. I speak of everywhere. European colonialists have gone and left us. And we want to see Africa remain free, independent, sovereign, where it can cooperate with everyone. I think it is essential that the Soviets have economic ties, but they should not help countries or regimes that can be destructive to other countries. That does not sit right with the policy of co-living and peace.

**One final question. President Sadat has described the psychological dimensions to the conflict with Israel—a total lack of trust, a total lack of understanding. If you had the possibility of addressing the Israeli people, in view of the psychological problems and realizing the possibility that your two countries might sometime soon be engaged in a war that could mutually destroy each other, what is it that you would say to them to convince them of your sincerity? You'll remember that at Sadat's Washington press conference the Israeli correspondent asked, "What has changed the situation?" What would you tell the Israelis that might convince them to begin the road to peace rather than the road to war?**

Well, I think it is going to be to their own benefit and to our own benefit, to the benefit of their own future generation and ours too. I would like to see my own son having peace, tranquility, and harmony with sons of Israeli counterparts of mine such as Simcha Dinitz. I was the colleague of Yosef Tekoah [formerly Israel's U.N. representative] at Harvard, and we sat in the same class of William Langer, who taught Modern European History. I look where the situation has developed since 1947. I would like to see peace replace war, where, if we could not talk to each other—Yosef Tekoah and I, who were schoolmates—because of the unhappiness of what happened between our two states, I would like to see that disappear so the new generation can then find it easier to co-live, to talk to each other.

**Not just the new generation. Does normalization mean that you and Yosef Tekoah, the next time I come to talk to you, can talk to me together?**

No, I don't mean that peace is for the next generation. You tell me how to convince them. I am telling them the fruits of peace for both of us in this generation.

**And the three of us together talking?**

Why not? Why not? Down the road I could see that taking place. If Israel withdraws from our territory totally and does not say this bit I like and this bit I don't like. And if the Israelis would recognize that they must live in harmony with the Palestinians and in peace. And then we can, yes, down the road, we can see normalization taking place between all the countries in the area, where normal conditions require normal behavior.

**Thank you.**

Good luck.