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... All the men in history who have really done anything with the future have had their eyes fixed on the past. I need not mention the Renaissance, the very word proves my case.

G. K. Chesterton
The Fear of the Past

Lead Article

The Window of Opportunity: Sadat's Fading Legacy *Mark A. Bruzonsky* 9

Fiction

Making Big Ones Out Of Little Ones *Cynthia Gooding* 30
 The Molehill *Randall Schluter* 50
 A Study In Turquoise *Alyce Ingram* 69
 Signing Off *John C. Hanley* 80

Poetry

The Heart of You *Mary Shortsleeve* 27
 Old Friends *Mary Shortsleeve* 29
 Visiting *Frank Finale* 45
 Stranger Passing *Frank Finale* 46
 The Madrigal of Waters *William Dubie* 47
 Great-Uncle In The Beach House *William Dubie* 48
 En Route, Boston *Adassa Frank* 56
 The Cistern Cleaner *Marjorie D. Roessler* 58
 Consensus *Mary Engel* 73
 НЕВОЛЬНЫЕ ПОЛУНОЧНЫЕ МЫСЛИ *Victoria Babenko* 74
 Большая грешница к иконе подошла. *Victoria Babenko* 78
 Impromptu Thoughts At Midnight *James E. A. Woodbury* 75
 A Sinner *James E. A. Woodbury* 79
 A Reflection: Of The Sky On Wheat and The River *Stephen Todd Booker* 97

Art

Bonnie Biggs, Works: 1979-1982 35
Paul Cadmus, Works: 1933-1979 59
Karen Rasco, Collages 95

Review

A Grief Endured *Ruth Moose* 98

Departments

Subscription Department 104
 Notes On Contributors 3

THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY: SADAT'S FADING LEGACY

Mark A. Bruzonsky

RECENT EVENTS IN LEBANON underscore the continuing danger in failing to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict in a just and comprehensive manner. Contingency plans litter the Pentagon—war is a complicated business for which meticulous preparations usually determine the outcome. But peace planning lacks the rigor and, all too often, the seriousness of war planning. And when the subject is American efforts to achieve a comprehensive Middle East peace—to resolve the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian entanglement—diplomatic history is replete not with detailed strategies but with failed, usually *ad hoc*, efforts. Since the 1967 Six-Day War, such failures (or at best uncompleted initiatives) exist under the headings:

- Resolution 242 (1967)
- The Rogers Plan (1969)
- The Geneva Conference (1973)
- The Ford-Kissinger “Reassessment” (1975)
- The Brookings Report (1976)
- The Joint Soviet-American Statement (1977)
- The Camp David Accords (1978)

The purpose of this article is not to review the past. Rather, it is an attempt to help devise a contingency plan for achieving peace—a comprehensive strategy to achieve a comprehensive peace. The attempt will be to outline an approach to realize what has in fact been American policy for more than a decade—an Arab-Israeli detente leading to reconciliation and providing for Israel's recognition and security; a Palestinian homeland; and more stable U.S.-Arab relations. Before doing so, however, it is imperative to examine two subjects: to summarize why American national interests more urgently than ever require an Arab-Israeli peace; and to outline what that peace in general terms would look like.

Israel, the Arabs, and U.S. Interests

Increasingly, the Arab Middle East region has come to represent the focal point of Soviet-American competition. It is basically a competition for resources, influence and alliances. There is also the strategic

NOTE: This article was written in early summer 1982 prior to President Regan's new outline of American Middle East policy.

dimension involving the military forces of the West against the East—though in an important sense this is largely derivative since military power is essentially being used in the first instance to protect resources and in the second to court influence.

Since the 1967 conflict, the importance of the Middle East region to American economic well-being and that of our allies in Europe and the Far East has multiplied considerably. Not only does the region contain irreplaceable oil resources but petrodollar wealth in itself has become a resource. Additionally, the nearly 150 million people who inhabit the region provide something of a psychological barometer which forecasts the strength or decline of the American versus the Soviet “empires”.

These are hard realities—both realpolitik and realeconomik.

Less tangible are the cultural and social linkages between the nations of that area and the Western world. Our association in the past with colonialism and then with Zionism (which in the eyes of many Arabs is a peculiar form of colonialism) has, for some time, strained American relations with the Arab states. Still, Western political values and religious orientation are enticing to most groups in the region, including those having an intellectual, cosmopolitan veneer. Even in times of major tensions, students, businessmen and tourists from nearly all countries in the region continue to be attracted to Western, especially American, institutions. It has become important for the American sense of potency that Western influence be maintained and consequently that social and political strains be avoided or minimized. The Middle East cannot be compared to Europe in the American mind and heart; but the area has taken on characteristics which make its importance far greater than the Southeast Asia of the 1960s.

Now, this kind of discussion *does not* imply there should be an American willingness to abandon Israel for Arab largesse. Israel's existence and security represent another American interest and commitment to which we should not and need not retreat. But support for Israel's security and well-being definitely does not mean support for the current Israeli government's policies or attitudes either in the occupied territories or toward her Arab neighbors. This is the basic conclusion America must grasp if it is to pursue its own national interests in the Middle East. We can no longer risk alienating and destabilizing our moderate Arab friends for the sake of pacifying our Israeli friends who have deviated from the moderate course. Support for Israel's security will have to be divorced from support for Israel's policies. True friendship at times imposes the obligation of honest differences. Today the U.S. can not allow itself to be in the position of rejecting new Arab policies compatible with Resolution 242 and over a decade of stated

American objectives while accepting new Israeli policies which tend to negate both Resolution 242 and long-standing U.S. pledges.

What this kind of discussion *does* imply is the necessity for the U.S. to attempt objectivity in analyzing regional conditions as well as aspirations and sum up just what American interests are and how they can best be pursued. The basic attempt must be to minimize potential frictions and maximize potential friendships, and this requires a clear-sighted awareness of regional history and sensitivities coupled with an ability to place Israel within the psyche and consciousness of the Arab world. Of course, in a country which has grown accustomed to an Israeli-bias in analyzing the region, these thoughts might be considered heretical. Nevertheless, pursuit of American national interests requires a hardheaded and realistic attempt to eliminate emotion and sentiment in order to achieve historical perspective and objectivity.

Western competition with the Soviet Union in the Middle East began with substantial advantages. The decolonization process had been completed with far less bitterness than it might have been; American economic strength and technology remain incredibly attractive; and Western emphasis on human rights and religious freedom is more compatible with Islamic heritage than is communist philosophy.

The only major inroad available to the Soviet Union in the Middle East, especially in those states bordering Israel, is provided by the political and military tensions resulting from the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is not to say that inter-Arab and internal national conflicts are nonexistent; it is to say that the single major source of geo-strategic gain for the Soviets results directly from the lingering Arab-Israeli quagmire.

With these considerations in mind, former Kissinger assistant Leslie Janka has called for a “normalization of relations between the U.S. and Israel.” In the past, Janka suggests, “the polarization of the region resulting from the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Arab search for arms have been the major source of Soviet opportunity.” While “maintaining our commitment to the security and independence of Israel . . . is a *sine qua non* of peace in the Middle East,” Janka adds, “American leaders have consistently failed to distinguish between the American commitment to the security of Israel and Washington's acceptance of and support for the particular views and policies of a given Israeli government. Our support for Israel need not be uncritical or unlimited, but too often it has led us to surrender our own independence of perception and policy in the Middle East.”¹

1. “The United States and Israel: Time To Normalize Relations?” manuscript

In addition, there is the issue of basic American values which should require the U.S. to work toward a policy which would give real meaning to the Camp David phrase "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people". In the recent State Department memorandum on human rights, approved by former Secretary of State Haig, the Department perceptively notes that, "Neutralism abroad and a sagging domestic spirit partially are caused by fear of Soviet military might and our perceived lack of desire to resist it." But the memo continues, "Perhaps even a more significant cause lies in the notion of 'relativism' — why arm, and why fight, if the two superpowers are morally equal. Our human rights policy must be at the center of our response."²

In applying these concepts to the Middle East situation, it seems imperative that the U.S. adopt a position morally compatible with our own values and understandable to regional allies. Unless we uphold not only Israel's legitimacy and security but also the Palestinian right to self-determination, we will have abdicated our moral position with unforeseen consequences.

American national interests in the Middle East, then, are:


- 1) Economic—access to oil, petrodollars and markets;
- 2) Moral—commitment to Israel's legitimacy and security coupled with recognition of Palestinian rights to a national homeland;
- 3) Strategic—minimizing Arab reasons for turning to the Soviet Union for weapons and political support;
- 4) Historic—maintaining and improving cultural, social and political linkages with an important and emerging area of the world.

Contours of Peace

Insufficiently understood in the wake of Egypt's peace treaty with Israel and Sadat's tragic death is the Arab world's willingness—even while berating Camp David—to negotiate a peace along the lines envisioned not only by U.N. resolutions but also by long-standing American policy as enunciated over the years in the Rogers Plan (1969), preparations for the Geneva Conference (1973), and the bi-partisan outline presented in the Brookings Report (1976).


If one compares Resolution 242, the Rogers Plan and the Brookings Report with King Fahd's eight-point peace plan (first enunciated in August 1981 and which represents the moderate Arab consensus), the similarities are striking. But if one compares these various initiatives with the current policies of the government of Israel, it becomes evident that the Begin administration has moved substantially away from international opinion and from U.S. policy.

2. Policy memorandum drafted by Deputy Secretary of State William P. Clark and Under Secretary of State for Management, Richard T. Kennedy. *New York Times*, 5 November 1981.



The Gun-Tateh-Palestinian Nationalist Symbolism
Photographs: Mark A. Bruzonsky

Wall painting in Shartila Refugee Camp outside of Beirut

SAUDI PLAN³

1. Israeli evacuation of all Arab territories seized during the 1967 war, including the Arab sector of Jerusalem.

Resolution 242

"inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war."

"withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied."

Rogers Plan⁴

"The Security Council resolution endorses the principle of non-acquisition of territory by war and calls for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war. We support this part of the resolution, including withdrawal . . ."

"We believe that while recognizable political boundaries must be established and agreed upon by the parties, any changes in the pre-existing lines should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security."

Brookings Report⁵

"Israel undertakes to withdraw in agreed stages to the June 5, 1967 lines with only such modifications as are mutually accepted."

"... each national group within the city should . . . have substantial political autonomy within the area where it predominates."

Israeli Government

Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) are part of *Eretz Israel* (The Land of Israel) and sovereignty will be claimed.

Jerusalem has been incorporated into the State of Israel and is non-negotiable.

2. Dismantling the settlements set up by Israel on the occupied lands after the 1967 war.

(No settlements at time of passage of resolution.)

(Few settlements at this time; not recognized as major problem as Israel had not laid claim to the territories.)

(Palestinian entity of some kind resulting from self-determination expected; implication settlements to be removed or mini-mized.)

More settlements will be built throughout Judea and Samaria and plans to substantially increase Jewish population of territories.

SAUDI PLAN ³	Resolution 242	Rogers Plan ⁴	Brookings Report ⁵	Israeli Government
3. Guaranteeing freedom of religious practice for all religions in the Jerusalem Holy Shrine.	Agreed	Agreed	Agreed	Agreed
4. Asserting the rights of the Palestinian people and compensating those Palestinians who do not wish to return to their homeland.	"just settlement of the refugee problem."	"There can be no lasting peace without a just settlement of the problem of those Palestinians whom the wars of 1948 and 1967 have made homeless . . . We believe its just settlement must take into account the desires and aspirations of the refugees and the legitimate concerns of the governments in the area."	"The Palestinians for the most part believe that they have a right to self-determination. For a peace settlement to be viable, indeed for it even to be negotiated and concluded, this right will have to be recognized in principle and, as part of the settlement, given satisfaction in practice." "Moreover, a peace settlement should include provision for the resettlement of those Palestinian refugees desiring a return to whatever new Palestinian entity is created, for reasonable compensation for property losses for Arab refugees from Israel and for Jews formerly resident in Arab states, and for sufficient economic assistance to the state or entity in which Palestinian self-determination is realized	No recognition of Palestinian national rights or of Palestinian right to self-determination or of right to compensation for property.

SAUDI PLAN ³	Resolution 242	Rogers Plan ⁴	Brookings Report ⁵	Israeli Government
5. Commencing a transitional period in the West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip under United Nations supervision for a duration not exceeding a few months.	No timetable discussed.	"It is our hope that agreement on the key issues of peace, security, withdrawal, and territory will create a climate in which these questions of refugees and of Jerusalem, as well as other aspects of the conflict, can be resolved as part of the overall settlement."	from its neighbors and from the international community, to enable it to survive and to develop." "Withdrawal to agreed borders and the establishment of peaceful relations carried out in stages over a period of years, each stage being undertaken only when the agreed provisions of the previous stage have been faithfully implemented."	Transition period for autonomy only; Israel to claim sovereignty at end of transition period.
6. Setting up a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.	"Just settlement of the refugee problem."	"We believe its just settlement must take into account the desires and aspirations of the refugees and the legitimate concerns of the governments in the area."	"There should be provision for Palestinian self-determination, subject to Palestinian acceptance of the sovereignty and integrity of Israel with agreed boundaries. This might take the form either of an independent Palestinian state accepting the obligations and commitments of the peace agreements or of a Palestine entity voluntarily federated with Jordan but exercising extensive political autonomy.	No Palestinian state under any circumstances; no discussion of Palestinian self-determination; no separation of entire city of Jerusalem from Israeli sovereignty.

7. Affirming the right of all countries of the region to live in peace.

"Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force."

"We support Israel's security and the security of the Arab states as well."

"The Arab parties undertake not only to end such hostile actions against Israel as armed incursions, blockades, boycotts, and propaganda attacks, but also to give evidence of progress toward the development of normal international and regional political and economic relations."

Agreed

8. Guaranteeing the implementation of these principles by the United Nations or some of its member states.

"For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones."

Reference to resolution 242

"It would be desirable that the UN Security Council endorse the peace agreements and take whatever other actions to support them the agreement provide. In addition, there may be need for unilateral or multilateral guarantees to some or all of the parties, substantial economic aid, and military assistance pending the adoption of agreed arms control measures."

No acceptance of international guarantees; interest in U.S. security guarantee.

The international consensus—except for Israel—remains only an outline. But it can be summarized in the following points:

1. Recognition of Israel by the Arab states and peace treaties leading to security for Israel and normalized relations;
2. Israel's withdrawal to approximately the 1967 borders with special provisions for Israeli security;
3. Palestinians entitled to national existence either as independent state or in some form of federation with Jordan; principle of self-determination to be implemented; Palestinian refugees entitled to compensation for properties lost;
4. Israel entitled to special and specified interim and permanent security arrangements to be negotiated;
5. United Nations and United States guarantees for peace treaty, Israel's negotiated boundaries, and regional peace.

This international consensus is, in some ways, Sadat's legacy. By taking the unprecedented steps he initiated in November 1977, Sadat's Egypt attempted to lay the foundation, psychologically and politically, for a comprehensive settlement. Sadat more than anyone else created this "Window of Opportunity" to resolve the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian quagmire. But it is a window that is closing—out of frustration on the Arab side and because of the unilateral action by the Israelis in gradually incorporating the West Bank *de facto* into *Eretz Israel*. Israel's recent invasion of Lebanon will further erode the possibilities for Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli co-existence.

In some ways today's consensus for Arab-Israeli peace is returning full circle to the partition approach prevalent at the time of Israel's creation (1947). The U.N. vote legitimizing Israel's creation, it needs to be remembered, was a vote for partitioning Palestine between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs.

But in its current formulations, today's consensus involves dividing Palestine much less equally than the U.N. envisioned in 1947. Today, Israel would attain approximately 75% of historic Palestine (excluding territories east of the Jordan River which some Zionists do in fact claim) while the Palestinians would have to be content with approximately 25% of their former country.

3. Unofficial translation from Arabic of plan proposed by then Crown Prince Fahd and published by the Saudi press agency. *New York Times*, 31 Oct. 1981, p.6
4. Speech by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, 9 December 1969. Included in *The Search for Peace in the Middle East, Documents and Statements, 1967-79*; Report prepared for Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 1979.
5. *Toward Peace in the Middle East*, The Brookings Institution, 1975.

Whatever one's view of this international consensus, not only does it exist, but it indicates that the Arab states and the Palestinians have reached their minimal territorial demands. While there is room to negotiate over transitional phases, security arrangements, forms of Arab recognition of Israel and types of guarantees, there remains little room for the Arabs to grant greater territorial concessions or for the Palestinians to reduce their national demands for a West Bank-Gaza state. Just as Sadat could not agree to yield sovereignty over any part of Egypt but could negotiate all other issues, so too Arab and Palestinian attitudes of inviolability toward the West Bank and Jerusalem.

Orchestrating Peace

Success in finally orchestrating a comprehensive Middle East peace will require not only a clear analysis of American national interests throughout the region and conceptual clarity about desirable ends, it will require political determination to follow through—a combination of political shrewdness and toughness that no American government since Eisenhower has been capable of sustaining.

In another article,⁶ I suggested that it is up to the U.S. "to create the overall conditions which would make such a peace reasonable (or at least palatable) for the moderate political forces in the region—especially in Israel and among the Palestinians." The U.S., I said, must "Follow a policy of 'incubating peace' rather than 'imposing peace'."


It is necessary, however, to recognize that the line between advocacy and imposition is unclear and subject to interpretation. Clearly the U.S. has various levers of influence—military and economic aid, political support, strategic agreements—which will have to come into play as part of any serious and determined strategy for achieving the peace that has eluded previous American administrations. Crucial to the success of an attempt to nurture peace will be American determination and American persistence. Too often in the past, policy has been uncoordinated within the many departments of the American government and subject to bitter personal confrontations for power and influence.⁷ Too often in the past, policy has been insufficiently thought through and thus subject to displays of conceptual insecurity by policymakers who themselves have been insufficiently informed about the historical and political thickets into which they wandered.

6. "America's Palestinian Predicament", *International Security*, Summer 1981.

7. The Kissinger-Rogers squabble remains the harshest example and is dealt with extensively in Seymour Hersh's book about Kissinger, excerpted in the *Atlantic*, May 1982.



Menachem Begin, in the early 1940s, speaking before his Herut Party gathering. In the background is a photo of Ze'ev Vladimir Jabotinsky and in the foreground is the emblem of Begin's party showing what they consider to be all of Palestine. The Hebrew reads, "For Homeland and Freedom," Freedom (Herut) being the name of Begin's party.



Bruzonsky Meeting with Sadat November 1977 to arrange first telegram ever sent from an Arab head of state to a group in Israel.

Public Opinion

Journalists, academics and politicians all interact to create political environments in which foreign policy is first conceived and then implemented. Organizing for peace in the Middle East requires informing and involving public opinion makers as well as attempting to directly form public opinion itself.

In the past, both the White House and the State Department have been ill-prepared to interact with public opinion makers on Middle East policy. The State Department has had a single press officer dealing with the subject while the White House has often had no one specifically knowledgeable about Middle East affairs or Middle East public opinion. Yet more than any other single foreign-policy issue, the Arab-Israeli situation has created a stratum of propagandists, analysts and non-governmental organizational spokesmen who, at times, have proven able to overwhelm the personnel available to government. And, of course, the Israeli government and most of the Arab governments not only have their own press and public information departments but they retain private consultants and political operatives. For them, Middle East diplomacy is everything. For the U.S. the world is the stage and American administrations too often find themselves at a disadvantage in numbers of qualified people available to carry out Middle East policy.

In short, there is an urgent need to establish some form of "American Middle East Desk" at the State Department to deal with the immense public interest in Middle East policy and to staff the White House with sufficient personnel to deal with the political ramifications of implementing a specific Middle East policy. Otherwise, major U.S. initiatives—such as President Carter's call for a "Palestinian homeland" or the 1 October 1977 Joint Statement by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.—bring about public opinion contests for which the American government is neither prepared to pursue nor staffed to cope with.

Of course there is the constant danger that tipping one's hand in advance by attempts to prepare public opinion will give not merely the Soviet Union but others a chance to play their cards in opposition early in the game. Still, there is quite a difference between showing one's hand and simply creating a receptive climate for pursuit of thought-through policies.

American Jewish Community

Historical memory is not a monopoly for the Arabs. In devising and implementing a Middle East policy, the American government must be exceptionally sensitive to the outlooks and traumas of a special

ethnic group within American society—the American Jewish community.

In the post-Holocaust world, the cause of Israel has, understandably, become something of a secular religion for many American Jews. They have organized themselves to protect their special interests, as is compatible with the nature of our pluralistic political system. But, like most Americans, knowledge of the Arab world, understanding of the Palestinian issue, and appreciation for the various interests to be pursued by a sound American foreign policy, are all minimal, at best, in the Jewish community. Only in very recent years has there been an attempt to delve into the complexities of the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian situation.

In the past, no American administration has made a concerted effort to appreciate either the realities or the diversity of the American Jewish community, but to carry out a well-conceived and determined plan to achieve a comprehensive Middle East peace, it will be necessary to do so. This means more than having a Jewish adviser in the White House and an occasional meeting with representatives of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations or the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). It means bringing into the inner and trusted circles of the Administration's Middle East planning thoughtful and influential American Jews who, like all other Americans, want to pursue policies in the best interests of the United States and policies that will bring peace and stability to the Middle East.

In the beginning there will need to be a process of educating American Jewish opinion about the necessity for and the parameters of American policy. There will also have to be a process of creating personal understanding and trust between leading representatives of the American Jewish community and persons in government responsible for Middle East policy. Then there will be the need for careful consultations and interaction with the Jewish community as difficulties arise during the implementation phase of policy.

Any Administration attempting to embark on a comprehensive Middle East peace strategy must expect considerable opposition not only from the current government of Israel, but from certain Arab parties; not only from segments of the organized American Jewish community, but from other domestic groups. Such opposition must be thoroughly understood and prepared for. Not everything that will be said in the press can be interpreted at face value. The undercurrents of what is being said, and, more important, of what is not being said, will have to be analyzed. Success in implementing a comprehensive Middle East peace policy is a domestic politics challenge as well as a foreign

policy problem. One of the challenges in our form of democratic society is to pursue foreign policy imperatives that will prove controversial to powerful groups within the polity.

Certain basic facts must be understood about the American Jewish community. The organizations within this community—and they are quite numerous—represent only a minority of American Jews. Substantially less than half of American Jews belong to *any* of the organizations represented by either the Presidents Conference or AIPAC. And these organized elements tend to be the most outspoken and the most uncompromising in attitudes toward a comprehensive Middle East peace. Additionally, many of these organizations are substantially influenced by Israeli policies and Israeli institutions—considerably more so than among American Jews in general.

A recent public opinion poll confirms that American Jews, like Americans in general, are searching for ways to resolve, fairly, the Palestinian issue while safeguarding Israel's security. This basic realization should guide the American government in attempting to present a comprehensive Middle East peace strategy to the American Jewish community. For, within that community are many groups and individuals, often unheard, who would welcome such a development but who need encouragement to publicly support it.

Attitudes toward an Independent Palestinian State on the West Bank⁸

	Total Public			Total Jews		
	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure
<i>Hypothesis:</i> The Palestinian people are now homeless and deserve their own independent state, just as much as the Jews deserved a homeland after World War II	71	12	17	49	36	15
<i>Hypothesis:</i> There must be a way to guarantee Israel's security and also give the Palestinians an independent state on the West Bank	72	11	17	59	25	16

In order to be successful, a comprehensive Middle East settlement must be pursued with bi-partisan support and must not be permitted

8. *A Study Of The Attitudes of the American People and the American Jewish Community Toward The Arab-Israeli Conflict in the Middle East* (Study No. 804011); Louis Harris and Associates, Inc.; prepared for Edgar M. Bronfman, Chairman, The Seagram Company Ltd., and Acting President, World Jewish Congress; September 1980; Table 42, p. 101.

to become an electoral issue—timing is as important as substance. And it must be done with conviction and steadiness or those who oppose it will destroy it—there can be no conceptual insecurity on the part of the U.S. once the policy is embarked upon.

There will be moments of intense assault on both the policy and on those who initiated it. These moments must be faced while the political game is played with utmost skill. There will be moments of despair and times in which retreat from the contours of a comprehensive peace will seem particularly attractive. Such moments will pass and the American government must not succumb to the temptation to abandon its policy.

In the wake of Sadat's departure from the Middle East stage, it is vital that the U.S. realize that Sadat's legacy was not simply an Egyptian-Israeli peace but rather a unique window of opportunity for a just, lasting and comprehensive peace. Sadat and Egypt have shown the way. Only the U.S. has the power, the ability, the relationships, and the reasons for stepping forward now and doing what must be done. If the United States fails to bring *all* the parties—including the Palestinians—to the negotiating table, the suffering that is still being experienced in Lebanon will not end suffering in the Middle East but it will intensify the grievances.

I should like to see the truly generous man giving to his country, neighbors, relatives, and friends, but by them I mean his friends without means; unlike the people who bestow their gifts on those best able to make a return. Such persons do not seem to me to part with anything of their own, but use their gifts as baits to hook other people's possessions. . . . But the first essential is to be content with your own lot, the second to support and assist those you know to be most in need, embracing them all within the circle of your friendship.

Pliny, *Letters*
Book Nine (30)

Until quite modern times all teachers and even all men believed the universe to be such that certain emotional reactions on our part could be either congruous or incongruous to it—believed, in fact, that objects did not merely receive, but could *merit*, our approval or disapproval, our reverence, or our contempt. The reasons why Coleridge agreed with the tourist who called the cataract sublime and disagreed with the one who called it pretty was of course that he believed inanimate nature to be such that certain responses could be more “just” or “ordinate” or “appropriate” to it than others.

C. S. Lewis, *The Abolition of Man*
“Men Without Chests”