

Decision time for Israel on Palestine

Must change **Won't change**

Scholar Amos Perlmutter and journalist Mark Bruzonsky, both just back from working trips to Egypt and Israel, write from significantly different perspectives. Perlmutter says he is impressed with the prospects for success of the Begin approach. An Israeli-American specialist on the Mideast closely acquainted with major Israeli figures, Perlmutter is professor of political science and sociology at The American University here. His books include *Politics and the Military in Israel, 1967-1977*.

Bruzonsky writes his criticism of the Begin policies from the perspective of an American Jewish liberal and internationalist.

Perlmutter's article is adapted from his new piece in *Foreign Affairs*. Bruzonsky's is adapted in part from articles in forthcoming issues of the magazines *Politics and Worldview*.

By Mark Bruzonsky

By Amos Perlmutter

"For Mr. Sadat to have negotiating room, the Israelis have to deal seriously with the West Bank and the Palestinians."

— Secretary of State Vance

When I met President Sadat in Cairo a few days before his heroic visit to Jerusalem, he told me his goal was to make the people of Israel realize that a real, lasting, just peace was finally available to them. "They will be much more flexible then," he concluded.

In the wake of Sadat's remarkable journey to the Jewish state, Israel has indeed entered a period of unprecedented rethinking and even soul-searching.

Shimon Peres, leader of the now-opposition Labor party (and the man who was expected to be prime minister), has begun to speak of "Palestinian national existence" and the fact that "two peoples, two nations" have legitimate claims in historic Palestine.

And though the Begin government rejects such concepts, there has at least been a rhetorical shift from referring to the Palestinians as "the Arabs of the land of Israel" to "Palestinian Arabs." Begin himself has been cautiously hinting at specific concessions, though so far indications are that the emphasis is on cosmetic repackaging of former positions rather than boldly imaginative new policies.

Other prominent voices are also speaking up in Israel. Golda Meir, the former prime minister, has implied recognition of a Palestinian problem. And this in itself is quite a concession in view of her stand a few years ago when she forced her own party's secretary-general to resign, insisting that he was guilty of "inventing the Palestinians."

My meeting with Sadat was to arrange for a message to be sent to an Israeli symposium which had brought many of the world's Middle East experts together in Tel Aviv. Four days before he landed in Israel, Sadat sent the first commercial telegram from an Arab country to this gathering.

Sadat used the opportunity to high-

See CHANGE, E-4

Menahem Begin is the last Mohican of the grand old Zionist generation born in the diaspora. Confounding some expectations, he assumed office as if he were born more to the statesman's manner than to the guerrilla's. His authoritative political style, coupled with strict regard for the forms of legal and constitutional process, has not been seen in Israel since Ben-Gurion retired in 1963.

Like Ben-Gurion, he is autocratic, patriarchal and charismatic, the leader of both his Herut Party and the coalition government. On a personal level he is more relaxed, less tense than Ben-Gurion, and is courteous, pleasant and open where Ben-Gurion was not.

Begin, again like Ben-Gurion, is a Herzlian Zionist. Theodor Herzl, the founder of Zionism, was a 19th Century Viennese writer, dreamer and Don Quixote, but with a realist's view of politics. He regarded Zionism as essentially a political movement for territorial settlement of the Jews and considered the Zionist Congress organized by him in 1897 as the instrument to proclaim the Jewish aim of establishing a state (in Uganda or Zion, Herzl was indifferent).

This political solution to the Jewish problem required that the great powers bestow on the Jews a political charter over a territory destined to become their independent state. This political Zionism — diplomacy with the great powers over the establishment of a Jewish state — was the Herzlian legacy that held overwhelming appeal for both Ben-Gurion and Begin.

Here the similarity between Ben-Gurion and Begin ends. The real chasm between the two is wide. They were deeply divided on the strategy to achieve Jewish political and territorial independence. Ben-Gurion represented the mainstream of political Zionist thought. Both he and former President Chaim Weizmann aspired to establish a state populated, if possible, only by Jews. Thus, although Ben-Gurion was a territorialist, for him practical Zionism meant the settlement — urban and rural — by Jews of those mandated areas of Palestine that were either

See BEGIN, E-4

CHANGE

Continued from E-1

light his beliefs about the centrality of the Palestinian problem. He called upon Israel to recognize "the living reality of the Palestinian people and their inalienable right to statehood."

Then, in his speech before the Knesset a few days later, Sadat reiterated this theme. "As for the Palestinian cause, nobody could deny that it is the crux of the entire problem," Sadat stressed. "Nobody in the world today could accept slogans propagated here in Israel, ignoring the existence of the Palestinian people." Sadat continued. "The Palestinian people are entitled to legitimate rights, and the Palestinian people is the core and essence of the conflict, and so long as it continues to be unresolved, the conflict will continue to aggravate, reaching new dimensions. In all sincerity, I tell you there can be no peace without the Palestinians. It is a grave error of unpredictable consequences to overlook or brush aside this cause."

I remained in Israel after Sadat's departure and interviewed various Israeli political figures about what comes now.

I found significantly new Palestinian and West Bank attitudes emerging throughout the Israeli political spectrum — everywhere, that is, excepting Prime Minister Begin.

"There is a wide national consensus for a boldly imaginative peace policy," The Jerusalem Post noted shortly after Sadat's return to Egypt. Yet, the Post added, "The existing consensus is currently being distorted by the predominance of one relatively small faction — Mr. Begin's own — in the shaping of foreign policy."

Press reports in the United States have assessed, but usually only superficially, the widening gulf within the Israeli establishment on these crucial issues. What has not been sufficiently pointed out, however, is that political currents are actually creating the possibility that the core of the Begin government — the Herut movement which arose from the Irgun military organization when Israel achieved statehood — could become totally isolated within a matter of months.

Begin's current hints at offering an "autonomous West Bank" really involve only a repackaging of his longstanding insistence that Israel must retain full security control and settlement rights over what his government terms Samaria and Judea. "I stand by my principles [which] are so well-known I [need] not elaborate on them," the prime minister told an interviewer a few days ago. Yet, only a complete shift from these principles toward acceptance of the Palestinian "national" problem which necessitates a territorial homeland of some kind for the Palestinians will make it possible for the Israelis and the Egyptians to move very far in their bilateral peace process.

Should Begin continue to refuse to bite the Palestinian bullet, it is becoming thinkable that a totally new coalition could emerge to challenge his authority.

Here are excerpts from my recent interviews with Shimon Peres, leader of the opposition Labor party; Arie (Lova) Eliav, former secretary-general of the Labor party who now heads a two-member Knesset faction advocating creation of a Palestinian state and mutual recognition with the PLO; and Ephraim Evron, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan's No. 2 who is director-general of the Israeli foreign ministry and one of the most important spokesmen for the Begin government.

Shimon Peres

Peres hinted at the emerging differences with the Begin government in his Knesset speech which followed Sadat's and Begin's. Whereas Begin completely avoided the Palestinian issue in what was widely regarded as a tough, no-give response to Sadat, Peres took a far different tone and his speech was specifically applauded by Sadat the following day.

"Let us not hide from it, let us not disregard it, we are aware of the existence of the Palestinian identity and this does not depend on the authorization of another nation." In the interview I asked him:

Q: You accept the idea of Palestinian national existence?

Peres: That's right. . . . Every nation can decide about its identity. If there are Arabs who consider themselves Palestinians, it is their decision, not mine. And they don't have to have my approval, and my disapproval is meaningless.

The question is if the PLO is a representative or a terrorist organization. . . . The moment they come with guns they don't represent, they threaten. That's number one.

Number two. Their (PLO) charter is not for Palestinian nationhood. . . . They claim Israel is Palestine. . . . The PLO doesn't say we are Palestinian people and for that recognize our people. That would be OK. They say Israel is Palestine. So we are playing ping-pong on two different tables.

Number three. To make them a partner means to select a partner which is against an agreement, while we have the people we lived with, and we have the Jordanians, and with them we can and should conclude a negotiation.

Number four. When two peoples, two nations, are living on the very same land it is accepted by the civilized world that there is more than one solution. There can be a territorial solution, there can be a federal solution. I can't say that Switzerland or Yugoslavia are less civilized because they didn't divide the land.

Q: What if, as you say, West Bank Arabs come to the negotiations and announce that it is their intention and their goal to negotiate for the creation of a Palestinian state?

A: We shall talk with them and we shall explain to them that there must be compromise on both sides.

As far as I am concerned, I will tell the Palestinians and the Jordanians: "My dear friends, there are two possible compromises; either a geographic one — and that's partition but not along the lines that you are seeking — or alternatively, a federal arrangement — namely to divide the government instead of dividing the land. You must decide. First of all make up your minds and then we shall deal with territories."

I maintain that there will be many Arabs who will think let us have a partial control on a large piece of land than complete control on a partial piece of land.

Q: IF the PLO accepts Resolution 242 and if the PLO agrees to the idea of reaching a coexistence arrangement with Israel, what would be your attitude toward the PLO?

A: Then they would stop being the PLO. They wouldn't have a problem. . . .

Let's face it, we don't object to the PLO just because they killed people. Actually, we are dealing with people who killed Jewish people on the West Bank. But the PLO is an organization to transform the Jewish majority with an Arab majority and to destroy the State of Israel. If they stop doing it they will stop being the PLO.

Lova Eliav

Eliav is without doubt Israel's most respected dove. His clashes with Golda Meir and the Palestinians eventually drove him from the Labor party. Today he is chairman of the Sheli party which holds two Knesset seats, has held discussions with the PLO, and advocates creation of a Palestinian state in the context of an overall peace settlement.

Q: What's changed because Sadat came here?

A: I wrote to (Zbigniew) Brzezinski on the first of November, after I visited him in the White House, that the Israelis are so trauma-ridden and their suspicions so deep that there is no one to talk to on the other side, that only a direct hit in their hard core would maybe shatter the rigidity. . . .

Sadat came. He gave the Israelis another trip. His trip was high. People had again a euphoria. Six-Day War, high. Yom Kippur War, low. Entebbe, high. Now people are on a high again. He scored a bullseye in hitting the myth that there is nobody to talk to. And patterns of thinking, clichés, demagoguery that the Likud built on — Golda cemented them and the Likud built on them a second and third story and got the votes — are being shattered now, they are falling apart. But, I'm afraid that . . . that, I'm afraid to say it.

Q: Please say it.

A: Even this ultra, ultra dramatic visit was not yet strong enough and long-lasting enough to shatter it completely so that people will start re-thinking.

Q: Which is, of course, my real question. What do you expect Mr. Begin and the people who run this country to do in response?

A: I don't know. I don't know. I know one thing is sure. Begin didn't give, to my mind, didn't give Sadat enough lee-way and didn't meet him half-way.

Q: He didn't meet him at all, did he, from his Knesset speech?

A: Well, he could have said don't come.

Q: It looks to me like something is happening in the Labor party regarding the Palestinian problem.

A: Shimon Peres came to me after his Knesset talk and said, "Lova — I was his secretary-general — you see I even veered from the Labor platform about 'your' problem." The Palestinians are my problem! Golda said I invented the Palestinians! Eight years ago she said, "Lova invented the Palestinians."

Q: So the sentences in Peres' Knesset speech about the Palestinians were very serious sentences?

A: They were serious sentences. I think he sees that he has to do something, he has to say something. They're not good enough, but they are already something.

Q: If Labor were still in power what concessions would they have made?

A: They would still be sitting in their councils and fighting. Peres would fight Rabin, Rabin would fight Peres. And I don't think they would give Sadat any answer of any kind because of their internal rivalries and the big shadow of Golda which is still dominating.

Q: What is it in this country that makes it so difficult for intelligent people to accept in principle the obvious about the existence of a Palestinian national movement?

A: I told you. We are a paranoid, schizophrenic society. We've got all the right to be — all the right to be paranoid and schizophrenic. We have to be treated — because of the 2,000 years, because of the traumas and not less because of the horrible attitude of the PLO.

Ephraim Evron

Peres, at the end of our interview, characterized his party's new willingness to compromise about the West Bank and to negotiate for the fulfillment of Palestinian "national" identity as "quite a major difference" from the attitude of the Begin government.

So did one of the Begin government's top behind-the-scenes operators, Ephraim Evron, director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Peres' new views are "extremely different" from past Labor party policies, Evron said.

Evron repeatedly refused to accept the concept of a "Palestinian national existence" or even of "Palestinian identity." Instead, he insisted, there is only a Palestinian Arab problem to be solved within the framework of Israeli sovereignty over all the territory west of the Jordan river.

Q: There seems a definite shift in the Likud's policy. Mr. Dayan was in Washington a few months ago and said if any Palestinian spokesman said either that they were coming to negotiate for a Palestinian state or that they represented the PLO there would be no discussions and Israel would walk out.

A: If they want to raise it we shall say "No" right away there and then to the idea of a Palestinian state. There can be no doubt about it, the government and the great majority of the opposition members of the Knesset are totally opposed to the idea of a separate, independent Palestinian state. We will not walk out of a conference (if this demand comes up), but at the same time we will not give an inch on that.

Q: Well, everybody comes to negotiations saying we won't give an inch on this; we won't change our position on this . . .

A: I don't want there to be any misunderstanding about this. Some people will say that because they will not walk out of a conference when people raise the problem this means they are willing to compromise. On this I want you to be quite clear. Nobody in the government and I don't

think even in the Labor party is willing to accept the idea of a separate Palestinian state.

Q: Does the government accept Mr. Shimon Peres' view that "We are aware of the existence of the Palestinian identity. Every people has the right to decide its own identity and this does not depend on the authorization of another nation. But the granting of expression to the Palestinian identity must be done without endangering Israel's security."

A: This government does not accept the Labor party view . . . I don't agree with his formulation. We say that there is a Palestinian Arab problem . . .

As far as giving any sovereignty, any independent status, to a Palestinian entity, the government is opposed to it . . .

Q: Is there or is there not a Palestinian identity?

A: We are ready to discuss with the Palestinian Arabs ways and means of coexistence. We will not accept any foreign sovereignty in Judea or Samaria whether it's in the form of a Palestinian state or any other. That's the position of this government.

The gut issue dividing the Middle East parties is clearly the Palestinian problem. Neither Sinai nor the Golan Heights has been claimed by Begin's government as "sacred land," part of Eretz Yisrael. And security arrangements, though difficult, can be worked out for these areas, if the result is to be real peace.

The West Bank and the Palestinian issue are the real thorn in the side of peace now that Sadat has made convincing his pledge of "normalizing" relations after a comprehensive settlement is agreed upon.

And so, the ferment in Israel is a most welcome and hopeful develop-

ment. That Begin's government has not, as yet, accepted the eventual necessity of dealing with "Palestinian nationalism" rather than "Palestinian Arabs" is understandable. First the bottom line Egyptian positions will have to be explored. Second, for Begin to take such a step will involve a compromise of his cherished "principles" — and whatever else Israel's prime minister is and has been, he's an honest man when it comes to telling what he stands for. Giving in at this point in life and after finally achieving political power will be a supreme test of statesmanship. Neither Begin or Sadat is a great man. But Sadat is doing great things. Will Begin rise to the historical moment? Can he?

At minimum, the Palestinians — those now living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, those in refugee camps in surrounding territories, and those scattered around the world — deserve and will have to be offered at least a limited form of self-determination.

Yet before this can possibly happen the Begin government will have to take the giant step from "Palestinian Arabs" to "Palestinian national existence" — the step now being cautiously taken by the Labor party under the wise leadership of Shimon Peres.

If the Begin government cannot or will not continue down the road to some form of Palestinian homeland rather than a Palestinian region under the thumb of both Israel and Jordan, the task will await the formation and assumption of power of another political coalition in the Jewish state. For without this happening, there will not be stable or lasting peace in the Middle East.

Parts of this article are adapted from a forthcoming article in the new magazine *Politics and Other Human Interests*. The complete interview with Eliahu appears in the January-February issue of *Worldview* magazine, of which Bruzonsky is associate editor.

BEGIN

Continued from E-1

sparsely or not at all populated by Arabs. In the case of the two major Jewish urban centers, Jerusalem and Haifa, where a mixed Arab-Jewish population existed, Jewish numerical, social, economic, and political hegemony over the Arabs was tenable.

The model of the practical Zionists was actually Tel Aviv, a new and strictly Jewish city, and the agricultural collective and cooperative settlements. Ben-Gurion and the socialist Zionists conceived of these agricultural settlements as being exclusively Jewish. Their idea was the "conquest of the soil," i.e., of empty or sparsely populated areas of land, by settlement, and the creation of an autonomous Jewish working force in the Jewish sector of Palestine. Population and sovereignty were seen as related variables. Jewish hegemony would be established over territory that was not occupied by Arabs, and was therefore suitable for Jewish settlement; a Jewish autonomous state would be carved out of historical and mandated Palestine that was now settled by Jews.

Therefore, Ben-Gurion adhered to the concept of the partition of Palestine (he supported three British partition proposals) into distinct and separate Jewish and Arab states. Ben-Gurion, proclaiming the Jewish Commonwealth in 1942, clearly accepted the idea of the divisibility of Palestine.

Menaheem Begin, the most dedicated disciple of Ze'ev Jabotinsky's Revisionist Zionism, conceives of the future and the structure of the Jewish state in different strategic, ideological and political terms. For Begin, following the dogma of Revisionist Zionism, the territorial and political integrity of Palestine is indivisible. Jabotinsky himself tolerated British rule over Palestine only as long as the latter did not subscribe to the partition of Palestine; his Revisionist Zionism had as its goal the eventual political domination of Zionism over the whole of mandatory Palestine, which at the time included Transjordan, today's Jordan. Revisionism in fact was born when Transjordan was eliminated from the original British Palestine mandate.

For Begin, the problem of the composition of the population in the Jewish state is secondary to a concern with its territory. For his part, Begin would prefer a Jewish majority over all of formerly western Palestine. In its absence, however, he claims the political indivisibility of the territory between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River; its settlement by Jews; and the eventual establishment of Jewish hegemony and political domination over those parts of western Palestine truncated by the 1947 U.N. partition into separate Jewish and Arab states.

The political implications for conflict resolution on Begin's terms are profound. When Begin or his government speaks of Jewish settlement on the West Bank, it is in conformity with his vision of an independent Jewish sovereign polity destined to dominate historical Palestine. The matter of settlement for Begin is not just tactical but strategic and fundamental. In approaching the issue of the West Bank, the reality of the present irredentist claims to Judea and Samaria on the part of the Israeli government must be understood; these preclude the formation of a Palestinian state.

Because he is a maximalist, Begin, not unlike his Arab rivals, prefers grand solutions to the intractable conflict. His strategy is basically two-pronged: (1) opposition to the Kissingerian step-by-step approach; and (2) opposition to the creation of any form of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank.

Step-by-step withdrawal, Begin feels, is not the frame through which Israel should be viewed by the world. It is a mode that portrays Israel as intransigent and uncompromising. Above all, since U.S. leverage on Israel is greater than on the Arabs, this kind of diplomatic strategy creates unnecessary friction between Israel

and the United States. Therefore Begin prefers that even a "grand Geneva" conference deal with the less prickly issue of procedures and forego substance.

Begin's concept of the role of the United States as a mediator, negotiator and partner is quite different from his predecessor's. The Labor government informally accepted the Kissingerian concept of American-Israeli "coordination," meaning no American decision concerning an Israeli concession to the Arabs would be negotiated as an imposed American solution or without some compensation from the Arabs unless Israel was partner to the arrangements. This policy of coordination also required an American commitment to the outcome of the negotiations, to remuneration for Israel with full military and economic support and, above all, an American guarantee of the success of every troop-separation deal.

Begin rejects this approach. For him, the Labor policy of an Israeli-American "coordination" means an American form of pre-negotiation, a subtle form of imposed solutions.

As Begin sees it, what the Arabs lose by war and violence they can gain from Israel through international extortion and the use of American leverage over Israel. This policy, according to Begin, leads Israel toward international isolation and unnecessary confrontation with the United States. The case of the Palestine Liberation Organization is in his mind. In 1975, the Labor-Kissinger open understanding was that there would be no independent American negotiations with the PLO as long as the latter refused to change the paragraphs in its charter calling for Israel's annihilation and as long as it refused to adhere to U.N. Resolution 242.

In fact, according to both Begin and Dayan, the United States violated not only its oral understanding with Israel, but also the written, September 1975, second Sinai troop disengagement agreement inspired by Israeli-American "coordination." This clearly stipulated that if the PLO did not amend its charter and accept Resolutions 242 and 338, the United States would not negotiate with the PLO. If negotiation should occur, then it would be only in "coordination" with Israel.

Neither the Nixon-Ford nor the Carter administration has adhered to the "coordination" understandings, according to both former prime minister Rabin and Begin. Rabin blames President Carter for violating the understanding by making — without consultation with Israel — public statements about a "Palestinian entity," a "Palestinian homeland," and for allowing American representatives to meet and negotiate continuously with the PLO. And Carter's abrupt proposals for border modifications, made without prior consultation with Israel, are interpreted as a blatant violation of the policy of "coordination."

Here an insight into the Begin-Dayan relationship is crucial to understanding Israel's new strategy. Foreign Minister Dayan, with his military background, recognizes Israel's security imperatives on the Jordan River rather than the historical claims of the Zionist Revisionist. He also knows, however, that he can differ only to a certain degree with Begin. Although there is no formal or informal, tacit or clandestine "deal" between Begin and Dayan as to who is the nice guy and who is not, there is mutual understanding that Dayan, as chief negotiator for Israel, must have some flexibility at his disposal. And he will use it, though stopping short of violating Begin's real commitments.

Dayan is known to be loyal to his superiors. He is a soldier who precisely understands the nature of authority, as well as a politician who recognizes the limits of his political influence. Thus, Dayan has designed a fallback strategy both on procedure and substance by which he hopes to assure continuing momentum for negotiations even if a Geneva is held and fails, and that will lift any blame for stalling from Israel.

In Dayan's conception, the negotiations would be multi-phased, to be conducted in separate places simul-

taneously and continuously — in Cairo, in Jerusalem, somewhere in Europe and possibly also in Washington. The different negotiation structures are designed also to accommodate different levels of bargaining. Talks between middle-level officials would signal to senior officials how to continue at higher level of negotiations, and ultimately at the highest level. Also if the Cairo conference doesn't take off, it would be a signal to the most important decision-makers of serious problems which only they could resolve. This process could take weeks or months, if Arab states other than Egypt enter into the negotiation. Geneva, however, would only serve as an imprimatur to what has been achieved elsewhere by the most senior officials. Geneva can thus take place in Cairo.

Dayan is more attuned to process than to a grand conference, and that is precisely how he envisions the construction of peace — as a long and arduous process. Neither Arabs nor Israelis, he believes, are ready to dismantle instantly several decades of hostility, mistrust and misperception. Dayan also doubts the political legitimacy of Arab regimes, their rulers' authority, and their political longevity. Thus, he prefers short-term arrangements.

Concerning the PLO, Dayan's position complements Begin's. He totally rejects negotiation with the PLO even if it is willing to amend its charter or accept U.N. Resolution 242. For Dayan, as for Begin, the PLO means the political and physical annihilation of Israel. His reason for refusing to negotiate with an independent PLO delegation is that the purpose of such negotiations would be to establish, eventually, a PLO state in the West Bank and Gaza, which Dayan will not accept on any condition. He does favor negotiating with Jordan on the future of the Palestinian population of the West Bank, so they may be granted greater social and economic autonomy.

Like Begin, Dayan rejects absolutely the political autonomy or sovereignty of the Palestinians in the West Bank or elsewhere in western Palestine. He seems not to object to non-PLO, non-official Palestinian members in a Jordanian delegation, seeking in his way an Israeli-Jordanian functional solution for the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank.

Strategically, however, the security of the West Bank will be strictly Israeli. The Jordan River will be Israel's security border.

Politically, then, Dayan somewhat modifies Begin's concept of total domination over western Palestine. The foreign minister conceives of territory as a strategic-security asset, not as the essence of political-ideological Revisionist Zionist dogma.

In light of Begin's dedication to territorial goals, his public claim that he is willing to negotiate on everything is open to question. When he calls for an overall settlement based on Resolution 242, and strict adherence to the resolution which refers to the Palestinians as refugees, he means that he will not surrender the ideological commitment to territorial Zionism — in other words, that he will not accept a Palestinian state. Compromise on this is ideologically and politically untenable for Begin and his party. This would seem to rule out an overall settlement.

Does this mean that Begin is an unregenerate ideologue and dogmatist? It is important here to realize how meaningful it is that he does delegate tactical authority. Dayan will command the procedural strategy both in and outside of actual negotiations. The foreign minister will have considerable influence on the actual Israeli negotiations and Begin has given him some freedom of action. On procedure, then, the Israeli government will foster movement — but on substance no deviation from Begin's Revisionist Zionism can be predicted.

Excerpted, by permission, from *Foreign Affairs*, January 1978. Copyright © 1977, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

