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## CONTENTS :

Editor's Note		5
Summaries of the Hebrew Articles		10
Zionist "Colonialism"	R. AVISHAI	13
Evacuation de(s) Territoires	P. GINIEWSKI	24
Israeli-Soviet Relations 1948—1973	S. BUTHANI	32
The Threat of Palestinian Nuclear Terrorism in the ME	L. R. BERES	48
The Legacy of Palestinian Terrorism	Y. ALEXANDER	57
Early Warning System in Sinai	S. BERMAN	65
A United States Guarantee to Israel?	M. BRUZONSKY	71
USA — ME Relations 1950—1976	A. BEN-ZVI	108
West Bank Arab Attitudes on Peace with Israel	H. A. KAMPF	116
The Inalienable Rights of Israel	G. SCHMIDT	128
Israeli Foreign Aid Programs to Africa	V. BELFIGLIO	132
Ideologies and International Cooperation	W. PFEIFENBERGER	145
Les Conventions Fiscales	A. SEGAL	152

★

### The Hebrew Articles

René Cassin — in memoriam	M.
USSR Proposals to Regulate the Arab- Israeli Conflict	A. Y. YODFAT
On Human Rights in the Soviet Union	L. BOIM
The Impact upon the International Legal System of Internal Changes in Nation- States	M. MUSHKAT,

★

### Book Reviews

I. Giritli, The ME, Oil, Cyprus and Turkey	J. LANDAU
A.J. Barker, Behind Barbed Wire	J. LADOR
A. Perlmutter, The Praetorian State	J. LANDAU

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# American Thinking About a Security Guarantee for Israel

Mark A. BRUZONSKY\*

## Looking Back On The Guarantee Idea

When in 1970 the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, J. William Fulbright, proposed a United States treaty with Israel to "guarantee" her security, what can be called the guarantee approach to settling the Arab-Israeli conflict became a matter of widespread public discussion. Since the Yom Kippur war the idea of a guarantee for Israel has resurfaced in a variety of forms, and, more importantly, for a variety of reasons.

There is a growing belief, in fact, that post-Yom Kippur War American policy is leading to a precarious situation — a *de facto* and unstable peace after substantial Israeli territorial withdrawal and the creation of some form of Palestinian State with everything coupled to an American and possibly also a Soviet "guarantee". The logic of American Middle East policy as directed by Henry Kissinger must continue to be Israeli concessions. The process will be one of imposition over time as Israeli dependency becomes more and more established. American and Israeli interests, never as linked as the Israeli lobby would have everyone believe, are now clearly divergent. What Israel will be offered by both the Arabs and the U.S. in exchange for continual concessions remains the unresolved question. It is at this point that "guarantees" fit into the scheme of negotiations and pressures.\*\*

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\*\* This essay was completed before the appearance in *Foreign Policy* magazine of Edward R. F. Sheehan's article "How Kissinger Did It" in the Spring 1976 issue. Sheehan's research lends considerable support to the view that U.S. policy has dramatically altered since the Yom Kippur War. Further, the concept of guarantees as a means of both imposing and justifying some kind of a settlement upon the Israelis apparently has been specifically on Kissinger's and Ford's agenda.

According to Sheehan, the early 1975 "reassessment" of Middle East policy led to three policy options. The first and preferred was as follows: "The United States should announce its conception of a final settlement in the Middle East, based on

Historically, guaranteeing Israel's existence through international or bilateral commitments was hardly a novel notion even in 1970. Even in conception, Israel's founding father Herzl contemplated outside protection. "We should as a neutral State remain in contact with all Europe which would have to guarantee our existence", Herzl wrote in *The Jewish State*. Two years after the State's creation there was the Tripartite Declaration by Britain, France and the United States pledging opposition to a Middle East arms race and to "take action, both within and outside the United Nations, against any attempt to violate frontiers or armistice lines". In 1955, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles publicly broached the idea of U.S. participation in more formal international guarantees.

By 1957, what became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine pledged American support for the "independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East". But the overall motivating concept then was the containment of international communism. The Eisenhower Doctrine was not a pledge to defend Israel from the Arabs. For one thing, not until the 1970s has there actually been such a perceived need.

There was, however, one special commitment made by the Eisenhower Administration. In 1957, the U.S. appeared to be assuring freedom of shipping through the Straits of Tiran. But with the collapse in May 1967 of what were in fact various types of international commitments — symbolized so dramatically by the abrupt withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force — Israeli security and regional stability were no longer realistically contemplated in terms of outside "guarantees".

The Israeli predicament, however, soon caused the United States to search again for a way to stabilize the conflict. Beginning with the Four Power Talks and the Rogers Plan, both in 1969, a shift back toward the "guarantee idea" became evident. Resolution 242's ambiguity

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the 1967 frontiers of Israel with minor modifications, and containing strong guarantees for Israel's security. The Geneva conference should be reconvened; the Soviet Union should be encouraged to cooperate in the quest to resolve all outstanding questions (including the status of Jerusalem) which should be defined in appropriate components and addressed in separate subcommittees".

"It was the Israeli lobby", Sheehan writes, "that dealt reassessment its coup de grace". Resuming step-by-step was then the only choice and Kissinger decided to reserve the option "that at some future date, when the President was stronger, when his prospects were more auspicious, he might go to the people with a plan for peace based upon the first option".

"In formulating the first option", Sheehan discovered, "Kissinger's advisers envisioned Ford going to the American people, explaining lucidly and at length on television the issues of war and peace in the Middle East, pleading the necessity of Israeli withdrawal in exchange for the strongest guarantees". pp. 54-59.

in using both the phrases "secure and recognized boundaries" and withdrawal "from territories occupied in the recent conflict" had actually set the stage for a potential schism in U.S.—Israeli relations. This is often forgotten today even though Ambassador Scranton's March 1976 U.N. speech condemning Israeli settlements in the occupied territories (including Jerusalem) may be the harbinger of a similar confrontation. An accurate summary of developments in those years can be found in a study published by The Hebrew University in Jerusalem:

"While Israel placed the emphasis on the word 'secure', meaning natural and defensible boundaries, the United States placed emphasis on 'recognized boundaries', i.e. boundaries which the adjoining states would accept and which would be guaranteed by the great powers. Thus the recognized political boundaries called for by the resolution should not, according to the U.S., reflect the weight of conquest, and should be confined to insubstantial alterations. But in Israel's view, outside guarantees could not serve as a substitute for the essential security which natural boundaries — such as a river, a range of hills, or a stretch of land provide... By late 1969 there were signs that the differences between the United States and Israel were leading to a crisis of major proportions between the two countries".

Two developments in 1970 averted such a crisis. The first was the refusal by both the USSR and Egypt to accept the Rogers Plan, and the second was the influx of Russian personnel into Egypt. Violations in August 1970 of the agreement ending the war of attrition (when missiles were secretly moved up to the Canal enabling, three years later, the Yom Kippur crossing) followed by Soviet encouragement a month later of Syria's attempt to invade Jordan, both contributed substantially to an easing of American pressures upon Israel.

But after Sadat's expulsion of the Russians in the summer of 1972, various strains in the U.S.—Israeli relationship began to reappear. It is fair to say that after the Yom Kippur War of 1973 the severe tensions which existed in 1969 began to return. But this time Israeli dependence upon the U.S. has become immensely greater.

What has now emerged in the 1970's is a series of new approaches to the idea of a U.S. guarantee for Israel. These current approaches are rather differentiable from the past, however. Today's guarantee ideas are predicated not on Israel's strength, but on its weakness; based not on a regional calculus of military forces, but on a world matrix of economic and political forces; structured not on Israeli desires and urgings but on a curious convergence of separate American and Arab perceptions and goals. In the past two years, in the altered environment initiated by the Yom Kippur War, this theme of a U.S. guarantee for Israel has gained

considerable support. Reasons differ, but a great variety of American policy suggestions have the common thread of guarantees. Paradoxically, even those with differing assumptions about the basic nature of the Middle East conflict and the desirable role of the U.S. in encouraging a peaceful solution are allied in proposing "guarantees", no matter how divergent the motives.

Furthermore, the indication by the Soviet Union in April 1975 of willingness to "guarantee Israel's sovereignty" within the pre-1967 lines has raised significantly the political visibility of the guarantee approach. In February of this year, in a speech to the 25th Party Congress, Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev further indicated that his country is ready "To participate in international guarantees of the security and inviolability of the frontiers of all Middle East countries, either in the U.N. framework or on some other basis". As well, a number of Arab leaders — with their own motivations and goals of course — have spoken favorably of guarantees for Israel once it gives up "all occupied territories" and agrees to the restoration of "the full rights of the Palestinian people".

Reflecting the spreading emphasis upon guarantees, the January 1976 Security Council resolution, vetoed by the U.S. for other reasons, specified guarantees for the sovereignty of all states in the area as a central feature of any overall settlement. This clause was the focus of considerable attention, unlike the mention of guarantees in 1967 in Resolution 242.

### **Israeli Anxieties**

Nevertheless, all guarantee proposals — whether in the form of U.S., Soviet Union, joint Great Power, or international commitments — have continued to be received with the greatest of skepticism by the Israelis themselves. They and their American supporters often and well articulate the unacceptability of and dangers inherent in such third-party guarantees. This is thought to be especially the case if guarantees are contemplated as a substitute for Israeli ability to defend itself or as a replacement for a true Arab—Israeli settlement establishing a tangible path to at least a non-belligerent co-existence.

Two basic rationales explain contemporary Israeli apprehensions. First, of course, an historical analysis of "guarantees", be they bilateral or international, is completely unreassuring. A recent Israeli study which surveys the history of Great Power "guarantees" reaches the conclusion that "in view of the inherent limitations of international guarantees, the prognosis for their applicability to the Middle East conflict is poor". A similar attitude is reflected in a second study. While recognizing that "it is widely accepted and expected that any peace settlement in the

Middle East will be accompanied by some form of American guarantee". This second study questions the very nature of guarantees by concluding that "Even treaties must be viewed as mere policy statements. They reflect valid — indeed solemnly accepted — policy of the moment of their adoption, but their future implementation will be dependent on the shape of future policy..."

Moreover, both Jewish and Israeli history do warrant a profoundly skeptical connotation to the very notion of placing modern Jewry's political and cultural fate in the hands of others. Hebrew University professor Joseph Dan simply notes that "The word 'guarantee' has a bad smell in Israel".

Second, the current wave of guarantee proposals is itself thought to be of serious political danger — i.e., widespread acceptance of the guarantee idea in current circumstances risks the creation of unbearable pressure that might crush Israeli ability to resist an imposed geo-political settlement. Such an unstable "peace" might result in future years, it is feared, in military danger more serious than ever before for the Jewish State.

In this way, the perceived interaction between guarantee formulas in the coming months and possible future rounds of military onslaughts in the coming years is central to the Israeli approach to its current predicament. The October War, in many Israeli eyes, has now been shifted to the political front, politics being but a continuation of war through diplomatic chicanery. Guarantees are feared as devices allowing the Arabs to achieve territorial and military goals without having to give substantial political returns ending the state of war. The Israelis are as determined not to be weakened by political debacles as they are determined to win on more obvious battlefields. When it comes to questions of security, Israel is unwilling to gamble or be a test case for geo-political strategists. This is all the more true when it appears that much of the international community is hostile to Israel and when the U.S. seems incapable of a coherent, long-term foreign policy.

### Images of Moderation

The first Israeli concern is strictly *realpolitik*. The second is more political in terms of public attitudes and whether Israel appears reasonable or intransigent.

The public jockeying for position in anticipation of future rounds of step-by-step diplomacy or of eventual resumption of the Geneva Conference (or of a combination of both) involves the creation of images of moderation. In the negotiating context, a willingness by the various parties to "guarantee" Israel's survival (however shrunken and vulnerable it might emerge from political surgery) is meant generally to deflate the

value of Israeli insistence that the Arab states give directly to Israel some reasonable *quid pro quo*. The guarantee idea has not only advocates seriously convinced that it has important merits but also advocates who see it was a way to manipulate increasing pressures upon Israel for concessions. Beyond such pressures, the public statements concerning the possibility of guarantees have been buttressed by very cautious consideration in various capitals, including Jerusalem, of what a U.S. and/or international guarantees could mean — as negotiating proposals in international diplomacy as well as potentially as fact. Secretary of State Kissinger and Prime Minister Rabin are both said to have ordered thorough studies of the various form a U.S. guarantee could take.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile, Soviet willingness to guarantee Israeli sovereignty remains at best uncrassuring in view of apparent Soviet interests and opportunistic elements which permeate Russian foreign policy. And Arab willingness to entertain "guarantees" appears to many as only the public face of an elaborate Arab strategy to achieve present Arab territorial and political aims, whatever the ultimate goals vis-à-vis a Jewish State in the Middle East. With "peace" a decision only for "future generations", "guarantees" do not ring the bell of what Israel has continually sought for risky territorial and military concessions.

Consequently, it is on American guarantees that those seriously contemplating the guarantee idea focus their attention. Here even Israeli apprehensions are mixed with substantial interest. There is skepticism concerning the willingness of the U.S. to extend meaningful guarantees as well as over American credibility, but there is also interest in seeing whether or not a real guarantee relationship is politically feasible. Some analysts have even gone so far as to indicate that Israeli insistence upon the Sinai technicians and the Congressional debate which ratified the second Sinai agreement with Egypt had to do with a testing of the waters to determine how viable a U.S. guarantee might be further down the road after major Israeli territorial concessions.<sup>2</sup>

### **Three Approaches To Guarantees:**

The central purpose of this analysis is to examine the many recent American proposals urging a U.S. guarantee for Israel and to outline the differing assumptions and motivations behind them. Conveniently, these proposals can be divided into three alternative approaches:

1. A guarantee to supplement a settlement reached by the parties themselves.
2. A guarantee to accompany and make possible an imposed settlement.
3. A guarantee to establish a foundation upon which a real peace might become possible.

An additional purpose throughout this analysis is to clarify the reasons for Israeli skepticism and widespread American Jewish anxiety concerning all three approaches to a U.S. guarantee for Israel's future.

### I. SUPPLEMENTING A SETTLEMENT WITH GUARANTEES

It is of special noteworthiness that neither the U.N. Resolution symbolizing the consensus of the international community after the Six-Day War, 242, nor that through which an end was imposed to the Yom Kippur War, 338, calls for outside guarantees as a major element in reaching a Middle East settlement. Resolution 242 calls for negotiations leading to territorial withdrawal to borders which will be both secure and recognized. And this is to be accomplished only in conjunction with the establishment of a just and lasting peace, an end to the state of belligerency, a solution to the Palestinian problem, and the right of all parties to live in peace free from threats or acts of force. Resolution 338 adds a specific call for a settlement achieved by the give-and-take process of negotiations "between the parties" and for the implementation of Resolution 242 in "all" of its parts. The references in 242 to guarantees were almost gratuitous it seems.

Until the Yom Kippur War, the basic position of the U.S. seemed to be one of firm adherence to the requirements outlined in these resolutions. Accordingly, discussion of guarantees for Israel was within the context of strengthening a true compromise settlement once reached by the parties to the dispute. There was admittedly some ambiguity in the Jarring Mission, the Four Power Talks, and the Rogers Plan — but, overall, it was thought undesirable to push a potentially unstable settlement premised upon outside assurance and so-called guarantees. To do so many thought might drag the Great Powers even more dangerously into a potential confrontation while only whitewashing the deep conflicts and antagonisms that would continue to simmer in the region. Recently it has been revealed by Israeli opposition leader Menachem Begin that President Nixon went so far as to assure Prime Minister Meir by letter that the U.S. would definitely not pressure Israel for major territorial withdrawals until a real peace settlement was reached between Israel and the neighboring Arab States. Looking back on the past two years, however, post-Yom Kippur War American policy has diverged almost nakedly from that promise.

#### "Not a Substitute for a Peace Agreement"

As early as 1955 John Foster Dulles indicated that

"President Eisenhower has authorized me to say that given a solu-



tion of the other problems, he would recommend the U.S. join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the (agreed) boundaries. I hope that other countries would be willing to join in such a security guarantee, and that it would be sponsored by the United Nations".

As for the territorial dimensions of the foreseen settlement, Dulles indicated that the 1949 cease-fire lines (the same as in 1967) "are not designed to be permanent frontiers in every respect" and he spoke of a negotiated agreement to "boundary lines of safety" to precede any treaty or guarantee arrangements".

In February 1971, Joseph Sisco, then Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs and the highest-ranking American official most directly and consistently involved in recent years in Middle East policy, renewed this understanding in conjunction with the Four Power Talks then in progress. "We have agreed to begin preliminary talks on the question of supplementary guarantees", he said, continuing,

"However, let me make clear that the principal focus has to be the negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. The discussion of supplementary guarantees in the Four cannot be a substitute for negotiations. Guarantees cannot be a substitute for a peace agreement between the parties. The principal element of security for both sides must be a binding agreement... But if a common understanding can be achieved on guarantees by the Four, it would add, as a minimum, an important psychological and political support of the agreement between the parties"".

Some questions did, however, arise as to the basic U.S. view of guarantees. It is unlikely, in fact, that there was a single well-thought-out basic view. What there was instead was belief in the centrality of U.N. Resolution 242 and in the need for the Arabs to meet Israel's legitimate security needs if they expected withdrawal from territories protective of Israeli population centers and occupied in response to serious provocations in 1967. Just a month after Sisco's statement, President Nixon himself raised some anxieties regarding "guarantees". "We are prepared", he indicated, "to join other major powers, including the Soviet Union, in guaranteeing any settlement that is made, which would give Israel the security of its borders that it might not get through geographical acquisition"". The recognition of the centrality of the new cease-fire lines to Israeli security was there, but there was, as well, the thought that outside guarantees might somehow substitute for regional security.

The triangular trade-off between territorial security, Arab—Israeli settlement leading to security, and outside guarantees providing for security was becoming established. But still, with the focus on a negotiated settlement, the basic role of any guarantees would have to be to strengthen

the fabric of such an agreement rather than to substitute for the fabric itself.

### **Through 1973, Guarantees Only After A Settlement**

In January 1972, Secretary Rogers reiterated the U.S. position, specifically ruling out a unilateral U.S. commitment. Responding to a question about "the prospect of the U.S. actually offering a guarantee of any borders the two sides agree on", Rogers said, "I don't think that the U.S. individually as a nation would undertake that. I think that the U.S. will consider possibilities of some kind of U.N. guarantee". Whether this was meant as a way of deemphasizing guarantees or as negative statement of U.S. views regarding a formal U.S.-Israel alliance is uncertain. What does seem quite clear is that until 1973 guarantees were definitely not the major focus of a strategy by anyone, least of all the U.S., for reaching a Middle East peace. They were most usually thought of as a way of capping an agreement rather than a way of forcing one where the underlying instability of unresolved conflict would remain. U.S. officials always stressed three concepts when guarantees were mentioned.

1. They could only come after a settlement reached by the parties of the various substantive issues between them.
2. They could not substitute for regional security, only supplement security arrangements reached by the parties.
3. They were most feasible as an expression of international community and Great Power approval of the settlement and consequently of willingness to support it.

## **II. IMPOSING A SETTLEMENT BY "GUARANTEEING" IT**

Israeli apprehensions about guarantees are attributable primarily to the context within which they have begun to be raised. As in 1970, former Senator Fulbright continues to promote "great power guarantees... and ...an explicit, binding American treaty guarantee of Israel" as a way of coercing an end to so-called Israeli intransigence on territorial matters and Palestinian "rights". For Fulbright, "Israel... is stalling, and with nothing concrete in mind except to get all the arms and money she can from the U.S."<sup>1</sup>

Concurrence with Fulbright seems to be growing, though a more balanced approach than his is often evident. Former ambassador to the U.N. and to Syria, Charles Yost, writes, "I suspect that, if and when Israel is ever persuaded to withdraw from most of the territories occupied in 1967, it will become more interested in guarantees". As the essential U.S. element in a guarantee framework he suggests "a bilateral treaty between the United States and Israel whereby the former would bind itself... to send U.S. forces to Israel's assistance"<sup>2</sup>. The current

chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, John Sparkman, surprised many when he publicly advocated the creation of a Palestinian state and indicated that "I think it would be fine for major powers to give Israel assurances that she is safe within her borders in return for Israel's surrendering some of the land, if not all".

Many strategists and politicians view an American guarantee as a method by which Israel is to be partially compensated for territorial and political concessions. While some have written comprehensively about the likely benefits and dangers inherent in emphasizing this guarantee as compensation to Israel, few have considered the concept historically or in relation to military and geographic realities. Fewer still have attempted to assess the psychological ramifications on both the Arabs and the Israelis of such a new American preoccupation.

It cannot be said with absolute certainty that American policy after the Yom Kippur War reflects such a new emphasis on guarantees. Secretary of State Kissinger repeatedly denies it in public. Yet the logic of American policies, strategy, and tactics since October 1973 leads to the conclusion that the U.S. now contemplates not a formal, *de jure* settlement between the parties but a *de facto*, quasi-settlement built upon the American relationship with all of the parties". Such a concept could result in an Israeli withdrawal to approximately the 1967 borders and possibly a Palestinian "entity" on the West Bank and Gaza Strip."

Acceptance of such a new status quo by Israel is extremely unlikely without a complete change of attitude by the Arab states (not to mention the Palestine Liberation Organization) or without an unprecedented and highly credible commitment by the U.S. that no military assault against Israel would ever again be tolerated.

This latter possibility, at least in relation to the former, seems the more likely. Even if Arab moderates should be willing to offer some concessions to Israel, it is extremely unlikely that an acceptance of the legitimacy of the Jewish State can be expected in the coming few years". It is also not realistic to expect that the level of trust could in any short period rise to a point where even such a stated willingness on the part of a few Arab leaders would suffice for the Israelis.

The policies pursued by Secretary of State Kissinger seem to many observers to clearly reflect this new preoccupation with guarantees. If true, all three of the earlier concepts which together cast an undebatably supplementary complexion on the idea of guarantees seem to have been altered if not overturned. The current American approach — one apparently supported if not nurtured by at least some of the Arab leaders — seems to be one of using "guarantees" as a political technique for eventual insistence upon Israeli territorial withdrawal, however risky this might be and without fulfillment by the Arab parties

of the requirements laid down in the two U.N. Resolutions.' Such a shift, if it is occurring, would be a substantial political defeat for Israel. It cannot be said with either certainty or proof that post-Yom Kippur War American policy has taken such a definite turn. Yet the logic of American policies and tactics does reasonably lead to such a conclusion.

For many in the U.S., this new American "even-handedness" seems only realistic based on the totality of American interests.' America has become the go-between and at each step appears to take on more responsibility for insuring the steps already taken and the process which must continue. America has become already the substitute for direct negotiations and *de jure* peace. **It is becoming more and more logical that it will eventually offer itself as guarantor of a settlement which will be a peace made not between Arab parties and Israelis but between Arab parties and the U.S. and Israel and the U.S.** Of course, numerous critics have concluded that this new American approach substitutes not just **de facto** peace for the desirable **de jure** peace but an unstable and ambiguous peace for a real peace. Since in the process Israel will be maneuvered out of the territories and possibly into the acceptance of a Palestinian State, Israel's future would become hostage to American credibility and American resolve. Moreover, some critics have concluded that this approach is dangerous to Israel because it fosters the growth of U.S.—Arab relations upon a basis that must necessarily result in greater and greater strain in the U.S.—Israel relationship. As the process continues, the desirability of one further concession rather than risking the collapse of the whole strategy and of the carefully rebuilt U.S.—Arab friendships becomes only reasonable. Meanwhile, Israel's dependence upon the U.S. is becoming near totally resulting in severe psychological uneasiness<sup>29</sup>.

### **The New U.S. Approach**

It is not denied that present American policy involves a U.S. role as intermediary between Israel and the Arab parties. That this is a role which leads immediately to **de facto** and possibly later to **de jure** guarantees of the results of this process of indirect, third-party negotiations is of course denied. Vaguely though, the now well-known "senior American official" did admit in September 1975 that "the placement of American technicians in the Sinai mountain passes... could become a precedent for a larger presence in future Middle East agreements"<sup>30</sup>. The new U.S. policy is one of maximum pressure upon Israel, minimum pressure on the Arabs, and much hope that the regional conflict can be kept simmering below the boiling point. Post-Yom Kippur War U.S. policy seems more and more drawn to pushing Israel into what may prove to be an

illusory agreement with vague guarantees replacing secure and recognized borders, negotiations between the parties, a real end to the state of belligerency, and the beginnings of true peace.

If there has indeed been such a fundamental alteration of approach by the U.S., it has been made possible by the combination of greatly increased Israeli dependence upon the U.S., U.S. recognition of the need to find ways to counteract growing Soviet influence in the Arab world, the astute Arab use of the oil weapon and propaganda techniques, and the adeptness of Henry Kissinger in juggling seemingly irreconcilable interests and policies.

To achieve his stature with the Arabs, Secretary Kissinger has probably had to imply if not actually give various promises. While Israel has continued to receive arms, the Arabs have been given firm reasons to expect near-total Israeli territorial retreat on top of U.S. economic and U.S.-plus-Western European military aid. What Kissinger has gotten in return from the Arabs is less reliance, for the present at least, on Moscow and the potential of significant U.S. influence throughout the region. But the big question mark, and of course the issue most crucial to Israel's supporters, is what the Secretary of State has gotten concretely in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict. There is considerable skepticism that Sadat's "Friend Henry" has achieved any tangible Arab willingness to coexist with the Jewish State". The instabilities of the Arab world and the uncertain aspirations of the Soviet Union only provide further fuel for worry. It is this multifaceted anxiety which is at the very core of Israel's dilemma — since U.S. and Israeli priorities, interests and perceptions do in fact diverge, how can Israel fully maintain U.S. support while maximizing its security interests vis-à-vis an increasingly strong and possibly even more determined coalition of Arab adversaries?

#### **A Coalition of Interests All Converging on "Guarantees"**

The Soviet Union, the Arab States and the U.S. all have their competing reasons for focusing on "guarantees". In short, Secretary Kissinger desires, and reasonably so, a Middle East settlement that will safeguard U.S. economic and political interests in the Arab world. This may be viewed as a settlement that will restrain the influence of the Soviet Union in the area. Since he cannot satisfy Israel's security concerns with Arab assurances, he must instead offer American assurances coupled with military and economic aid in ever-increasing amounts. Unless he can bring about Israeli concessions, it is unlikely that the Arab States will continue to play the game by American rules. And unless Israel will be forthcoming with concessions, the U.S. must use American economic aid and political support as the tools of coercion. The logic of the situation is not as ambiguous as the Secretary of State has often implied.

Meanwhile the Soviet Union continues to search for a method of political and economic penetration into the Middle East which would dethrone Western dominance. The Soviets can afford to wait and see if the delicate game of American diplomacy can actually be conducted successfully. In the meantime, talk of guarantees is only conducive to an image of reasonableness and moderation. And the Soviets know that they can always play the role of spoiler if necessary. This is why such persons as Nahum Goldmann and Lord Caradon insist that America must join with the Soviet Union in bringing about a settlement, not attempt a *Pax Americana* throughout the Middle East. Soviet public discussions of guarantees for Israel must be viewed within this framework.

The Arabs, taken as a whole, seek a weakening of Israel and the increased ability to assert Arab hegemony throughout the Middle East — and eventually, it is hoped, upon Israel. Even the most moderate of the Arab States, Egypt, is now something of an enigma when it comes to co-existence with Israel. As Moshe Dayan has recently responded to the question "Do you think that Egypt is now willing to coexist with Israel, or is its goal to reduce Israel to indefensible borders as a prelude to future attack?"

"It is not a simple either-or situation. I believe that Egypt still wants, above all, to see Israel disappear altogether. But realistically, the Egyptians have already fought four wars against us and lost all four of them... They prefer (now) to conduct a political offensive in the hope of extracting large concessions from Israel... They have succeeded in getting the American State Department to put political pressure on Israel. They are exploiting the various interests of the Americans, the Russians, and the Arabs, coupled with the threat of an oil embargo... Not a showdown of tanks against tanks, but political warfare to achieve the same result".

### **Soviet—American Competition**

It is, of course, the U.S. interest in guarantees which deserves the greatest consideration, since the only potentially acceptable guarantees will in fact have to be American. For Secretary Kissinger, as he assesses historical U.S. interests, the overall need in the Middle East is to counter Soviet regional ambitions dating back to Peter the Great and the 17th century. To attempt this at this time with various domestic constraints on purely Machiavellian initiatives, the U.S. must openly befriend both the Arab States and Israel — quite a feat, which may be why it was never successfully attempted before Kissinger. Nevertheless, the Secretary's even-handedness is a strategy whose theoretical reasoning is quite sound though its practicality must await long-run developments. Meanwhile, it is a policy requiring of Israel the kinds of concessions and risks which

make for considerable and continual friction. Viewed in these terms, recent Israeli bitterness as a result of the "Saunders Document"\* and feuding over PLO participation in the Security Council are occurrences within the logic of divergent overall approaches to the situation.

Since Moscow's primary entrée into the region has been as arms merchant, and since the majority of the Arab States are actually far more receptive to Western culture and economic involvement than to Soviet imperial interests and communist philosophy, Kissinger's approach might well have considerable merit. In attempting to implement if he has increasingly staked his own reputation on the continuation of Arab—American cooperation. He has used U.S. economic aid, arms agreements, and implications of coerced Israeli compliance if necessary, to entice many of the Arab States into an acceptance of his grand design. And in addition, he has once or twice flexed U.S. muscle (rhetorically on oil) to raise fears of possible U.S. imposition of terms upon the Arabs as well as upon Israel. Unfortunately, now citizen J. W. Fulbright is largely correct in his assertions before the Middle East Institute Convention that "the commanding American interest in the Middle East is access to oil. Our interest in Israel is emotional and ideological".

That the U.S. role as middle-man obviously implies some kind of guarantees is undebatable. The Arabs need not be too concerned with U.S. credibility, will, or guarantee potential, for it is they who stand to make gains which do not require guarantees. Clearly Israel is the subordinated party. The promise by the U.S., implicit or explicit, to deliver Israeli-held territories has become something of a hostage for Arab friendship. As the U.S.—Arab relationship grows, the costs of its shattering become commensurately greater. If the U.S. delivers, Israel will at best

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\* This statement has been termed by Congressman Lee Hamilton (chairman of the subcommittee before which it was made) "the most comprehensive statement I have ever seen by the U.S. Government" on the Palestinian problem. It was originally delivered on November 12, 1975 by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Harold Saunders, before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives (Saunders has since been promoted to direct the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department). "In many ways", Saunders testified, "the Palestinian dimension of the conflict is the heart of the conflict". The Israeli Foreign Ministry was enraged and the Israeli Cabinet met to denounce the statement. Nevertheless, the Department released the document as an official statement of "Current Policy" and then, in the December 1, 1975 Department of State Bulletin ("the official weekly record of United States foreign policy"), published the document under the heading "Department gives position on Palestinian issue". See SWASIA (World Council of Churches, New York), December 19 and 26, 1975, for the text of the statement and reactions to it.

be more vulnerable geo-politically, spiritually and economically. If the U.S. fails, the Arabs will be in a good political-military as well as world-opinion posture for war and then the whole cycle could be begun again. Playing the U.S. off against the Soviet Union is always an Arab option. As one Arab spokesman recently put it, "good relations with the Soviet Union are one of the main political cards of all Arabs". There is a higher and higher limit to how far the U.S. can be pushed once the relationship is accepted.

Since the Middle East has for centuries been a region of imperial contests, Soviet—American competition is not itself the new element. What is new is the U.S. attempt to ally with Israel and simultaneously with the Arabs at the very time when Israel's existence has been brought realistically into question and the Arab world is gathering immense economic and political leverage in addition to military power.

For the U.S., Israeli security is only one of a great panoply of interests and worries. Consequently, the U.S. may be quite willing to take certain calculated risks with Israel's future while still sincerely endorsing the Jewish State's legitimacy. Any potential agreement, from the U.S. viewpoint, need not necessarily be lajr — it simply must be acceptable to the Arabs and imposeable on Israel. What is envisioned is not a settlement at any price, but rather a settlement based on U.S. perceptions of interests, not just Israel's security concern or American Jewish anxieties about the future.

Consequently, any credence given to the notion of destroying Israel in stages must be discounted by references to other, moderate statements of Arab spokesmen. There is always enough said to pick and choose. But to grant even minimum validity to the Arab-expounded theory of stages leading to Israel's eventual disintegration would imply a potential sell-out of Israel and raise storms of protest in the U.S. Only with the presumption of Arab, and not just Egyptian, good faith in a new willingness to accept Israel's sovereignty and rightful existence can this post-Yom Kippur War approach be justified.

And this is indeed how the Secretary of State does attempt to justify his policies. In a Jerusalem Press Conference on 17 June 1974, during President Nixon's visit to Israel, Kissinger stated,

"It is our conviction that for the first time in the existence of Israel, the Arab States, even the more radical ones like Syria, are talking about a continuing State of Israel and that some of the Arab States seem to have made a rather crucial decision to seek to work out modalities of co-existence with the State of Israel".

It is, of course, this presumption of a basic and revolutionary change in Arab attitudes — the presumption, in other words, of Arab good faith — which Israel and many of its supporters insist must be put to the test of



actions and facts before Israeli territorial and political concessions which will be irreversible. And if an American guarantee is meant to provide the security needed to test Arab intentions, it must be a guarantee whose credibility will be beyond doubt".

Of all the parties with interests and influence in the region, the U.S. still remains the most powerful and dominant. And it is the U.S. choice of strategy and tactics that consequently may well determine the outcome of Israel's struggle for existence as well as of the Soviet—American competition for regional supremacy. While some have concluded that the Kissinger implementation of even-handedness (first recommended by William Scranton in the early days of Nixon's presidency) is the most hopeful policy for the U.S. and the best that Israel can hope for, others have increasingly concluded that only a return to firm U.S. support for Israel and a determined attitude towards both the Kremlin and the Arab States can give the U.S. a real likelihood of maximizing U.S. long-term interests while assuring Israel's long-run survival. Only then, it is argued, would a U.S. guarantee for Israel really be both meaningful and credible.

But what is so paradoxical is that, even among those with manifestly divergent assessments of the requirements of the current situation, there appears to be agreement on the notion that a U.S. guarantee for Israel is desirable. This is a paradox best explained by outlining the differing perceptions and assumptions which lead both optimists and pessimists to propose a U.S. guarantee. The pessimists believe in the third approach, the deterrence approach, to a U.S. guarantee; while the optimists believe in the second approach, the imposition approach.

### **Kissinger's Ambiguity**

Secretary Kissinger himself has been extremely cautious in mentioning the role contemplated U.S. guarantees are playing in his overall strategy. He is no doubt quite aware of the potential torrent of criticism that could descend upon the Ford Administration and himself personally should his gradual shift toward the imposition by guarantees approach become less ambiguous than it is. What he must fear more than anything else is widespread public agreement with Hans Morgenthau's conclusion that this new U.S. posture may be leading to Israel's "piecemeal dismemberment". Consequently Kissinger has gone out of his way to make it appear that guarantees are thought of only as "icing on the cake", as he put it in an interview last year with the editors of *The New Republic*. The magazine then went on to criticize any thought of using the deception of guarantees to impose a settlement upon Israel, while leaving the architect of this new policy unscathed". But as one of the most perceptive commentators on Kissinger's Middle East policies, Theodore Draper, has written, this Kissinger formulation is in accord neither with a number of earlier remarks nor

with the apparent realities of his complex strategy. Consequently, "If there was a cake... icing would seem to be, in the circumstances, a luxury that could well be spared. The truth is that guarantees look more like icing without the cake". And, in the form of a not very disguised warning Draper adds, "The consequences of attempting to impose a one-sided settlement on Israel, covered up by a less-than-convincing guarantee, would be traumatic for both Israel and the U.S."

The Ford letter to Rabin after the March 1975 breakdown in shuttle diplomacy, which heralded the "reassessment" and was followed by the letter from 76 Senators, may have been the opening shot in the onset of such a confrontation. More recently *The Christian Science Monitor* in a page 1 lead story stated bluntly, "There is a crisis in relations between Israel and the United States", and went on to suggest that a new U.S. policy toward the PLO may well be the next step in the U.S. march toward gradual imposition". Nevertheless, since it is in the interests of both Israel and the U.S. to minimize differences, the battle is largely being fought with forced smiles and in diplomatic circles.

#### **Guarantees as Compensation**

Unlike Kissinger, many of the American strategists who have recently formulated proposals for reaching a Middle East peace with varying reliance on varying forms of guarantees have more candidly discussed the centrality of guarantees as compensation to Israel for a more vulnerable situation post-imposed settlement. The American military alert and heightened fear of a future U.S.—Soviet confrontation are uppermost in mind for many of the academic and political figures who have recently joined the imposition school. Many of them have done so as critics of Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy. Nevertheless, they are united with Kissinger in the pressure that they feel must be applied upon Israel at in the belief that guarantees may simply have to substitute for a real settlement.

For instance, former Under Secretary of State George Ball has written,

"The major nations of the world have an obligation not to stare passively by while a new war flames in one of the world's most sensitive strategic areas... The danger that the Middle East could become a Balkan-like situation involving the superpowers in a nuclear confrontation cannot be lightly dismissed".

Ball's conclusion: an imposed settlement should be "guaranteed jointly by the U.S. and the Soviet Union".

Taking much the same approach, Professor William Griffith of the M.I.T. Center for International Studies warns that

"Unless the United States takes immediate steps to force an Arab-Israeli settlement, the explosion of a fifth war in that tragic area

seems inevitable — along with a new and tougher oil squeeze, widespread financial chaos and the most serious threat to world peace in decades”.

For him, “The key issue involves the territories that Israel conquered in the 1967 war”. And he too favors compensation to Israel in the form of guarantees which would, he claims, “only formalize a long-standing commitment”. “The U.S.”, he writes,

“should sign a formal military pact with Israel, making it clear that we would regard an attack on Israel proper as an attack on the U.S. and that we would send American troops to defend Israel... Come what may, we should never abandon Israel. But defending its conquests is quite another matter”.

Professor Nadav Safran writes, “A resolution of the Arab—Israel conflict has become... an imperative necessity for all the outsiders that have been involved in it”, and he renews his 1971 call for a “mutual defense treaty” to be entered into “after Israel and the Arab States had signed a peace treaty based essentially on the Arabs’ own proposals; and it would be seen as the means by which Israel was brought to agree to those proposals”.

A Harvard colleague, Professor Robert Bowie, concurs. “A continuing stalemate is dangerous to everyone”, he argues.

“A new outbreak of hostilities would not only disrupt the region, it would once more risk U.S.—Soviet confrontation, jeopardizing the flow of oil, and split the U.S. and its allies... Thus an outside initiative seems both necessary and proper... Some will, of course, strongly object to ‘imposing’ a settlement on the parties. The objection seems to me unjustifiable”.

Columbia University’s Zbigniew Brzezinski reaches similar conclusions, though with greater circumspection. “The need to solve that conflict is now more acute than ever, not only because of its threat to world peace, but because of its polarizing effect on American relations with the rest of the world”. Brzezinski states his imposition by guarantees approach with the guarantees somewhat disguised as something coming after a real settlement. Essentially, however, his guarantee proposal, too, is designed to render ineffective Israeli protests — for it should be increasingly obvious that any U.S. spelling out in public of what should be done by Israel and the Arab States borders on imposition upon Israel. The choice would be between agreement and complete isolation. And so, Brzezinski prescribes, “It would be advisable, and timely, for the U.S. to spell out openly what it considers to be the general outlines of a desirable settlement and to indicate that it would be prepared to guarantee it”.

The boundary line, in fact, between the imposition by guarantees

approach and the earlier U.S.—Israeli relationship based on the two U.N. Resolutions and only supplementary guarantees can be said to be where the U.S. might attempt to convince Israel of certain policies but refrains from setting out on an independent course sure to place tremendous pressure upon Israel. This reasoning probably puts Professor Stanley Hoffman's recent call for "a sweeping Israeli initiative" outside of the imposition by guarantees approach. Still, many of those who are hesitant to impose a settlement directly upon Israel are leaning towards pushing the parties into a settlement which would be anchored in guarantees of one kind or another. Hoffman, for instance, believes that "The settlement itself will not be negotiable by the parties alone; other powers will have to play brokers and put pressures on the parties. If there should be a settlement, it will require external enforcement and protection also".

This debate over territories and guarantees has gone so far that James Reston in *The New York Times* has even called into question who Israel's real friends are -- those resisting the shift in U.S. strategy or those advocating more willingness by Israel to take risks in view of Israel's political isolation. For Reston, "The idea of an American 'guarantee' of Israel's security now seems the most relevant, if difficult, compromise". But for Israel, security and long-term existence are not matters for compromise or risk. And if there are to be some Israeli risks for peace, what political risks will Sadat and other Arab leaders, including Arafat, assume to prove that they are aiming at lasting peace rather than a lull in the "historic struggle"?

#### **Yom Kippur Earthquake Shocked Washington As Well**

Post-Yom Kippur War American policy is, it is true, partly the result of Israel's failure to show a way out of the Middle East dead-lock short of more of the same. It is part of the price which Israel must pay for the failure to repel the Arab armies on 6 October. The post-1973 situation as generally perceived in the U.S. is one, in the words of Stanley Hoffman, in which

"A return to the earlier policy was impossible: merely to provide Israel with weapons without pressing toward a settlement would have meant the certainty of more wars, new confrontations with Moscow, a splendid opportunity for the Soviets to expand their influence in the Middle East, a widening breach with Western Europe and Japan (i.e. no possibility of a common oil strategy under U.S. leadership) and the sacrifice of U.S. positions in friendly Arab countries<sup>100</sup>."

As well, of course, the new U.S. strategy is premised on belief that something can be done eventually to alter the somewhat publicly obscured Arab intransigence in refusing any really significant political or military

concessions to Israel beyond verbal moderation before Western audiences. The Arabs know that the scales are heavily weighted on their side and that the U.S. is fearful of losing everything in the entire region and finding itself stuck with only one dependent country of three million Jews and no resources. Not only the potential for collision with Moscow, but the possible renewal of the oil embargo and the possible first-use of the still growing petrodollar weapon have created legitimate anxieties in the U.S.

On top of all these considerations, the Arabs have succeeded in making "return of all territories" appear to be the central issue, and they have as a result of this succeeded in branding Israel rather than themselves with the intransigent label. Few stop any more to ask what the central issue was in 1967 when there were no "occupied territories". Few understand such pleas as that of Lord Caradon, principal author of Resolution 242, who insisted in Lebanon last year that "had we requested (in 242) the return to the 1967 lines, we would have been wrong. I know these lines. They are not feasible. They must be modified". And few are willing to realize that the 1967 lines are merely the unintended result of 1949 developments and are aptly described in Israel as a "strategist's nightmare".

Territorial withdrawal to the 1967 lines is beyond question the main Arab goal at this time. Creation of a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza is a potential result within this larger context of the Arab-Israeli struggle. Consequently few understand what is meant or implied by the phrase "the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people" or talk of a "Palestinian entity" acceptable "for now".

The conflict between Zionism and Arab nationalism is dimly understood outside of the actual arena of conflict. It is small wonder, then, that the U.S. is in the process of completing the shift in policies initiated while the October War was still raging. The 1975 "reassessment" was in this sense only an attempt to formalize and publicly present the new policies already put into effect in anticipation of either a resumed Geneva Conference (eventually a likely forum of imposition) or more bilateral agreements brought about through the good offices of the United States.

#### **Centrality of "Guarantees" in American Policy**

The role of guarantees in this fundamentally altered post-Yom Kippur War American strategy appears nothing less than central. In the case of the Middle East, political interludes between military encounters have become institutionalized, going back to the 1948 war and U.N. cease-fires. The U.S. may well prefer an unstable peace to no peace. And if in fact the guarantee approach has become something of a public-opinion weapon

to neutralize those who might otherwise react vehemently against imposition of an unstable and dangerous "peace" upon Israel, its centrality to current developments is more clear than ever.

A focus on guarantees potentially renders ineffective Israel's two uncompromisable requirements: first, that there be deeds and steps, in addition to rhetoric, leading to an end to the state of belligerency and to some form of minimal co-existence; and second, that the Arabs be willing to enter into direct negotiations leading to a territorial settlement and an acceptable solution to the Palestinian problem. Theodore Draper sums up the meaning of the contemporary focus on guarantees quite succinctly:

"Let us be clear about one thing; the issue... is not whether Resolutions 242 and 338 are good or bad. The issue is whether they are being gutted... It should now be sufficiently clear why a guarantee has, in some minds, been promoted from a supplement to a substitute. It has emerged as the most seductive way of getting around the conditions set forth in Resolutions 242 and 338... If the resolutions were lived up to, guarantees would not be so urgent or would at most be regarded as useful reinforcements. The new prominence of guarantees is a sure sign that the balance in the resolutions has in practice tipped drastically against Israel and that something has to be improvised that would appear to right the balance".

If there is merit in this analysis, what is popularly perceived as Israeli intransigence is in fact the direct result of what might more properly be termed as Arab intransigence. The Arabs have apparently convinced U.S. leaders that the only U.S. policy capable of furthering U.S. geopolitical and economic interests is one which forces Israel to accept far less than what it would be entitled to if fairness and Israeli security were paramount. Again, according to Draper:

"The old concept used to be that there could be no peace in the Middle East unless Israelis and Arabs come to terms with each other. The new concept is for both of them to come to terms with the U.S. It is only one step from this to the concept that the U.S. must come to terms with them by, if necessary, imposing its terms on them...

"It was Sadat's strategy to make the U.S. the center of the struggle... An American guarantee is perfectly acceptable to him because it shifts attention away from anything resembling an Arab guarantee... What starts as a guarantee to Israel ends in reality as a guarantee to Egypt".

And so, "The U.S. has become the main front in the Arab-Israeli conflict".

Though many of the American strategists pursuing the imposition by guarantees approach may not fully agree with this interpretation of policies and events, is it likely most of them are aware of the risks Israel is being pressured to assume. For many other Americans whose first priority in the Middle East is the security and welfare of Israel these risks seem far too great. And for still others, morally committed to Israel yet quite concerned about U.S.—Arab relations, there seems a growing belief that Washington should strengthen the commitment to Israel and build at the same time sound relationships with the Arab States on mutually understood terms, rather than relationships based on expectations of more and more U.S. "even-handedness" until there is little left of the Israel—U.S. alliance. The paradox, mentioned earlier, is that some of these firm supporters of Israel are themselves promoting a U.S. guarantee for Israel, though it is a very different approach which is taken, with different concepts and different strategies.

### III. CREATING CONDITIONS FOR SETTLEMENT THROUGH A U.S. GUARANTEE

#### Attacking Kissinger

Within a few months of the Kissinger diplomacy in U.S. Middle East policy substantial opposition began to emerge. Professor Hans Morgenthau was for a time the most vocal academic critic. U.S. policy, he asserted in an open letter to Kissinger during 1974, was propelling the "U.S. into pressing Israel to make ever more far-reaching concessions until its very existence would be jeopardized". The U.S., he cautioned Kissinger, "must refrain from exerting pressures which can only lead to Israel's piecemeal dismemberment". Questioned by William Buckley less than two months after the war, "Are you predicting the end of Israel?", Morgenthau responded with typical *realpolitik* detachment.

"I do not predict it, but I think it is more possible now than it ever was since Israel was founded as an independent State... I'm not serene about it but I have tried to accustom myself to facing the facts as they are, however disagreeable they may be in terms of my preferences".

Central to Morgenthau's perspective is the belief that "The unchanged objectives of all Arab States, moderate as well as radical, (is) to destroy Israel". This view is widely shared in Israel where

"The basic assumption underlying the Israeli political-military doctrine is the understanding that the central aim of the Arab countries is to destroy the State of Israel whenever they feel able to do so, while doing everything to harass and disturb its peaceful life".

Whereas the imposition by guarantees school downplays the Arab theory of stages, the deterrence through guarantee advocates fear that

a major part of Stage 1, now partially accomplished, is in fact to lull Western public opinion into a belief that further stages are not in fact contemplated. For these more cautious strategists, the Declaration that emerged from the Algiers Summit Conference soon after the October War was in effect a cryptic restatement of the theory of stages which originated in the aftermath of the Six-Day War as the preferred if not only way eventually to defeat Israel. In Algiers, the assembled Arab leaders declared,

"The struggle against Zionist invasion is a long-haul, historic responsibility... The process of Arab liberation (is) 1. Evacuation by Israel of the occupied Arab territories and first of all Jerusalem. 2. Re-establishment of full national rights for the Palestinian people. So long as these two conditions have not been met, it will be illusory to expect in the Middle East anything but a continuation of unstable and explosive situations and new confrontations".

Of course, the Rabat conference in 1974 and the "Zionism is racism" Resolution in the General Assembly in 1975 have only served to confirm this ominous interpretation.

With Arab commentators continually predicting eventual victory over Israel, and with Yasser Arafat's PLO unyielding in its determination eventually to rule over all of historic Palestine (and applauded in international forums for its goals and tactics), the theory of stages appears to many as the most reasonable explanation of current Arab policies. Most recently in Lebanon in April 1974, Dr. Kamel Abu al-Majd, the Egyptian Minister for Youth at the time, restated this basic strategy.

"Egypt is now conducting a multi-stage policy, that is to say, the first stage is to achieve the removal of the consequences of the 1967 aggression, then we shall bring about the removal of the 1956 aggression, and in the third stage we will act so as to remove the 1948 aggression".

Muhammed Hassanein Heikal, one of the best known Arab journalists, believes that "total withdrawal" would "pass sentence on the entire State of Israel". The Yom Kippur War is widely perceived in the Arab world as the beginning of the end of Zionism. As Heikal put it during the war, "The matter no longer concerns the liberation of the Arab territories occupied after June 5, 1967, alone, but also poses a deep and severe blow to Israel's future, although this is not evident now. For if the Arabs succeed in liberating the territory occupied after 5 June 1967 by armed force, what will prevent them in a later stage from liberating Palestine itself by armed force?"

In 1971, Heikal was even more specific.

"There are only two specific Arab goals at present, elimination of the consequences of the 1967 aggression through Israel's withdrawal



from all the lands it occupied in that year, and elimination of the consequences of the 1948 aggression through the eradication of Israel. The second goal is not, in fact, specific, but abstract... We should learn from the enemy how to move step by step".

Most recently, in his book **The Road to Ramadan**, Heikal concludes that future war "is inevitable."

It is interesting to recall that Bernard Lewis as early as 1964 outlined the basic goals of Arab diplomacy regarding Israel. Unlikely to achieve Israel's liquidation by military force alone, the Arabs have been consistently demanding, Lewis then pointed out, even before there were any post-1967 "occupied territories", "an imposed settlement by the great powers — a kind of compulsory surgery on the conference table in which, perhaps, Soviet arms would wield the knife, while Western diplomacy administers the anaesthetic". In this sense, "guarantees" today are designed, many have concluded, as the method of restraining the patient (victim) while the anaesthetic takes effect.

This is not the place to go further into detail on the theory of stages and the current illusion of Arab moderation". It is enough to state that those who are opposing the new U.S. diplomacy believe strongly that Arab aims have not basically changed concerning Israel and that the U.S. is becoming an accomplice to a weakening of Israel which might, in time, prove to be fatal. This view is actually quite widespread and accounts for pollster Lou Harris's findings that "American Jews now seem totally possessed of a doomsday vision of what will happen to Israel and what might happen to Jews in this country".

#### **Return to Resolutions 242 and 338**

Until recently, Morgenthau and others have called for a return to the earlier U.S. policy of insistence that the Arabs reach a compromise settlement with Israel, including negotiated borders and security arrangements, and that in the meantime the U.S. continue to supply Israel with the weapons necessary for deterrence as well as defence. As Draper recently indicated,

"What is desperately needed is an unflinching American determination to see the Middle East conflict through on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338... If American pressure is designed to extort substantial concessions only from the Israelis, it will not result in a durable and peaceful compromise".

The trouble with arguing for a return to earlier policies is that there is simply too much opposition in the U.S. Furthermore, the Arabs, having tasted U.S. "even-handedness" and the possibility of actually neutralizing Israel's only remaining protector, will continue to amass economic and political pressure upon the Americans. The Israelis, fearful of U.S. un-

willingness to back Israel fully, will prepare for the worst and will remain determined to trade territory only for real political concessions which are unlikely to be forthcoming. As for acceptance of a West Bank and Gaza Palestinian State, Israelis still seem totally unwilling, largely for security reasons, to tolerate the idea. A U.S. return to the earlier policy after all that has occurred will no longer offer the hope of creating a stable political-military foundation from which moderate Israelis and truly moderate Arabs will be able to make progress. It is too late to return to policies applicable only before the events brought about by the Yom Kippur War and before American and Israeli interests became so clearly divergent.

#### **Hard-Line Promoters of a U.S. Guarantee**

In this context, the paradox that a U.S. guarantee for Israel is also promoted by some of those who oppose the imposition by guarantees approach and who are more pessimistic about the depth of the Middle East Conflict can be understood. The primary apostle to date of the deterrence approach to a U.S. guarantee for Israel is Professor Richard H. Ullman, a past member of the National Security Council staff and currently Director of the Foreign Policy in the 1980's project of the Council on Foreign Relations".

In Ullman's view, American diplomacy since the Yom Kippur War "is likely to produce the worst possible outcome — a war in which the Israelis might suffer drastically and in which the U.S. might very well find itself, willy-nilly, involved". For Ullman, Morgenthau, and other critics, the very ambiguity of current U.S. policy only encourages the Arab stage-by-stage planning while creating ever greater fears in Israel. What Ullman sees as likely to happen during the coming years is a situation where the Arab States, after continuing to apply increasing pressure upon the U.S. — oil, petrodollars, propaganda, and a possible turn toward Moscow — and after forcing the U.S. to apply unsuccessfully ever increasing pressure for undeserved concessions from Israel, will resort to war. Rather than U.S. "even-handedness" leading to peace, it is more likely to lead the Arabs to see in American wavering and Israeli weakness potential victory, or at least gains through war. At the point of a future conflagration, the U.S. would be more than ever required to intervene on Israel's side (under unbearable domestic pressure, of course) and this could result in the collapse of all the carefully cultivated American gains in the Arab world. Better now, the argument goes, to make the Arab States unequivocally aware of the unyielding American commitment to Israel and then attempt to gain Arab friendship, rather than allow that friendship to develop with false illusions that the U.S. can eventually be turned away from Israel. As Ullman puts it,

"The relatively ambiguous nature of the present American commitment encourages the Palestinians along the road of irredentism... induces Israeli military leaders and politicians alike to think in terms of worst-case scenarios... and... does not deter those in the Soviet Union who would pursue adventurist courses".

### **Premises of the Deterrence Camp**

Deterrence approach advocates of a U.S. treaty alliance with Israel, which would of necessity include the stationing of some U.S. forces in Israel to demonstrate the validity of this commitment (to the Americans themselves as well as to the Arabs and the Israelis), do foresee Israeli territorial concessions. In fact, in Ullman's second major article which appeared last summer he implied that to effectuate a U.S. guarantee offer Israel would have to withdraw to approximately the 1967 boundaries. But the motivating concepts of those who support Ullman's analysis are quite different from the perceptions of the situation held by those in the imposition through guarantees school. The deterrence approach is based upon a number of differing premises:

1. An imposed "peace" would be dangerously unstable and would probably only encourage Arab dreams of eventual victory over Israel. Arab aims of eventually destroying Israel have not been changed, they have only been stretched out in time and become much more sophisticated in design. An imposed peace would be seen as proof of the effectiveness of the 1973 war and the use of Arab economic and political power.

2. Israel has become something of a dependency of the U.S. and this new post-Yom Kippur War relationship requires something more than the earlier political support and arms sales. In short, Israel's ability to deter Arab attack short of nuclear weapons is now something determined as much in Washington as in Jerusalem. The more essential American resolve to Israel's survival, the more that resolve needs to be demonstrated unambiguously.

3. To be fully credible a guarantee for Israel must be given because the U.S. positively decides to do so, not because of a negative, reluctant decision to do so because it is the only way to impose a Middle East settlement.

4. Only an unequivocal U.S. guarantee can create on both sides the realization that Israel's destruction is not a realistic possibility now or in the future, thereby establishing the long-term basis for a compromise settlement. Neither the Soviets nor the U.N. has the strength, credibility, or desire to accomplish this goal. As Ullman puts it, "My proposal... is aimed not at achieving 'peace' in the sense of formal recognition and treaties — at least in the short run. It is aimed at creating a foundation of security upon which, eventually, formal peace might be built. It is aimed

at taking the possibility of Israel's destruction out of the day-to-day politics of the Arab States, so that Arab leaders who want to coexist with Israel will not always feel forced to escalate their anti-Israel rhetoric to combat that of rival politicians".

The first premise has already been elaborated upon. The difference between those of the imposition school and those advocating a deterrence-motivated guarantee is one of perceptions regarding Arab aims, expectations of the stability of an imposed settlement, views on the state of American credibility and resolve, and outlooks as to what further Soviet initiatives can be expected in the region.

The third premise has much to do with Israeli apprehensions as well as with the interpretations that will be made of such a U.S. guarantee by both the Soviet Union and the Arabs. If a U.S. guarantee comes as a means of forcing Israel into withdrawal, it lacks the sense of permanence which is vital to its role. A guarantee to be effective must be unalterable over time and sure in its application. It must be the product of desire by both parties involved. If given out of consideration for the ties that exist between two countries and after a careful process of deliberation, then it is much more likely to be found acceptable.

As for the fourth premise, here is the main divergence in perspective between the imposition advocates and the deterrence believers. Ullman believes that peace is not possible at this moment ("the dynamics of politics on both sides" make peace "very nearly impossible in present circumstances") precisely because the Arabs are not convinced that they have to live with Israel and the Israelis are not convinced that they can always count on American support. By altering these doubts on both sides, the conditions for moderate leaders to make the compromises necessary for real peaceful co-existence might become reality. "The purpose of outside guarantees, therefore, would in effect be to remove the issue of Israel's 'existence' from the politics of the Arab world by confronting with force majeure those who would deny it". Those who favor imposing a settlement believe that the Arabs will acquiesce and accept Israel once there is a return to the 1967 lines, that the conflict today stems from the "occupied territories". Why the Arabs continue to stress "restoration of the full national rights of the Palestinian people" even after return of territories is not adequately explained, since under such circumstances the Arabs themselves could decide about a West Bank State if that is what they are willing to settle for. The basic difference is that one group sees peace possible now if Israel would just make concessions, while the other sees peace as possible in the future and only then if the U.S. makes unequivocal its commitment to prevent Israel from ever being destroyed as a sovereign country.

### Dependent Israel

It is the second premise, however, which deserves more probing attention. If the strategic and psychological arguments are unconvincing to Israeli skeptics concerning even the deterrence approach to a U.S. guarantee, it is possible that cold economic and military analysis might be more successful. Israel now lives through a *de facto* American guarantee. The 1973 war terminated Israeli independence considerably more than the Israelis are usually willing to recognize. Bluntly, in the past two years, Israel has become something of an American protectorate. This is harsh reality for a people whose nationalism has its origins in the desire for independence and self-reliance after centuries of oppression and domination. But, in three senses, it is truth: the psychological deterrence sense, the military balance sense, and economically. And it is this context within which a formal treaty alliance is advocated.

With the collapse of Israel's purposefully fostered image of invincibility, its position in the Middle East has become one in which future battles against it can be realistically begun with hopes of both political and military success. For three decades Israel has striven to prevent just such perceptions by its enemies. But, as *New York Times* military editor Drew Middleton puts it, "Israel's power is no longer great enough to deter the Arabs... We may have seen the last limited war in the Middle East... In the future, the military odds against Israel will be longer than they have been since 1948".

Many take issue with this view and obviously the Israelis themselves will not publicly concur. Nevertheless, Rabin's talk of an agreement to refrain from striking at each other's cities and the references by both Rabin and President Ephraim Katzir to nuclear weapons "if need be" belie the new anxieties which have gripped Israel. Robert W. Tucker's recent advocacy of Israeli deployment of and reliance upon a nuclear deterrent to free it from dependency on America has added considerably to the debate over how to respond to American pressures. Deterrence is largely a matter of psychology. Israel lost its ability totally to frighten the Arabs in 1973, and, with political forces always sure to prevent an Arab rout, the Arabs are in a much less deterrable posture than before 1973. A nuclear balance of terror may in fact become the result of such a situation.

As for the objective military balance, Israel is economically being drained for military defenses. For the first time in its history she requires great quantities of military grant aid to keep an adequate balance of forces. A few figures tell the story. Currently, Israel is spending about 31% of her GNP and approximately 40% of her budget for military

1967, 26% in 1970, and 45% in 1973. For the decade 1963—1973, Israeli military expenditures rose approximately 26% yearly\*\* while its GNP increased 8% and its GNP per capita only 5%. As Stanley Hoffman puts it,

“It is imperative for Israel's own future that the weight of the state-of-war budget and balance of payments be reduced. The only alternative is a drastic reduction in the standard of living that would both provoke serious inner tensions if it goes too far and increase the appeal of ‘hawkish’ solutions”<sup>†</sup>.

As for arms aid, in the two decades preceding 1973 the U.S. sold to Israel (mostly through loans) a total of about \$1.2 billion in arms. In 1973 alone the U.S. allocated to Israel over \$2 billion with the majority in the unprecedented form of grant aid. The current request to the U.S. is for just under \$2 billion in military aid and some three-quarter billion in economic aid. And the prognosis is at least for requests of the same magnitude into the foreseeable future.

While in earlier years the Diaspora could make contributions that made quite a difference to Israel, now, for every \$1 from American Jewry, the U.S. government gives more than \$3. The U.S. is no longer Israel's arms salesman, it has become Israel's arsenal and military reserve. And in addition, the decisions made in Washington concerning military aid for Israel have a tremendous bearing on the funds which Israel has for economic growth and social welfare. A cut, for instance, of \$500 million in the aid requested from the U.S. would result in another 10,000 unemployed persons, and this in an economy which currently has about 32,000 unemployed.

The economic situation is potentially disastrous, especially should constant amounts of U.S. aid not be forthcoming. As Finance Minister Yehoshua Rabinowitz recently stated before a workers' audience, “You must wake up and realize what has happened to this nation in the two years since the Yom Kippur War... Let's face it: we must all drop to a lower standard of living”<sup>††</sup>.

What all of this means is simply that Israel has now become a U.S. dependency both militarily and economically as well as politically. Under such conditions, discussions of a formal U.S. guarantee for Israel take on a different complexion from that before the October earthquake. Even if Israel were to reach the 50% level of domestic arms production, a goal recently set by Defense Minister Peres, the dependence on the U.S.

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\* Closer to 60 percent if debt servicing is included, the debt primarily due to earlier defence spending.

\*\* This figure is somewhat inflated due to high expenditures in 1973.

will continue to grow and the need for an arms airlift in the event of a major war will not disappear. The Kfir fighter plane is really more of a spiritual lift than a means of shifting the arms balance away from unprecedented dependency. It is unlikely as well that a nuclear deterrent will suffice to alter the situation. Such a strategic deterrent might prevent defeat but it would not be effective against terrorist attacks or conventional wars of attrition. As for her economy, Israel's coming years will be successively trying and the need for American aid in larger and larger amounts will become apparent.

#### **Others Have Joined Ullman**

Ullman is not alone in promoting the deterrence approach to a U.S. guarantee for Israel. Over two years ago William Buckley suggested that Israel become the 51st State. Though he was not taken seriously at the time (not even by himself), his underlying analysis of assuring Israeli security seems appropriate today. More recently, the past naval chief-of-staff, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, suggested what he termed a "practical, workable" solution to head-off a potential superpower confrontation. He advocated the stationing of troops in Israel and the creation of something resembling the Dominion status now enjoyed by Puerto Rico. Hans Morgenthau also has recently joined Ullman at least to the extent of basing part of the Sixth Fleet out of Israeli ports, though he remains extremely skeptical about any "guarantees".

Most recently Ray Cline, past Deputy Director of the C.I.A. and past Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, has advocated inclusion of Israel within a new alliance network designed to restore U.S. world posture and credibility".

#### **Israelis Remain Opposed**

But even though the deterrence approach to guaranteeing Israel is one far less odious to Israeli security needs, it has not gained the support of Israel and her American supporters. Though it is possible to consider such a U.S. guarantee, if approved by Congress in the form of a treaty, to be a Zionist triumph ranking with the Balfour Declaration and the U.N. vote to legitimize a Jewish State in Palestine, this is definitely not how the proposal is viewed by those who see themselves as the main supporters of Israel. There are a number of reasons to explain this reluctance by Israel and her supporters to contemplate seriously even this form of a U.S. guarantee.

First, the differences in concepts and motivations are not all that clear in the proposals. A guarantee is a guarantee, with its strengths and weaknesses, regardless of why it is promoted. Especially since Ullman has himself hinted at how his proposal would "make possible" Israeli

territorial withdrawals (short of an end to the state of belligerency), his idea seems to melt all too readily into those put forward by the imposition advocates. The variable factors are what would be required of Israel to gain the guarantee and what the Arabs would be expected to give before Israel would be expected to withdraw from most of the territories. Had Ullman clearly stated, as has Ray Cline, that he favored granting, independently of other considerations, a unilateral guarantee for Israel — while also returning to U.S. insistence on negotiations leading to territorial compromise and full implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338 — then possibly the deterrence approach would have been clearly demarcated from the others. His failure to do so and his uncertain position on many of the ideas of the imposition school make his guarantee idea far too ambiguous, especially when contemplating what happens to subtle differences when ideas are put before the public or into negotiating agendas.

Second, Israel faces at this moment in history serious political and public opinion problems in determining its negotiating stance at any future Geneva Conference. What is surely feared is that by supporting any kind of guarantees — even the supplementary kind — Israel will find itself at Geneva facing a barrage of pleadings that it is intransigently risking both regional and world peace with semantic obstinacy regarding the type of guarantees that it is willing to accept. The boundary between imposition of a settlement built squarely around guarantees, supplementing a real settlement with outside guarantees, and creating the conditions for a future settlement through deterrence-motivated guarantees, is one subject to too much confusion in public forums where rhetoric counts for more than actions. With Geneva a forum “to exert Soviet—Arab pressure on Israel, and perhaps on the U.S. as well, to achieve an imposed solution that would contain neither peace nor security”, in the words of Prime Minister Rabin, interest in any guarantee proposals is all too likely only to increase the chances of an imposed settlement and/or Israeli political isolation.

Third, political conditions within the U.S. are hardly receptive to the rather bold idea of a true deterrence commitment to Israel in the form of a treaty plus troops. America is doing much more than reassessing Middle East policy — it is somewhat paralyzed contemplating its role in world affairs. So why, under these circumstances, give any support to an unworkable idea, consequently risking having such support misunderstood as acceptance of the overall guarantee approach to a Middle East settlement? Besides, what is crucial now is not public Israeli support for the idea, but a broad-based realization in the U.S. of the need for strengthening the US—Israel alliance to prevent further Middle East



fighting and to allow America to build Arab—American relations on a mutually understood basis.

The Israelis seem absolutely convinced that the guarantee idea under current circumstances and however presented is a dangerous one for them. Lately there has been some recognition of the need to strengthen, especially in Arab eyes, the American commitment to Israel. But attempting to do so with a guarantee seems far more risky than potentially fruitful. As Professor Amos Perlmutter put it in the 7 February 1974 issue of *Ma'ariv*,

"Perhaps there is a need for an explicit security guarantee from the United States — but it would be insufficient by itself as a condition for Israeli withdrawal... No guarantee by the U.S. could be a substitute for a substantive open change in the Arab attitude and trend of thought concerning the political integrity and independence of Israel. The past history of international relations shows that the guarantee of Big Powers to small countries has never served effectively as a substitute for the security of the small States — and, in the end result, they were not honoured, either".

### Conclusion

Faced with such a defensive political posture, Israel is of course not looking forward to an easy time at Geneva or wherever else the Middle East debate is pursued. At best it seems that the U.S. will remain unwilling to consummate publicly the new imposition strategy and negotiations will remain at a deadlock. Few in Israel, or even in the U.S., really believe a settlement is reachable at this time, though many worry that there is serious potential for increased political isolation of Israel, public opinion slippage, and even American neutralization. The Arabs may well use stalemate as the platform upon which to launch a campaign for Israel's expulsion from the U.N. and then possibly another war, hoping for even more world acquiescence and U.S. "even-handedness".

In anticipation of such negative developments, this last and most acceptable of the current approaches to a guarantee for Israel might be deserving of more thought. How can Israel turn the guarantee idea to its advantage? Israel needs desperately to go on the diplomatic offensive and a plan for "a sweeping Israeli initiative", as outlined by Stanley Hoffman and others, combined with interest in an Ullman-type guarantee, might succeed in throwing the Arabs on the defensive and turning the tide of the diplomatic battle.

There would be risks in such an initiative. Most worrisome, the Arabs might only appear to fulfill certain Israeli requirements, leaving Israel with untrustable guarantees and a vulnerable geo-political situation. But the political risks of Israeli inaction are growing and it is imperative for

Israel to reverse the diplomatic pressure and regain a greater measure of unwavering public support if it is to lessen the dangers of renewed warfare and derail what is sure to be the greatest effort since its creation to impose an unacceptable settlement. Risks now seem greater in attempting to maintain the *status quo* than in making broad proposals for peace and at least encouraging a rethinking of guarantees more along the lines of the deterrence approach. Even should Israel decide that it cannot or should not back these proposals publicly, it should find ways to foster this approach within the American policy.

The American guarantee idea is, in the words of a Brookings Institution study titled "Toward Peace In The Middle East", perhaps the most controversial aspect of the U.S. role. The 16 persons who formed the study group, all well-known and influential, concluded that

"The Congress might... consider favorably some form of guarantee of a comprehensive peace... If at any time it should appear that a supplementary unilateral guarantee to Israel alone or to other parties as well were essential to the conclusion of a settlement, we believe such a guarantee would be in the U.S. interest".

But there is a contradiction in such reasoning. A guarantee cannot be both "supplementary" and "essential". Robert Tucker is correct. "There is no escape from the conclusion that an American guarantee is either a deception, however unconscious, or a very serious undertaking".

It is this conclusion which should become the starting point of all future discussions concerning a potential American guarantee for Israel.

\* Author's note:

As this article goes to press in the summer of 1976 an interesting study has been published by N.A. Pelkovits, a research fellow at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington. See Pelkovits, N.A.: "Security Guarantees in a Middle East Settlement"; Foreign Policy Papers, vol. II, No. 1, 1976; Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications.

Working under a Rockefeller Foundation grant, Dr. Pelkovits, a former State Department official whose last position was as director of U.N. policy planning, concludes as follows:

"In sum, guarantees can provide supplementary insurance that is useful though not worth a high premium -- and no one is asking Israel to pay such a premium. ... All this, however, is far down the pike, and if Israel has cause for nervousness it is because some have raised the issue of guarantees out of turn in the negotiating process -- exaggerating their utility and intensifying pressures on Israel to trade off recognition and secure borders for bilateral and international assurances. At the proper time, such guarantees could reinforce the settlement".

Unfortunately, Dr. Pelkovits' research does not adequately deal with the strategic and deterrence arguments raised by Richard Ullman and others in view of basic changes that have occurred since the Yom Kippur War.

Taking a somewhat different but as yet undefined approach is an organization

in Great Britain known as The World Security Trust. An ambitious project has been begun to conduct an 18-month study on "the constructive role that the super-powers might play in offering guarantees, supplementary to the mutual commitments undertaken by the parties and to any U.N. safeguards, in support of a peace settlement, which could provide the establishment of a durable peace in the Middle East". This is designed as a regional pilot study within the larger interests of the Trust which are "to seek to identify and to promote new approaches to international security".

### NOTES

1. Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State* (Tel Aviv, Rohald Press, 1956), p. 66.
2. Shlomo Slonim, "United States-Israel Relations 1967-1973: A Study in the Convergence and Divergence of Interests", *Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems* 8, The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, September 1974, p. 19.
3. *Jerusalem Post*; February 25, 1976; p. 1.
4. Alan Dowty, "The Role of Great Power Guarantees in International Peace Agreements", *Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems* 3, The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University, February 1974, p. 27.
5. Michla Pomerance, "American Guarantees to Israel and the Law of American Foreign Relations," *Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems* 9, The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, December 1974, pp. 5, 37.
6. "What Value are Guarantees?" *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review* (London); April, 11, 1975; p. 11.
7. See James Reston, "Guarantee for Israel?" *New York Times*, 21 February 1975; and "Second Thoughts on U.S. Guarantees," *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, 28 February 1975.
8. This is a particularly controversial subject and one which remains in the diplomatic closet. See however the front page *Washington Post* story by Marilyn Berger, "U.S. Precedent Seen in Pact," 4 September 1975. There is now considerable evidence Kissinger strongly opposed sending American technicians to the Sinai, but gave in to Israeli insistence. See Edward R. F. Sheehan, "How Kissinger Did It," *Foreign Policy* 22, Spring 1976, p. 61. Additionally, Sheehan quotes a senior Kissinger aide to the effect that in mid-1975, in negotiations over the then secret "Memorandum of Understanding" to accompany the second-stage Sinai withdrawal, early Israeli drafts "amounted to a formal political and military alliance between Israel and the United States". See p. 60. Sheehan's book titled *The Arabs, Israel and Kissinger* is being published by Reader's Digest Press in September, 1976.
9. Department of State Bulletin, 5 September 1955, pp. 379-80.
10. Department of State Bulletin, 8 March 1971, p. 293.

11. Department of State Bulletin, 25 March 1971, p. 438.
12. Department of State Bulletin, 24 January 1972, p. 91.
13. J. William Fulbright, "Getting Tough With Israel", *Washington Monthly*, February 1975. For Fulbright's original proposal of a guarantee see *Congressional Record*, 24 August 1970, p. 29805; and "Fulbright's Proposals", *The New Republic*, 10 October 1970, p. 20.
14. Charles W. Yost, "Mideast: Is It Peace or War Ahead?" *Christian Science Monitor*, 7 August 1975.
15. "Sen. Sparkman: Israeli Pullback in Return for Big Power Guarantees", *Jerusalem Post Weekly*, 28 January 1975, p. 2.
16. See Robert W. Tucker, "From Dependence to Nuclear Weapons", *Commentary*, November, 1975, p. 29, where he concludes that "The logic of [step-by-step] diplomacy is inevitably to make Israel more dependent... The American government has abandoned its former support of the concept whereby peace in the Middle East would have to come through a process of direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs ... For an indefinite period... the diplomatic reality will be an America that negotiates with the parties to the conflict and to whom the parties must in practice bring their complaints".
17. Israel's willingness to have the U.S. pursue with the Arabs states the possibility of ambiguously ending "the state of belligerency" rather than totally normalizing relations is an indication that both Israel and the U.S. are sensitive to how difficult acceptance of Israel's "legitimacy" will be for many years to come. Malcolm H. Kerr, President of the Middle East Studies Association during 1971-1972, writes in the introduction to one of the most useful new books on the Middle East imbroglio that "There is no getting around the fact that any Arab recognition of Israel under any circumstances would engage a powerful and damaging symbolism of failure and dishonor... it would mean a bitter conflict amongst the Arabs themselves: between conservatives and radicals, between Arab governments and the Palestinian liberation movement, between those Palestinians who are ready to settle for half a loaf and those who are not." Malcolm H. Kerr, editor; *The Elusive Peace in the Middle East* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), p. 14.
18. "Meet the Press" Transcript, 23 February 1975, pp. 1-2.
19. James Reston, "Guarantee for Israel?" *New York Times*, 21 February 1975.
20. See, for instance, the charge by Yuval Ne'eman, past President of Tel Aviv University and recently adviser to the Ministry of Defense, that "We have lost even the shadow of being an independent, self-respecting state having its own national interest." *Jerusalem Post Weekly*, 10 February 1976, p. 2. See also Wolf Blitzer, "The View from Washington: A Tense and Nervous Mood," *Jerusalem Post Weekly*, 21 January 1976; "Anxiety and Frustration: Mood of Israel Today", *U.S. News & World Report*, 9 February 1976, pp. 32-34; "Ultimatum Unveiled," *Jerusalem Post* editorial, 29 January 1975.

21. Marilyn Berger, "U.S. Precedent Seen in Pact," *Washington Post*, 4 September 1975, p. 1.
22. According to Matti Golan in his recently released book *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger* (New York, Quadrangle: 1976) all that will remain of Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy is Kissinger's "perfidy". "It now seems that his diplomacy has run its course, without having laid any foundation upon which to build a new structure of peace in the region". P. 251.
23. See Nahum Goldmann, "The Time For Peace", *Journal of Palestine Studies* 14, Winter 1975, p. 120; and "Delay in the Middle East: An Interview With Lord Caradon", Mark Bruzonsky, November 1975, to be published.
24. Joan Peters, "A Conversation With Davan", *Harper's*, November 1975, p. 74.
25. J. W. Fulbright, "Beyond the Sinai Agreement", *Worldview*, December 1975, p. 9.
26. "U.S. Policy in the Middle East, December 1973 — November 1971", Department of State publication 8799, January 1975, p. 17.
27. For challenges to the Kissinger presumptions and strategy see two recent books by Gil Carl Alroy: *The Kissinger Experience — American Policy in the Middle East* (Horizon, N.Y.: 1975); and *Behind the Middle East Conflict* (Capricorn, N.Y.: 1975).
28. "Midcast Peace?" *The New Republic*, 8 March 1975, p. 8.
29. Theodore Draper, "The U.S. and Israel: Tilt in the Middle East?" *Commentary*, April 1975, p. 23. A superb and indispensable article.
30. "Israel Grows Wary U.S. May Desert It", *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 December 1975, p. 1.
31. George Bell, "The Coming War in the Middle East and How to Avert It", *Atlantic Monthly*, January 1975, p. 6.
32. William E. Griffith, "It's Our Move in the Middle East", *Reader's Digest*, February 1975, p. 72.
33. Nadav Safran, "The War and the Future of the Arab—Israeli Conflict", *Foreign Affairs*, January 1974, p. 215; and Nadav Safran, "Middle East: The Fleeting Opportunity", *The Nation*, 5 April 1971, p. 425.
34. Robert R. Bowie, "For a New Mid-east Strategy", *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 April 1975, p. 27.
35. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Unmanifest Destiny: Where Do We Go From Here?" *New York*, 3 March 1975, p. 51.
36. Stanley Hoffman, "A New Policy for Israel", *Foreign Affairs*, April 1975, p. 420.
37. James Reston, "Who Are the Friends of Israel?" *New York Times*, 31 January 1975; and James Reston, *New York Times*, 21 February 1975.
38. Stanley Hoffman, "Tiptoeing Toward Peace in the Middle East", *Harvard Political Review*, Spring 1975, p. 33.
39. Interview with Lord Caradon, *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13, August 1974, p. 198.
40. Draper, *op. cit.*, p. 39.
41. Draper, *op. cit.* pp. 41, 29.
42. See *Congressional Record*, 30 April 1974, p. H. 3404.
43. "The Middle East Explosion and American Detente", *Firing Line*, PBS Transcript.

- 25 Nov. 1973, p. 6. See also Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Geo-Politics of Israel's Survival", *The New Leader*, 4 February 1974, and Hans J. Morgenthau, "An Intricate Web", *The New Leader*, 24 December 1975.
44. Michael I. Handel, *Israel's Political-Military Doctrine*, Occasional Paper 30, Harvard University Center for International Affairs, July 1973, p. 61.
  45. *New York Times*, 29 November 1973.
  46. *Al-Anwar* (Beirut daily), 10 April 1974, reprinted in *Near East Report*, 26 June 1974, p. 149.
  47. *Al-Ahram*, 19 October 1974.
  48. *Al-Ahram*, 1971.
  49. Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (New York, Quadrangle: 1975), Preface.
  50. Quoted in Gil Carl AlRoy, "Do the Arabs Want Peace?" *Commentary*, February 1974, p. 59.
  51. In addition to the AlRoy books noted in note 27, see also Joan Peters, "In Search of Moderate Egyptians", *Commentary* May 1975, p. 57.
  52. Louis Harris, "Oil or Israel?" *New York Times Magazine*, 6 April 1975, p. 21.
  53. Draper, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.
  54. There are some important exceptions. The most important is a new committee in Israel led by Arie Lova Eliav, former secretary-general of Israel's dominant party. The committee is willing to consider total Israeli territorial withdrawal and the possibility of a Palestinian state. See "Israel Group Urges Palestinian Talks", *New York Times*, 13 January 1976; *INTERCHANGE* (New York, Breira), March 1976; and "Israel and the Palestinians: A Different Israeli View" (New York, Breira: 1975).
  55. See Richard H. Ullman, "After Rabat: Middle East Risks and American Roles", *Foreign Affairs*, January 1975, p. 184; and "Mr. Ullman Replies", *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1975, p. 579. All quotations are from these two articles. Also see Mark A. Bruzonsky, "The U.S. and Israel: Proposals to Avert Another Middle East War", *International Problems*, Fall 1975, p. 30.
  56. Richard H. Ullman, "Alliance With Israel?", *Foreign Policy*, 19 Summer 1975, p. 18.
  57. Drew Middleton, "Who Lost the Yom Kippur War?", *Atlantic Monthly*, March 1974, p. 45.
  58. Robert W. Tucker, "From Dependence to Nuclear Weapons", *Commentary*, November 1975, p. 29.
  59. Hoffman, *op. cit.*, *Foreign Affairs*, p. 420.
  60. "Wake up to fiscal facts or face disaster: Rabinowitz", *Jerusalem Post Weekly*, 2 December 1975.
  61. Ray Cline, *World Power Assessment* (Georgetown University, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Washington: 1975).
  62. "Toward Peace in the Middle East", The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1975, pp. 22-23.
  63. Tucker, *op. cit.*, p. 37.