

Dependent Israel: The Two Options

Mark Bruzonsky and Israel Singer

Rarely have Israelis felt more frustrated and alone." Newspapers are filled with such reports—this one from the *New York Times* following the U.S.-Israel feud over PLO attendance at the Security Council Middle East "debate" and the lingering bitterness over the "Saunders document."* At this moment Geneva seems distant and the Saunders statement more of a beginning than anyone will admit, even if there might be a respite until after the American election. Following a visit to the U.S., Knesset member Aharon Yariv, formerly the Minister of Information, is back in Israel publicly warning that U.S. support for Israel's political posture is waning and that America is moving toward recognition of the PLO and possible advocacy of a Palestinian state.

There can no longer be any real doubt that Israel's ostrichlike attitude on the Palestinian problem is seriously draining the immense reservoir of Western public support that has always existed for the Jewish state. Prime Minister Rabin's December insistence that Israel will "never" negotiate with the PLO or consider a third state in historic Palestine may have been little more than emotionally inspired overkill in the face of ever mounting pressures for a break with Golda Meir's approach. But such policies are causing an ever greater isolation and even alienation. The early December Israeli air assault on Palestinian camps in northern Lebanon had much the same effect.

The result, even in Israel, is increased doubt that Israel is capable of the desirable firmness, coupled with the necessary reasonableness. The fragility of Rabin's domestic political coalition cannot, month after month, be an acceptable excuse for such political frozenness and myopia. It must be admitted that the charge of intransigence has a basis in reality. Shimon Shamir, Chairman of

MARK BRUZONSKY is a Washington writer and consultant on international affairs. He has just returned from a visit to Israel. ISRAEL SINGER is deputy chairman of the Judaic Studies Department at Brooklyn College, where he teaches the history of Zionism. Together they are at work on a book, *Let There Be Peace*, discussing the possibility of coexistence between Israel and a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Tel Aviv University's Department of History, is correct when he writes that "Some of Rabin's statements seem so divorced from the present reality in the Middle East that it was difficult to believe that he meant what he said." What "Israel desperately needs," according to Shamir, is "a more positive position through which she could offer all elements in the Palestinian world an entrance into political discussions aimed at bringing peace to the Middle East." (Shamir and most others who have been calling for a new Israeli approach to the Palestinian problem are supporters of what is popularly termed the Yariv-Shemtov formula. With this approach Israel would announce its willingness to negotiate with any Palestinian group that renounces terrorism, is willing to recognize Israel's legitimacy, and agrees to negotiate on the basis of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338.)

Israel's sense of isolation is undoubtedly intensified by the unceasing and, for the most part, unbalanced journalistic discussions of Israeli inflexibility and political paralysis. And of course everything else has been compounded by the "Zionism is racism" resolution—one which understandably has stirred the mobilization instincts of Israelis and Jews everywhere. Dr. Joachim Prinz, for instance, one of American Jewry's elder statesmen, who in 1948 resigned his membership in the

*This document was originally delivered by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Harold Saunders before a Congressional subcommittee. (Saunders has since been promoted to direct the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.) "In many ways," he testified on November 12, "the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of the conflict." The Israeli foreign ministry was enraged, and the Cabinet met in Jerusalem for a long Sunday session. A few weeks later the State Department released the Saunders statement as an official department document on "current policy." It was then published in the December 1 *Department of State Bulletin*, "the official weekly record of United States foreign policy," under the heading "Department gives position on Palestinian issue." Coming weeks after the initial furor, these two publications have substantiated speculation that the Saunders statement represents a new approach to the Palestinian problem on the part of the United States.

Zionist Organization of America, believing Zionism no longer had a major function in Jewish life in the United States, rejoined recently in a defiant show of solidarity. And as one young, rather apolitical Sabra writes from Tel Aviv, "It's funny, suddenly everyone here is a Zionist."

To formulate new policies while under continuous attack, to make concessions, to admit past errors and misperceptions, to consider major historical compromises, always difficult to do, is even difficult to contemplate under present circumstances. To take the requisite counteractions of moderation at a time of relentless pressures from friends and foes alike is politically inconceivable to many. Prime Minister Rabin himself is said to be absolutely determined not to initiate any policy shifts others could interpret as imposed upon Israel or as signs of Israeli weakness. He is apparently determined to "tough it out," to use a phrase reminiscent of Rabin's choice for the American Presidency in 1972. This means at least no initiatives until 1977, until after the American election, and possibly then an attempt to get by the coming "lean years," to use one of Rabin's own catch phrases.

And yet it is thought by growing numbers of those in the United States deeply concerned about Israel's future, including the present writers, that it is in Israel's own enlightened self-interest to come forward in the coming months with an historic peace initiative. In our view, this may well be a political imperative, for in reality Israel's only other option is quickly becoming one inspired by a Masada-like despair—a turn toward a nuclear regional balance of terror.

For Israel's political and economic welfare such a peace initiative is the only way to regain the greatest possible measure of public support and to maintain without further risky strains the *de facto* American alliance. In terms of Zionist psychology, it may also be the only realistic strategy for maintaining the greatest measure of Israel's fast fleeing independence.

Israel has indeed lost much of her former independence. When a small nation spends nearly 50 per cent of its wealth on the military and relies upon a single source for sophisticated arms and military grants, no illusions can camouflage the state of dependence. When a small nation absolutely requires increasing amounts of economic aid and a constant inflow of Jewish diaspora funds, it would be folly to portray its situation as one of independence. And when that small nation fulfills all of these roles, the reality of dependence is all the more pronounced.

Foggy Bottom and Jerusalem have become at best partners on diplomatic and military matters—and increasingly he who pays the bills may try to call the tunes. The recent disclosure of substantial cuts in military aid for fiscal 1977 (even if partially restored by a Congressional maneuver) underscores the meaning of the Saunders document and is a clear indication of the pressures Israel must expect from now on unless it reverses its image of stubborn defiance and its attitude of *ein breira* (no alternative).

These undesirable images and attitudes cannot be

substantially altered through any repackaging or any new sales campaign of current policies. New policies are essential not only in themselves but also to bring the U.S. and Israel back into a reasonable alliance. Otherwise, Yariv is correct in prophesying that there might well be "U.S. pressure for an overall settlement which would involve maximal territorial concessions but would be weak on the content of peace." "They are getting fed up," as he puts it. "One day they might just lay it down the line to us; take it or leave it."


Only Israelis taken in by their own self-assurance will not realize that today's dependence could lead to tomorrow's imposition. And since, we believe, there is less hope of a lasting peace through imposition than through attempted compromise, Israel should, for its own sake, decide to offer major concessions on territories and on Palestinian nationalism. The risks of attempting to hold today's ground may not be greater any longer than those of opening the doors to a possible Palestinian state. And for those who insist that the Israeli political spectrum would degenerate into open warfare should Rabin choose such a liberal-dovish strategy, Yariv is again right in insisting: "We've got to decide what we want. We might as well have it out at least: we're tearing ourselves apart anyway."

Now that the new Committee for an Israeli-Palestinian Peace (Eliav, Pa'el, and Avneri, among others) has called for a Palestinian state, a joint Israeli-Arab municipal administration over Jerusalem, and negotiations with "a recognized and authoritative body of the Palestinian Arab people," it is finally clear that it is impossible any longer to prevent a major debate within Israel. Both Abba Eban and Itzhak Navon, Chairman of the Knesset's important Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, have been urging, though with diplomatic restraint, a much more conciliatory policy on the Palestinian problem along the lines of the Yariv-Shemtov formula.

And in addition to all this Shamir is correct to warn that unless Israel comes forward soon, "there is a danger that the U.S. and other states which still oppose PLO representation in the political process will overlook the necessity of forcing the PLO to issue even the vaguest declaration of recognition of Israel." This may be, Shamir insists, "the last chance Israel will have to consolidate a position with the U.S. which would exchange PLO participation for meaningful and concrete concessions." Such a consolidation will obviously require the firm and reasonable Israel that can only reveal itself through a major peace initiative.

The earthquake of Yom Kippur, 1973, has altered in fact, if not yet fully in the Israeli consciousness, the economic and political face of Israel. Coupled with the new relationship, still rather embryonic, between leading Arab states and the U.S., Israel is under potential American domination as never before. This new condition of dependency requires bold thinking and action by the Israelis.

Stated even more bluntly, the Zionist creed of Jewish sovereignty in Eretz Yisrael to reestablish conditions in which Jews would be responsible for their own political, cultural, and economic welfare is today challenged by these factual realities. The Kissinger-Ford policy of



“evenhandedness,” rapprochement with the “moderate” as well as moderating Arabs, and the countering of Soviet regional influence must logically continue to include a policy of Israeli concessions. The Kissingerian logic leads to only one eventual conclusion if Israel refuses altogether to offer some realistic alternative—a *de facto* imposed “peace” requiring near total Israeli territorial withdrawal and the creation of some form of Palestinian entity, most probably in the form of a West Bank plus Gaza Strip Palestinian state. Coupled with such an admittedly unstable *modus vivendi* would be a complex of U.S. and international “guarantees” extended to Israel to at least safeguard its remaining physical “independence.”

Psychologically the Israel that might emerge from such a continuing process of imposition would not, however, be the Zionist state that was the Zionist dream. After two years of unceasing concessions, Palestinian and Arab slanders, and backroom threats, Israel is already on the road to becoming a homeland with a traditional Jewish ghetto mentality. The struggle for Jewish national autonomy cannot be victorious with an Israel that has lost its self-confidence, political integrity, self-respect, and sense of power over its own future. Linked with the deteriorating economic situation and the social tensions that are seriously exacerbated by the economic drains necessitated by the stalemate with the Arabs, the Israel that would emerge from these future years of imposition would be hardly comparable to the thriving state of today. It would not be the fulfillment of Zionist aspirations—and in all likelihood the flow of immigrants would be from, not to, the Jewish state. (It seems this is already beginning to occur with the recently revealed statistics indicating that last year about the same number of persons left Israel as

arrived.) Israel would instead become a self-conscious, fearful, militaristic enclave—a neoghetto indeed, and one threatening not only its inhabitants but also the diaspora Jewish communities, which would be forced to wrestle continually with the issues of dual loyalty and Jewish survival. Religious groups in Israel are increasingly the vanguard of this kind of unreasoned outlook. Their radicalism of the right on political matters, drawing the rest of the country into a position of no retreat, is a perfect throwback to the ghetto they seem to remember best.

Independence is far more than a matter of political sovereignty or even military security. It is a condition, a psychological state of mind. Few small nations have real political and economic sovereignty in the modern world. “Interdependence”—a word much in vogue—is even applied to the Superpowers to illustrate how old concepts of nationalism and self-determination have lost the clarity of meaning they represented in a pre-“One World” world.

For Israelis and Jews the ideal inherent within political Zionism understandably remains imbedded in the concept of maintaining an uncompromising Israeli independence. The Nazi slaughter must always be remembered as a central shared formative experience for modern Zionists. And yet Zionism has a different meaning to many Sabras and to most young Jews in the diaspora, especially those in America. For them Israel’s existence and security—and indeed its very “independence”—can be conceived in a manner partly separated from tragic Jewish history. For many of the young, Israel is increasingly a “normal,” secular state where the majority of the population is of Jewish heritage, while at the same time it remains a uniquely Zionist state. Consequently, for many of Israel’s most determined supporters independence is a condition of thought and feeling, not a reflection of what the Jews of the Pale never had.

Such a "condition" of independence is essential for the future of a vibrant Israel. It is not a condition dependent on territorial boundaries alone, or the situation with the Palestinians alone, or even on the degree of objective dependence on the United States. It is, however, a condition dependent on *how* boundaries are finally settled, *how* the Palestinian national problem is handled, and *how* the U.S.-Israel relationship is conducted.

If a territorial-political "solution" is eventually imposed upon Israel, the "condition" of independence will have been severely, if not fatally, compromised. And perhaps even more tragically, those within the Arab world who are determined to conquer Israel will interpret imposition as the ultimate weakness, and weakness as the essential prerequisite for continuing struggle. Such imposition will also define the U.S.-Israel relationship far into the future as one of simple subordination. The consequences of these developments on the very meaning of Zionism and the continuation of the Jewish state might be catastrophic—if not in terms of the state's physical being, at least at the psychological level.


But if a solution to the territorial situation and the Palestinian problem can be accomplished (or at least begun) during the coming years with Israeli cooperation, or even through Israeli initiatives, then the "condition" of independence will be maximally preserved. Zionism will then emerge much surer of itself, more convinced of the eventual possibility of evolving a true peaceful coexistence, more accepting of the U.S. guarantee relationship that in a *realpolitik* sense already exists.

Israel faces only two real options in 1976. Neither is absolutely certain to insure the healthy survival of the state, but one is clearly preferable to the other at this juncture in Zionist history. Some, like

Rabin, will argue that in view of the impending American election Israel can reject both of these options, that it has, once again, an opportunity to wait and see. But the period of ease will not last long, and the dangers of delay, with pressures continually building, are increasingly severe. It is not just Kissinger and Ford who are backing Israel into a corner from which there is no escape; it is the real and growing divergence in interests and attitudes between the U.S. and Israel. No election results will alter these realities for long.

The first of Israel's two options can be termed the "nuclear option." The case for it has been made reasonably well by Robert W. Tucker in the November, 1975, issue of the American Jewish community's leading journal, *Commentary*. The argument is simply that Israel should move from a position of having nuclear "capability" to one of having a real nuclear deterrent upon which Israel's overall geopolitical strategy would be based. "With a nuclear deterrent, Israel's destiny need no longer rest in American hands," Tucker insists. "A nuclear balance between Israel and the major Arab states would have a stabilizing effect.... What nuclear power can provide is an environment in which problems either must remain unresolved or their realization sought through means other than war."

The second option is for Israel to come forward with a bold and imaginative peace initiative with the aim of bringing the half-century-old conflict to an end through major territorial and political concessions. Such a plan for real peace would include return to approximately the 1967 boundaries, with special provisions for the Old City of Jerusalem. It would also include an acceptance of the historical validity of Palestinian nationalism and consequently of the need for a Palestinian state and something like the Yariv-Shemtov formula for negotiations with the PLO. Once these boundaries of a settlement are



acknowledged by both Israel and moderate Arab leaders, the discussion can then turn to the crucial issues of security, demilitarization, economic arrangements, and "guarantees."

The difficulty with the nuclear option is not simply strategic or military. In a sense Israel has already taken this nuclear step of desperation. President Katzair's remarks following the Yom Kippur War were obviously designed to signal the world that Israel has nuclear capabilities to which it would turn in extremis. But what Israel has wisely refrained from doing is to turn the Middle East into a minibalance of terror. Israel has consistently refused to take the Middle East down that road, always making clear, however, that it would respond swiftly to any such moves by its enemies.

If Israel were to pursue the nuclear option at this time, it would risk important psychological and political benefits of its past policies and incur potential economic, political, and psychological costs of the gravest magnitudes. Even if the balance of terror were to prove effective in preventing major warfare as well as small-scale conventional wars of attrition and terrorist attacks, the Jewish state would of necessity take on Spartan characteristics. With little world support or understanding, Israel's isolation would become near total. Her population would be completely locked within unstable borders totally surrounded by hostile neighbors. Survival would be synonymous with fear of total annihilation. After a few years it is unlikely that even the United States would continue massive military and economic aid unless Israel were forthcoming on territorial return and Palestinian "rights."

But then there would be general recognition that the reason Israel chose the nuclear option was that it judged such concessions insufficient to ensure lasting peace. The nuclear option having been effectuated, what reasons would then exist for concessions after the fact? And wouldn't the nuclear option strengthen the more militaristic, expansionist, and reactionary elements within Israeli society?

Pressures there would be, of course, especially from the United States. But a principal reason for choosing the nuclear option is to shape Israeli policies free of U.S. dictate. As pressures grew, refusal to accept imposition would in all likelihood escalate. Part of the Tucker thesis is that Israel cannot make the concessions that the U.S. is likely to attempt to impose upon it and consequently must develop an independent nuclear deterrent. It follows that Israel could not sensibly make such concessions after having chosen to go it alone. If such utter defiance were to become Israel's answer to the post-Yom Kippur War world, a break with the U.S. would become more than possible.

Israel cannot afford to alienate further both its friends and its antagonists. The dangers of total political isolation are only one aspect of what could result from choosing the nuclear option. Surely a fortress Israel would have to face a world economy increasingly pressured by Arab states and Arab oil against Israel. And American billions, already in question, definitely cannot

be expected if Israeli policies are generally perceived by American politicians as opposed to American interests and by the American public as dangerous to world peace.

Finance Minister Yehoshua Rabinowitz has already warned of possible economic catastrophe in the form of massive, crippling unemployment unless Israelis accept a more austere lifestyle. This has become necessary because Israeli dependence upon the United States has become evident in the economic area as well as in the military, and the Israeli Government desires to reduce this dependence at the price of lowering the standard of living. For instance, a cut of \$500 million from the 1976 American aid package of \$2.3 billion would probably have resulted in another ten thousand Israelis out of work this year. And during 1976 unemployment was already anticipated to rise from 37,000 (3.2 per cent) to about 60,000. The cuts in military aid proposed for fiscal 1977 will have to be reflected in Israel's overall budget and will consequently greatly increase Israel's economic problems. "You must wake up and realize what has happened to this nation in the two years since the Yom Kippur War....Let's face it: we must all drop to a lower standard of living." Thus the Finance Minister in December, 1975.

The nuclear option may in fact have to be pursued at some time in the future. As long as Arab willingness to accept a real coexistence with any Zionist state in any form within any frontiers remains in question, the nuclear option will exist. And the military security of a 1967-size Israel, especially with a Palestinian state federated with Jordan or squeezed in between Jordan and Israel, might indeed make imperative at a future date an announced nuclear deterrent.

But what the Israelis presently reject is the necessity of putting Arab policies to the test before any such acts of desperation. And this can be accomplished only through an historic and all-encompassing peace initiative. Should reasonable and conciliatory Israeli offers be refused, then Israel might be justified in an *ein breira* decision to pursue the nuclear option. At such a time it might well have the support not only of its entire population but of the U.S. and other Western countries as well.

Stated again bluntly, the pursuit of the nuclear option would now be interpreted as the ultimate act of Israeli defiance and bring about a basic change in the U.S.-Israel relationship. It would have the joint result of creating a ghetto-mentality within Israel and an attitude of skepticism and even hostility toward Israel throughout much of the world.

Consequently, Israel stands to gain far more from an unambiguous and public policy of maximal concessions. What is required is a comprehensive formula for peace designed to force the Arab states to reveal their actual goals and to press the Palestinians finally to state publicly a position on coexistence or unending hostilities with Israel. All but the PLO have at least said they are willing to coexist with Israel in return for a stated willingness to make concessions approximating the 1967 boundaries and for recognition of the national rights of the Palestinians. And within the PLO it

is again said there are "moderates," Arafat included, who will accept a two-state compromise while continuing to dream of a single, secular Palestine. (It is of special importance to note that Israel's U.N. ambassador, Chaim Herzog, has recently drawn attention to the necessity of putting the PLO to the test. A former advocate of the Yariv-Shemtov formula. Herzog is obviously restrained by his position from further advocacy. But he rather coyly said recently: "I am not free today to express my opinion on this issue. But I can mention a recent article by Shafiq al-Hut, a top PLO official in Beirut. In it he wrote that Yariv's proposal came as a thunderbolt to the PLO and caused deep rifts within their ranks. The removal of the proposal, al-Hut added, came as a blessing from heaven.")

Whether this willingness to coexist with Israel is actual and will be lasting, and whether it will remain after Israeli concessions have been totally made, are not questions to be lightly dismissed. They are hard, serious questions. Nevertheless, political conditions necessitate an Israeli initiative to reverse the burden of peace. It should not, and must not, be Israel that appears to be refusing an historic compromise or negating the rights of Palestinians to their own state. Rather the Arab states and the Palestinians must appear as those who are intransigent and unwilling to accept the right of Jews to a state of their own. This may well be the reality today, as so many Israelis constantly argue, but it is definitely not the perception widely held throughout the world and increasingly debated in the U.S. And even within Israel and the supportive American Jewish community there are, it must be admitted, doubts that have rarely, if ever, been passionately and widely expressed.

Recently Rabbi Henry Siegman, Executive Vice President of the Synagogue Council of America, courageously dissented from customary positions. Stating that current Israeli policies "may contain the seeds of disaster," he charged that the American Jewish community is guilty of "mindless dogmatism" and an "irrational unwillingness to look at new realities," coupled with a "troubling tendency...to suspend its own critical judgment entirely when it comes to Israeli foreign policy." This signals, we think, the beginning of a great debate within the American Jewish community. (His article appeared in September in *Israel* in *D'var* and in the January, 1976, issue of *Moment* magazine in the U.S.) This debate will of necessity go beyond Israeli policies and focus on the entire American-Israel relationship.

The new dependent Israel cannot continue to act as the old Israel. The Israel-U.S. relationship is now a crucial factor in all matters affecting Israel's welfare and future. If the nuclear option is ever pursued, the decision must be made with sensitive awareness of its effects in both Israel and the United States. Those effects in today's environment would be potentially deleterious for the U.S.-Israel relationship; this reason alone argues for other alternatives.

But Israel has in fact few alternatives. Though both Minister of Defense Shimon Peres and Prime Minister Rabin have been repeatedly hinting that Israel may just try to ride out the storm, it is unlikely that political

pressures can be contained for much longer. Israel, we believe, will find itself imposed upon if it fails to come forth with initiatives of its own. At the time of such attempted imposition the nuclear option may seem most attractive indeed. And yet, politically and psychologically, this would be exactly the wrong time to implement it.

Prime Minister Rabin recently came to the U.S. insisting that "You cannot achieve peace but from the standpoint of strength. It cannot be done from a standpoint of weakness. With a weak Israel no one will negotiate. Only in a strong Israel can there be a hope for peace." But Rabin better than anyone must know how weak politically, if not militarily, Israel has become. And the U.S. cut in arms aid plus increasing Arab political, military, and economic strength is putting Israel in the position where another war would severely damage its political, economic, and psychological health. Such a situation would make an Arab decision to go to war rational, even without the assurance of a victory.

Clearly the course Israel is on is fraught with immense danger. In fact, it is now practically beyond doubt that the current battle, in which Israel is attempting to hold the line on Palestinian national rights and the representativeness of the PLO, is a losing one. As the chairman of Georgetown University's Department of Government, William V. O'Brien, recently put it to a group of Jewish students upon his return from a visit to Israel: "I'm afraid we're just stuck with the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians... Israel simply has to negotiate, even though the odds are against her." And Dr. O'Brien, it should probably be noted, is a longtime, ardent supporter of Israel.

A new battle line should be drawn. The fight should be over the absolute necessity for mutual recognition and over what reasonable conditions Israel can rightly expect to be agreed to before there is serious consideration of the idea of a Palestinian state solution—conditions such as formal recognition, demilitarization, open boundaries, economic exchanges, Great Power (especially U.S.) guarantees. Unless ex-General Rabin recognizes the lineup of political forces and retreats now to more defensible political battle lines, he may lack the strength to do so later. Then an unstable imposed settlement may become the only choice available to the United States.

The *Washington Post* summed up the thinking of a significant sector of the American people following the recent Security Council drama. Rabin, the editorial stated, "will have to display great qualities of leadership to start moving the Israeli mainstream toward a position on the vital Palestinian issue consistent with the world's interest in a Middle East settlement. We think, nonetheless, that this is the direction in which Israeli as well as American policy must move." And the *Post* went further. "A Palestinian State...will eventually have to be established in the Middle East."

The time has come for Israel to let everyone know its territorial and security requirements for a real peace. Then the burden will be on the Arab states and on the Palestinians to reach a reasonable settlement; and on the U.S. to understand.