

MONOGRAPH

A UNITED STATES GUARANTEE FOR ISRAEL?

by
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This monograph
presents individual research
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FOREWORD

The troubled Mideast continues to be a zone of bitter antagonism and conflict among the regional interest groups and nations of the area as well as a zone of competition for influence by the United States and the Soviet Union. To control this turbulence and reduce the risks of war, should the U.S. be prepared to guarantee Israel's security within the framework of a new Mideast status quo? If so, what form should such a guarantee take? How can it be made fully credible? What conditions should precede willingness to extend such a guarantee? These are reasonable questions, perhaps crucial to the future of the Mideast as now structured politically.


In January of this year the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies published a monograph by Roger F. Pajak on "Soviet Arms Aid in the Middle East," which outlined one major destabilizing element in the Mideast. This study by Mark A. Bruzonsky examines the constructive diplomatic and political role the United States might play to offset Soviet influence and bring an end to the periodic Arab-Israeli wars and a beginning of a peaceful settlement in what is now surely the world's most explosive strategic region. The question of a United States guarantee for Israel will undoubtedly be a subject of growing importance as further efforts to resolve the tensions and conflicts of the Mideast continue. It is a question that has to be answered after the November Presidential election, if not before. This monograph analyzes the alternative policies and their strategic implications in a systematic, enlightening way. It provides the basis for a thoughtful view on the controversial and often emotionally clouded issue of a clearcut U.S. security guarantee for Israel.

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CHAPTER I
THE BACKGROUND

1. The Guarantee Idea

The conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis has involved the great powers ever since the turn of the century when both Jewish and Arab nationalists sought European support for their conflicting aspirations. Today, the Middle East conflict remains one of the world's most intractable.¹ Even more ominously, the regional conflict undoubtedly contains the potential for global cataclysm. Less obvious, however, is that potential resolution of the conflict may also require the continuing involvement of the great powers, especially the United States.

The purpose of this monograph is to consider one form of such continuing involvement -- the concept of an American guarantee for Israel's security. Such a guarantee could follow a settlement reached by the parties to the Middle East conflict, or it might accompany a settlement imposed upon the parties. As a third possibility, a guarantee could be extended to Israel as a means of assuring her of continual American support and as a means of deterring further military assaults against the Jewish State.

Even if various forms of international or multilateral guarantees accompany a new status quo in the region, only an American guarantee has any likelihood of being credible to the Israelis. Furthermore, there is a widespread conviction that only U.S. willingness to offer Israel such a guarantee would make defensible continuing American efforts to prod Israel toward militarily dangerous concessions, however much such concessions seem otherwise reasonable. There is also a group of strategists who base their support for extension of a U.S. guarantee only partially on encouraging Israel to make concessions. More crucial in their view is the need to convince the Arabs that Israel's survival is not negotiable. A U.S. guarantee, this group argues, is capable of setting the stage for a settlement which might otherwise not be forthcoming.

Much of the American political community has remained so shaken by the turbulence of the 1960's and early 1970's that objective examination of the potential roles the United States might constructively play in the Middle East has been rare. Public opinion, Congress, the academic community and the foreign policy professionals have yet to engage in a

serious dialogue strictly on the merits of competing proposals and strategies. When American society is prepared for a comprehensive attempt to evaluate how the Middle East bombshell might, at a minimum, be defused, it is hoped this study of what can be termed the "guarantee idea" will aid in untangling the complex issues involved.

2. The Guarantee Idea Today

There is a growing realization that American policy after the October 1973 war may be leading toward an attempt by the U.S. to strongly encourage and possibly impose some kind of quasi-settlement in the Middle East. A quasi-settlement would be one reached indirectly and without the establishment of normal relations between the principal parties and one less stable than the usual peace agreement where all issues are resolved and a binding peace treaty concluded. If this speculation is valid, U.S. willingness to guarantee such a quasi-settlement might act both as a major incentive and also as a justification.

Many would consider such a development a most precarious situation. It would be, they think, an unstable and false peace for which Israel would be required to make major concessions and assume unacceptable risks. Forcing Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and allowing the creation of some form of Palestinian entity -- all coupled to an American guarantee -- would only result in furthering Arab hopes that over time Israel's fate would be sealed, they would argue.

For others, the idea of an American guarantee for Israel has become, however uninviting, the only foreseeable way of attempting to bring some stability to the Middle East -- an area where the level of mistrust and fear makes all but impossible a settlement reached by the parties themselves. While obviously not as desirable as a full settlement, a quasi-settlement is far preferable to no settlement.

Regardless of one's perspective within this debate, the logic of current American Middle East policy -- whose origins pre-date the Yom Kippur War and can be traced back to the policy of "even-handedness" first heralded by special envoy, now U.N. Ambassador, William Scranton in 1968 -- will probably continue to require concrete Israeli concessions in exchange for far less concrete Arab concessions. The process

of negotiations in the past few years has positioned the U.S. squarely in the middle. America has become much more than a catalyst for indirect negotiations. More and more the American role is that of an umpire -- one with the power to impose some decisions should no other alternative allow the step-by-step process of negotiations to continue.

As Israeli dependency upon the U.S. becomes more established, American influence over Israel clearly increases. As the Arab world becomes economically and politically stronger, American interest in maintaining good relations with Arab countries grows. Add to this the American need to counter Soviet influence in the entire area and the multi-faceted equation of American Middle East interests begins to take shape.²

Even this most sketchy overview of contemporary American involvement in Middle East affairs helps explain why American and Israeli interests, never as linked as the Israeli lobby would have everyone believe, are seriously diverging.³ What Israel can be reasonably offered by both the Arabs and the U.S., in exchange for continual concessions, obviously becomes the central unresolved question. And it is at this point that U.S. guarantees fit directly into the future of Middle East negotiations, with the U.S. potentially exercising the umpire's power.

3. The Guarantee Idea Historically

In 1970 when Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee J. William Fulbright proposed a United States treaty with Israel to guarantee her security, the guarantee approach to settling the Arab-Israeli conflict became a matter of some discussion in American foreign policy circles. During 1974 and 1975 the idea of a guarantee for Israel resurfaced in a variety of forms, and more importantly, for a variety of reasons.

Historically, guaranteeing Israel's existence through international or bilateral commitments was hardly a novel notion back in 1970. Zionism's founding father, Theodore Herzl, had long before contemplated outside protection for any Jewish state. "We should as a neutral state remain in contact with all Europe which would have to guarantee our existence," Herzl wrote in Der Judenstaat.⁴

In 1950, two years after Israel's birth, there was in fact the Tripartite Declaration by Britain, France and the

United States pledging opposition to a Middle East arms race and to "immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent" future warfare. The three Western powers declared "their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area."⁵ The U.S. had stood by and watched Israel's struggle in the late 1940's, but once she established herself as a nation, American sympathies tended toward protection of Israel.

In 1955 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles publicly broached the idea of U.S. participation in more formal international guarantees. By 1957 what became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine pledged American support for the "independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East."⁶ But the overall motivating factor then was the Cold War and the containment of international communism. The Eisenhower Doctrine never was a pledge to defend Israel against the Arabs. For one thing, not until the 1970's has there actually been such a perceived need.

There was, however, one special commitment made by the Eisenhower Administration. In 1957 the U.S. appeared to be committing itself to the assurance of freedom of shipping through the Straits of Tiran. However, in late May of 1967, the various types of international commitments which the U.S. promoted collapsed.⁷ This was symbolized dramatically by the abrupt withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force, followed by President Johnson's reluctance to act in accordance with the U.S. commitments regarding the Straits of Tiran. As a result, Israel's security was, for a few years, not considered in terms of outside assurances.

The Israeli predicament, however, soon caused the United States to search again for a way to stabilize the conflict. Beginning with the Four Power Talks and the Rogers Plan, both in 1969, a shift back toward the "guarantee idea" became evident. Resolution 242's* ambiguity in using both the phrase "secure and recognized boundaries" and withdrawal "from territories occupied in the recent conflict" had actually set the stage for a potential schism in U.S.-Israeli relations. Today this is often forgotten. An accurate summary of developments in those years can be found in a study

*See the Appendix for the text of U.N. Resolution 242 of 1967 and Resolution 338 of 1973.

published by The Hebrew University in Jerusalem:

While Israel placed the emphasis on the word 'secure,' meaning natural and defensible boundaries, the United States placed emphasis on 'recognized boundaries,' i.e. boundaries which the adjoining states would accept and which would be guaranteed by the great powers. Thus the recognized political boundaries called for by the resolution should not, according to the U.S., reflect the weight of conquest, and should be confined to insubstantial alterations. But in Israel's view, outside guarantees could not serve as a substitute for the essential security which natural boundaries -- such as a river, a range of hills, or a stretch of land provide.... By late 1969 there were signs that the differences between the United States and Israel were leading to a crisis of major proportions in relations between the two countries.⁸

Two developments in 1970 averted such a crisis. The first was the refusal by both the USSR and Egypt to accept the Rogers Plan,⁹ and the second was the influx of Russian personnel into Egypt. Violations in August 1970 of the agreement ending the war of attrition (when missiles were secretly moved up to the Canal enabling, three years later, the Yom Kippur crossing) followed by Soviet encouragement a month later of Syria's attempt to invade Jordan, both contributed substantially to an easing of American pressures upon Israel.

But after Sadat's expulsion of the Russians in the summer of 1972, various strains in the U.S.-Israeli relationship began to reappear. It is fair to say that after the Yom Kippur war of 1973 the severe tensions which existed in 1969 began to return. But this time Israeli dependence upon the U.S. had become immensely greater.¹⁰

4. New Focus on Guarantees

What actually has emerged since October 1973 are three alternative approaches to the idea of a U.S. guarantee for Israel. Today's discussion is considerably more complex than that of earlier years. More than ever before, the entire subject is premised not simply on a regional calculus of military forces but on a world matrix of economic and political

forces and on future projections of military strengths.

Since 1974, in the completely altered environment initiated by the events of October 1973, the overall theme of a U.S. guarantee for Israel has gained considerable support from a variety of quarters. Reasons and motives differ, but a great variety of American policy prescriptions contain the common thread of guarantees. Significantly, even many of those with differing assumptions about the basic nature of the Middle East conflict and the desirable role for the U.S. in encouraging a peaceful solution are allied in proposing guarantees.

Furthermore, the indication by the Soviet Union in April 1975 of willingness to "guarantee Israel's sovereignty" within the pre-1967 lines has raised considerably the political visibility of the guarantee approach. A number of Arab leaders, as well, have spoken favorably of guarantees for Israel once she gives up "all occupied territories" and agrees to the restoration of the "full rights of the Palestinian people."

Reflecting the spreading emphasis upon guarantees, the January 1976 Security Council resolution, vetoed by the U.S. for other reasons, specified guarantees for the sovereignty of all states in the area as a central feature of any overall settlement.* This clause was the focus of considerable attention, unlike the mention of guarantees in 1967 in Resolution 242.

5. Israeli Anxieties

Nevertheless, all guarantee proposals -- whether in the form of U.S., Soviet Union, joint great power, or international commitments -- have continued to be received with the greatest of skepticism by the Israelis themselves. They and their American supporters often stress the unacceptability of and dangers inherent in such third-party assurances. This is considered especially true if guarantees are contemplated as even a partial substitute for Israeli ability to defend herself or as a replacement for a de jure Arab-Israeli agreement based upon specific and tangible compromises which would give meaning to, at minimum, a non-belligerent co-existence.

*See Appendix for the text of this resolution.

Two basic rationales explain contemporary Israeli apprehensions. First, of course, an historical analysis of guarantees, be they bilateral or international, is completely unreassuring. A recent Israeli study which surveys the history of great power guarantees reaches the conclusion that "In view of the inherent limitations of international guarantees, the prognosis for their applicability to the Middle East conflict is poor."¹¹ A similar attitude is reflected in a second study. While recognizing that "it is widely accepted and expected that any peace settlement in the Middle East will be accompanied by some form of American guarantee," this second study questions the very nature of guarantees by concluding that "Even treaties must be viewed as mere policy statements. They reflect valid -- indeed solemnly accepted -- policy of the moment of their adoption, but their future implementation will be dependent on the shape of future policy..."¹² Moreover, the tragedies evident in both Jewish and Israeli history warrant a profoundly skeptical reaction to the very notion of placing modern Jewry's political and cultural fate in the hands of others. Hebrew University professor Joseph Dan simply notes that "The word 'guarantee' has a bad smell in Israel."¹³

Second, the current emphasis on guarantees is itself thought to be a serious political danger. Widespread public acceptance of the guarantee idea in current circumstances risks the creation of unbearable pressure that might crush Israeli ability to resist an imposed geo-political settlement. Such an unstable peace might result in future years, it is feared, in military danger more serious than ever before for the Jewish State. And guarantees might in the future prove far less workable than they seemed during the period of negotiations.

In this way, the perceived interaction between guarantee formulas now being discussed and possible future rounds of military onslaught in the coming years is central to the Israeli approach to her current predicament. The October War, in many Israeli eyes, has now been shifted to the political front, politics being but a continuation of war through diplomatic chicanery. Guarantees are feared as devices allowing the Arabs to achieve territorial and military goals without having to give substantial political returns ending the state of war. The Israelis are as determined not to be weakened by political debacles as they are determined to win on more obvious battlefields. When it comes to questions of security, Israel is simply unwilling to gamble or be a test case for geo-political strategists. This is all the more true when it

appears that much of the international community is hostile to Israel and when the U.S. seems incapable of a coherent, long-term foreign policy.

6. Guarantee Offers and Public Opinion

The first Israeli concern is strictly realpolitik. The second is more political in terms of public attitudes and whether Israel appears reasonable or intransigent.

Israelis know that a distinction must be made between what is said for international consumption and what are the realities of international life. Today's jockeying for position in anticipation of future rounds of step-by-step diplomacy or of eventual resumption of the Geneva Conference (or a combination of both) involves the creation of an image of moderation. To date, Israel has not fared well. In the negotiating context, a willingness by the various parties to guarantee Israel's survival is seen to be an attempt to deflate the value of Israeli insistence that the Arab states give directly to Israel political, military and territorial quid pro quos of formal peace. Israel, however, believes there is a clear need to de-emphasize guarantees in order to maintain the requirement that the Arab world, tangibly as well as verbally, finally give up its crusade to eliminate Jewish sovereignty.

The guarantee idea has not only advocates seriously convinced that it has important merits, but also advocates who see it as a way to put increased pressure upon Israel for concessions. In Israel's eyes, this latter group is dominant, and those truly concerned with safeguarding Israel's security too easily bend to those primarily interested in territorial withdrawal.

Nevertheless, the various public statements on guarantees directed to the gallery of world public opinion have been reinforced by very cautious consideration, in both Washington and Jerusalem, of what a U.S. and/or international guarantees could mean. Consideration is being given not only to what such guarantee offers would mean in the context of negotiations, but also to what guarantees could mean in reality. Secretary of State Kissinger and Prime Minister Rabin are both said to have ordered thorough studies of the various forms a U.S. guarantee could take.¹⁴

7. American Guarantees: Three Approaches

For most Israelis and for many Americans, Soviet willingness to guarantee Israeli sovereignty remains at best unreassuring in view of apparent Soviet interests and the opportunistic elements which permeate Russian foreign policy. Further, Arab willingness to entertain guarantees appears part of an elaborate Arab strategy to achieve present Arab territorial and political aims without real concessions. With "peace" a decision only for "future generations," according to Egyptian President Sadat, one of the Arab world's most moderate spokesmen, guarantees even from the U.S. would seem questionable compensation for risky territorial and military concessions.

Consequently, only American guarantees actually have potential or theoretical credibility and it is on American guarantees that those seriously contemplating the guarantee idea focus their attention. Here even Israeli apprehensions are mixed with signs of some interest. There is indeed skepticism concerning the willingness of the U.S. to extend meaningful guarantees as well as about American credibility, but there is also interest in seeing whether or not a real guarantee relationship is politically feasible.

Some analysts have even gone so far as to speculate that Israeli insistence upon the Sinai technicians and its interest in the Congressional debate which ratified the second Sinai agreement with Egypt had to do with a testing of the waters. The desire may be to determine how viable a U.S. guarantee might be if Israel continues to make further concessions under U.S. pressure.¹⁵

Such speculation leads directly to a consideration of the three alternative approaches American strategists have taken to the guarantee idea in recent years and of the motivations behind each of the three.

In order to examine the many proposals, it is essential to study the different assumptions and motivations behind them. To do so, each of the three approaches needs to be considered separately. The following chapters are each concerned with one approach; they can be labelled as follows:

A. The Supplementary Approach: A guarantee to supplement a settlement reached by the parties themselves.

B. The Imposition Approach: A guarantee to accompany and make justifiable an imposed settlement.

C. The Deterrence Approach: A guarantee to establish a foundation upon which a real and lasting peace might become possible.

The reasons for Israeli skepticism and widespread American Jewish anxiety concerning all three approaches become clearer in the process of this examination.

CHAPTER II
THE SUPPLEMENTARY APPROACH

1. Until the October War

It is especially noteworthy that neither U.N. Resolution 242, symbolizing the consensus of the international community after the Six Day War, nor U.N. Resolution 338 which imposed an end to the Yom Kippur War, focus on great power or U.N. guarantees. Resolution 242 calls for negotiations leading to territorial withdrawal to borders which will be both secure and recognized. This is to be accomplished only in conjunction with the establishment of a just and lasting peace, an end to the state of war, a solution to the Palestinian problem, and the right of all parties to live in peace free from threats or acts of force. The mention of guarantees in operative paragraph No. 2 was purposefully vague and not the subject of primary emphasis at the time.¹⁶ Resolution 338 adds a specific call for a settlement achieved by the give-and-take process of negotiations "between the parties" and for the implementation of Resolution 242 in "all" of its parts.

Until the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the stated position of the U.S. (even in view of the Rogers Plan of 1969) seemed to be one of firm adherence to the strict requirements outlined in these resolutions. Accordingly, discussion of guarantees for Israel was within the context of strengthening a true compromise settlement once it was reached by the parties to the dispute.

There was admittedly some ambiguity in the U.S. position regarding the Jarring mission, the Four Power Talks, and the Rogers Plan -- but, overall, it was thought undesirable to insist upon a potentially unstable settlement premised upon outside assurances rather than regional arrangements. To focus on outside enforcement it was generally thought might drag the great powers even more dangerously into a potential confrontation while only papering over the deep conflicts and antagonisms that would continue to simmer in the area.

2. Not a Substitute for a Peace Agreement

As early as 1955 John Foster Dulles indicated that

President Eisenhower has authorized me to say that given a solution of the other problems, he would recommend the U.S. join in formal treaty

engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the [agreed] boundaries. I hope that other countries would be willing to join in such a security guarantee, and that it would be sponsored by the United Nations.

As for the territorial dimensions of a settlement, Dulles indicated that the 1949 cease-fire lines (the same as those of 1967) "are not designed to be permanent frontiers in every respect." He spoke of a negotiated agreement to "boundary lines of safety" to precede any treaty or guarantee arrangements. 17 Clearly the U.S. contemplated guarantees as secondary to an actual territorial and political compromise.

In February 1971, Joseph Sisco, later the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, renewed this understanding in conjunction with the Four Power Talks then in progress. "We have agreed to begin preliminary talks on the question of supplementary guarantees," he said.

However, let me make clear that the principal focus has to be the negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. The discussion of supplementary guarantees in the Four cannot be a substitute for negotiations. Guarantees cannot be a substitute for a peace agreement between the parties. The principal element of security for both sides must be a binding agreement.... But if a common understanding can be achieved on guarantees by the Four, it would add, at a minimum, an important psychological and political support of the agreement between the parties.18

However, some questions did arise as to the basic U.S. view of guarantees, although there probably was not a single basic view. What there was instead was an American belief in the centrality of U.N. Resolution 242 and in the necessity for the Arabs to meet Israel's legitimate security needs. A negotiated partial withdrawal, it was thought, should be exchanged for various agreements as to demilitarized zones, observation posts, etc. During this period Kissinger is now said to have been a "hardliner" privately endorsing Israel's aspirations to retain significant portions of the occupied territories.19

But just a month after Sisco's statement in 1971, President Nixon himself raised some anxieties regarding guarantees. "We are prepared," he indicated, "to join other major powers,

including the Soviet Union, in guaranteeing any settlement that is made, which would give Israel the security of its borders that it might not get through geographical acquisition" (emphasis added).²⁰ The recognition of the centrality of the new ceasefire lines to Israeli security was there, but there was as well the thought that outside guarantees might somehow substitute for regional security.

The triangular trade-off between territorial security, Arab-Israeli settlement leading to security, and outside guarantees providing for security was becoming established. But still, with the focus on a negotiated settlement, the basic role of any guarantees would have to be to strengthen the fabric of such an agreement rather than to replace the fabric itself.

3. Guarantees Only After a Settlement

In January 1972 Secretary Rogers reiterated the U.S. position, specifically ruling out a unilateral U.S. commitment. Responding to a question about "the prospect of the U.S. actually offering a guarantee of any borders the two sides agree on," Rogers said: "I don't think that the U.S. individually as a nation would undertake that. I think that the U.S. will consider possibilities of some kind of U.N. guarantee." ²¹

Whether Rogers was reflecting U.S. weariness because of Vietnam, had meant to de-emphasize guarantees in general, or was making a negative statement about any formal U.S.-Israel alliance is uncertain. What does seem quite clear, even with the significant differences between Israel and the U.S., is that through 1973 guarantees were not the major focus of the U.S. in attempting to reach a Middle East peace. They were usually thought of as a way of capping an agreement rather than a way of coercing one where the underlying instability of unresolved conflict would remain. U.S. officials always stressed three factors when guarantees were mentioned:

A. They could only come after a settlement reached by the parties of the various substantive issues between them.

B. They could not substitute for regional security, only supplement security arrangements reached by the parties.

C. They were most feasible as an expression of international community and great power approval of settlement

and consequently of willingness to support it in general.

Most Israelis and most American supporters of Israel continue to insist that even after the developments of recent years international or American guarantees for Israel must continue to be thought of within this framework.

CHAPTER III

THE IMPOSITION APPROACH

1. Compensation for Israel

Apprehensions today about guarantees are attributable primarily to the overall context within which they have consistently been raised. Former Senator Fulbright, for instance, continues to promote "great power guarantees...and...an explicit, binding American treaty guarantee of Israel" as a way of forcing an end to what he calls Israeli intransigence on territorial matters and Palestinian rights. For Fulbright, "Israel...is stalling, and with nothing concrete in mind except to get all the arms and money she can from the U.S."²²

Concurrence with Fulbright seems to be growing, though a more balanced approach than his also exists. Former ambassador to the U.N. and to Syria, Charles Yost, writes, "I suspect that, if and when Israel is ever persuaded to withdraw from most of the territories occupied in 1967, it will become more interested in guarantees." As the essential U.S. element in a guarantee framework he suggests "a bilateral treaty between the United States and Israel whereby the former would bind itself...to send U.S. forces to Israel's assistance."²³ The new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, John Sparkman, surprised many when he publicly advocated the creation of a Palestinian state and indicated that "I think it would be fine for major powers to give Israel assurances that she is safe within her borders in return for Israel's surrendering some of the land, if not all."²⁴

Many strategists and politicians view an American guarantee as a method by which Israel is to be partially compensated for territorial and political concessions. While some have written comprehensively about the likely benefits and dangers inherent in emphasizing this guarantee as compensation to Israel, few have considered the concept historically or in relation to military and geographic realities. Fewer still have attempted to assess the psychological ramifications on both the Arabs and the Israelis of such a new American preoccupation.

It cannot be said with absolute certainty that American policy after the Yom Kippur War reflects such a new emphasis on guarantees. Secretary Kissinger repeatedly denies it in public. Yet the logic of American policies, strategy, and tactics since October 1973 leads to the conclusion that the U.S. now contemplates not a formal, de jure settlement

between the parties but a de facto, quasi-settlement built upon the American relationship with all of the parties.²⁵ Such a concept could result in an Israeli withdrawal to approximately the 1967 borders and possibly a Palestinian "entity" on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Acceptance of such a new status quo by Israel is extremely unlikely without a complete change of attitude by the Arab states (not to mention the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO]) or without an unprecedented and highly credible commitment by the U.S. that no military assault against Israel would ever again be tolerated.

This latter possibility, at least in relation to the former, seems the more likely. Even if Arab moderates should be willing to offer some concessions to Israel, it is extremely unlikely that an acceptance of the legitimacy of the Jewish State can be expected in the coming few years.²⁶ It is also not realistic to expect that the level of trust could in any short period rise to a point where even such a stated willingness on the part of a few Arab leaders would suffice for the Israelis.

Hence, an American guarantee for something less than a complete settlement, becomes a logical element of American thinking -- especially since such a quasi-settlement is the only one on the horizon in many minds. Unless this is so, the entire strategy being pursued by the U.S. seems highly questionable.²⁷

Discussion of U.S. preoccupation with an American guarantee for Israel has become so widespread that when Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco appeared in late February 1975 on "Meet the Press," the very first question to him was: "Mr. Sisco, is the United States now considering a mutual defense treaty with Israel in order to guarantee Israel's security and survival?" Sisco's answer de-emphasized the guarantee approach, but when he was then asked, "Then you do not rule out an eventual defense treaty with Israel?" even his ambiguous response was telling. "I am saying," Sisco responded, "that this is something which is quite far down the pike. It is something that obviously we will want to look at in the context of a political settlement."²⁸

About the same time, columnist James Reston outlined the changes overtaking Foggy Bottom's thinking about

guarantees. "Until recently," he wrote, "neither the U.S. nor the Israeli Government has shown much interest in an American guarantee of Israel's independence and boundaries." But now, Reston continued, Mr. Kissinger

is searching for some way out of his troubles, and in the process, he has ordered a study of an American guarantee of Israel's independence and security, in return for an Israeli withdrawal to its 1967 borders.In short he is trying to find some way to break the diplomatic conflict between Israel and the Arabs.... And the idea of an American 'guarantee' of Israel's security seems now the most relevant, if difficult, compromise.²⁹

2. The New U.S. Approach

The current American posture results directly from American assumption of the go-between role. At each step the U.S. gives the appearance of taking on more responsibility for insuring the steps already achieved and for safeguarding the step-by-step process itself -- a process which is repeatedly said to be the very rationale for American diplomatic intervention in the area.

The now well-known "senior American official" did in fact concede in September 1975 to Marilyn Berger that "the placement of American technicians in the Sinai mountain passes...could become a precedent for a larger presence in future Middle East agreements."³⁰

With the U.S. in the middle, direct negotiations between the antagonists and a formal, de jure peace continue to appear distant. Even Geneva, it should be remembered, is for the Arabs a conference held under U.N. auspices rather than a direct political confrontation. Additionally the anti-Zionism U.N. resolution has only stiffened Israeli resolve to stand firm while calling further into question real Arab willingness to truly contemplate lasting peaceful co-existence.

Faced with this situation, it becomes increasingly conceivable that the U.S. could soon become the pivot in a quasi-settlement structured on U.S. agreements with the various Arab parties and separately with Israel. The pattern has

already been set with the three disengagement agreements since the October War.

Numerous critics have already concluded that such a gambit would risk substituting not just de facto peace for the desired de jure peace but an unstable and explosive "peace" for a real peace. Since in the process Israel would be maneuvered out of the territories and possibly into the acceptance of a Palestinian state, Israel's future might become hostage to American credibility and American resolve.

It is this creeping process of a gradual U.S. imposition which carries with it the new focus on American guarantees. For only if the U.S. can justify the risks involved for Israel in the kind of quasi-settlement contemplated is there any likelihood of convincing, or indeed even of pressuring, Israel to acquiesce. Such justification would also be necessary to prevent major domestic turmoil within the U.S. The Israeli lobby has already done what it could to discredit Kissinger and to worry Ford. The possibility of a new confrontation is real. Consequently the administration is unlikely to take further steps until after the November election.

But the creeping process of a U.S. imposition is now being institutionalized. U.S.-Arab relations are now being constructed on a basis that must necessarily result in an increasing strain on the U.S.-Israel relationship as long as Israel retains any of the occupied territories. As the process continues, the desirability of further concessions to the Arabs, rather than risking the collapse of the whole strategy and of the carefully rebuilt U.S.-Arab friendships, becomes only reasonable. Meanwhile, Israel's dependence upon the U.S. has become nearly total resulting in severe psychological uneasiness. The Israelis know how their ability to resist U.S. pressures is swiftly eroding.³¹

And so it can be argued that there has been a fundamental alteration of U.S. policy in the Middle East. It is a basic change still in the process of consolidation and maybe one not quite as clear-cut as this analysis suggests. But there is definitely a new emphasis on much more concrete American involvement leading to major if not total Israeli territorial withdrawal and some form of unprecedented American assurances.

The big question mark, and of course the one issue most crucial to Israel's supporters, is what Secretary Kissinger

has actually accomplished in terms of Arab attitudes toward Israel. There is considerable skepticism that Sadat's "friend Henry" has achieved any tangible Arab willingness to accept the legitimacy of the Jewish State. The instabilities of the Arab world and the uncertain aspirations of the Soviet Union in the area only create further uneasiness.

It is this multifaceted anxiety which is at the very core of Israel's contemporary dilemma -- since U.S. and Israeli policies, interests, and perceptions do in fact diverge, how can Israel fully maintain U.S. support while maximizing her security interests vis-a-vis an increasingly powerful and possibly even more determined coalition of Arab adversaries?

3. U.S.-USSR-Arab Promotion of Guarantees

The Soviet Union, the Arab States, and the U.S. all now have various reasons for emphasizing guarantees. For the United States, Secretary Kissinger has strongly and often persuasively argued that his policies offer hope of a Middle East settlement that will safeguard U.S. economic and political interests in the Arab world. Since the U.S. is now apparently unwilling to satisfy Israel's security concerns by allowing any significant territorial gains, and cannot satisfy these concerns with Arab assurances, the U.S. may find herself having little choice but to eventually offer American guarantees coupled with promises of military and economic aid in ever-increasing amounts. For unless the U.S. can bring about Israeli concessions, it is unlikely the Arab states will continue to play the game by American rules. In a sense this should be the prime lesson of October 1973. Consequently, unless Israel is forthcoming with concessions, the U.S. could decide to use American economic aid and political support as the tools of coercion. For Israel this should be the prime lesson of the 1975 "reassessment" following the March 1975 breakdown in shuttle diplomacy -- a breakdown which both Kissinger and Ford publicly blamed on Israel.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union continues its search for a method of political and economic penetration into the Middle East which could eventually end Western dominance. French and British withdrawal from the area after World War II was, the USSR hopes, only the historical prelude to American withdrawal. The Soviets can afford to wait and see if the delicate game of American diplomacy can actually be conducted

successfully. In the meantime, Russian talk of guarantees is conducive to an image of reasonableness and moderation.³² It also sets the stage for an American-Soviet condominium in the area or for Soviet insistence on Soviet guarantee forces to match American ones.

The Russians know they can always play the role of spoiler if necessary. This is why such persons as Nahum Goldmann, Lord Caradon and George Ball insist that America must join with the Soviet Union in bringing about a settlement, not attempt a Pax Americana throughout the region.³³ Soviet public discussions of guarantees for Israel have to be viewed within this framework.

The Arabs, in this case with considerable unity, seek, at this moment in history, a weakening of Israel through territorial return. Eventually, many undoubtedly hope, they will be able to assert Arab hegemony upon Israel itself. Even the most moderate of the Arab states, Egypt, remains something of an enigma when it comes to lasting co-existence with Israel. Moshe Dayan has recently responded to the question "Do you think Egypt is now willing to coexist with Israel, or is her goal to reduce Israel to indefensible borders as a prelude to future attack?" with a sober assessment of Egyptian strategy.

It is not a simple either-or-situation. I believe that Egypt still wants, above all, to see Israel disappear altogether. But realistically, the Egyptians have already fought four wars against us and lost all four of them.... They prefer [now] to conduct a political offensive in the hope of extracting large concessions from Israel.... They have succeeded in getting the American State Department to put political pressure on Israel. They are exploiting the various interests of the Americans, the Russians, and the Arabs, coupled with the threat of an oil embargo.... Not a showdown of tanks against tanks, but political warfare to achieve the same result.³⁴

With the American, the Arab and the Russian three-way interest in promoting the guarantee idea, it is easy to appreciate why the subject has become so pervasive.

4. U.S.-Soviet Competition for Hegemony

For Secretary Kissinger, as he assesses historical U.S. interests, the overall need in the Middle East is to counter Soviet regional ambitions dating back to Peter the Great and the 17th century. To attempt this at this time with various domestic constraints on purely Machiavellian initiatives, the U.S. must openly befriend both the Arab states and Israel -- quite a feat. This may be why it was never successfully attempted before Kissinger.

While the Secretary's even-handedness is a strategy whose theoretical reasoning is quite sound, its practicality must await long-run developments. Meanwhile, it is a policy requiring of Israel the kinds of concessions and risks which make for considerable and continual friction. Viewed in these terms, recent Israeli bitterness resulting from the "Saunders Document"³⁵ and the December 1975 feuding over PLO participation in the Security Council are significant indications of the multiplying strains between Israel and her big power protector. One journalist with contacts at the highest levels of the State Department writes that "relations between the U.S. and Israel...have deteriorated to a chronic crisis."³⁶

Since Moscow's primary entrée into the region has been as arms merchant, and since the majority of the Arab states are actually far more receptive to Western culture and economic involvement than to Soviet imperial interests and communist philosophy, Kissinger's approach might well have considerable merit. In attempting to implement it he has increasingly staked his own reputation, in addition to continuation of Arab-American cooperation, on bringing about Israeli concessions. He continues to use U.S. economic aid, arms agreements, and implications of coerced Israeli compliance if necessary, to entice many of the Arab states -- especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan -- into an acceptance of his grand design. In addition, he has once or twice flexed U.S. muscle (regarding possible U.S. military action should there be a danger of "strangulation" due to an oil embargo) to raise fears of possible U.S. imposition of terms upon the Arabs as well as upon Israel.

Kissinger is especially interested in Egypt. He told Sadat soon after the Yom Kippur War that "We look upon you as the principal Arab leader and our purpose is to strengthen your position -- in Egypt and throughout the Arab world."³⁷ President Ford's recent rebuff of the Israeli-Jewish lobby

and his decision to go ahead with arms to Egypt, even in this election year, indicates this friendship with Sadat's Egypt continues as a major leg of American Middle East policy.

Unfortunately for Israel, former Senator Fulbright was largely correct in his keynote address to the Middle East Institute Convention when he said that "the commanding American interest in the Middle East is access to oil. Our interest in Israel is emotional and ideological."³⁸ But this is too simple. The Arab world's importance has been greatly multiplied by both its oil deposits and its new wealth which has resulted from the OPEC cartel's exploitation of Western dependence on Middle East oil. But, in addition, the U.S. has immense political and geographic interests in the Arab world and its more than 100 million people. The resurgence of Islam was always bound to place tiny Israel in proper perspective.

That the new U.S. role as Middle East middleman eventually implies some kind of guarantees is undeniably logical, however politically dangerous for Israel and difficult for America. As far as the Arab-Israeli conflict is concerned, the Arabs need not, of course, be too concerned with U.S. credibility, will, or guarantee potential, for it is they who stand to make gains which do not require guarantees. Israel is the subordinated party. The promise by the U.S., implicit or explicit, to deliver Israeli-held territories has become something of a hostage for Arab friendship.

As the U.S.-Arab relationship grows, the costs of its shattering become commensurately greater. If the U.S. delivers, Israel will at best be more vulnerable geopolitically, psychologically and economically. If the U.S. fails, the Arabs will be in a good position for war -- politically, militarily and from the standpoint of public opinion. Then the whole cycle could be begun again. Playing the U.S. off against the Soviet Union continues to be an Arab option. As one Arab spokesman recently put it, "good relations with the Soviet Union are one of the main political cards of all Arabs." Sadat's gamble in siding with the U.S. now requires Western willingness to arm Egypt and to aid that country's desperate economic situation. There is a higher and higher range to how far the U.S. can be pushed once the relationship becomes accepted, and of course, this is the Israeli fear.

Since the Middle East has for centuries been a region of imperial contests, Soviet-American competition is not in

itself the new element. What is new is the U.S. attempt to ally with Israel and simultaneously with the moderate Arabs at the time when Israel's very existence has been brought into question and the Arab world is gathering immense economic and political leverage in addition to military power. Nevertheless, Kissinger may well be right that this new situation is an historic opportunity and his policies a necessary result of changing conditions.

5. Divergent U.S.-Israeli National Interests

For the U.S., Israeli security is only one of a vast array of interests and worries. Consequently, the U.S. may be quite willing to take certain calculated risks with Israel's future while still sincerely endorsing the Jewish State's survival. Any potential settlement, from the U.S. viewpoint, need not necessarily be balanced -- it simply must be acceptable to the Arabs and imposeable on Israel.

What many Americans have come to envision is not a settlement at any price, but rather a forced agreement, if need be, based on U.S. perceptions of American interests rather than Israel's geographic security concerns or American Jewish anxieties about the future.

Such a quasi-settlement would be designed in Washington to provide a political environment for tempers to cool and more progress to be made toward what could then be eventually molded into a lasting peace, even if it did not begin as such. Consequently, any credence given to the notion of Arab destruction of Israel in stages³⁹ must be discounted by references to other, moderate statements of Arab spokesmen. There is always enough said to pick and choose. But to grant even minimum validity to the Arab-expounded theory of stages leading to Israel's eventual disintegration would imply a potential sell-out of Israel and raise storms of protest in the U.S. Only with the presumption of Arab, and not just Egyptian, good faith in a new willingness to accept Israel's sovereignty as a Jewish state can this American approach since the Yom Kippur War be made acceptable to much of the American public, and alleviate the growing apprehensions within Israel.

Secretary of State Kissinger does attempt, in fact, to justify his policies with the assumption of a revolutionary change in Arab outlooks. In a Jerusalem Press Conference on 17 June 1974, for instance, during President Nixon's visit to

Israel, Kissinger stated,

It is our conviction that for the first time in the existence of Israel, the Arab states, even the more radical ones like Syria, are talking about a continuing State of Israel and that some of the Arab states seem to have made a rather crucial decision to seek to work out modalities of co-existence with the State of Israel.⁴⁰

It is, of course, this presumption of a basic and historical change in Arab attitudes -- the presumption in other words of Arab good faith -- which Israel and many of her supporters insist must be put to the test of actions and facts before Israel makes territorial and political concessions. Furthermore, if an American guarantee is to make reasonable Israel's assumption of the security risks necessary to test Arab intentions, it must be a guarantee whose credibility will be beyond doubt.

6. Kissinger's Purposeful Ambiguity

The Secretary himself has been extremely cautious in mentioning the role a U.S. guarantee might play in his overall strategy. He is no doubt quite aware of the potential torrent of criticism that could descend upon the Ford Administration and himself personally should his gradual shift toward what appears an imposed peace with guarantees become less ambiguous than it is. What he must fear more than anything else is widespread public agreement with Hans Morgenthau's conclusions that this new U.S. posture may be leading to Israel's "piecemeal dismemberment."

Consequently, Kissinger has gone out of his way to make it appear that guarantees are thought of only as "icing on the cake," as he put it in an interview last year with the editors of The New Republic. The magazine then went on to criticize any thought of using the deception of guarantees to impose a settlement upon Israel, while leaving the architect of this new policy unscathed.⁴¹

But as one of the most perceptive commentators on Kissinger's Middle East strategy, Theodore Draper, has written, this Kissinger formulation is neither in accord with a number of earlier remarks nor with the apparent realities of his

complex undertaking. "If there was a cake," Draper points out, "icing would seem to be, in the circumstances, a luxury that could well be spared. The truth is that guarantees look more like icing without the cake." And, in the form of a not very disguised warning, Draper adds, "The consequences of attempting to impose a one-sided settlement on Israel, covered up by a less-than-convincing guarantee, would be traumatic for both Israel and the U.S."⁴²

The harsh Ford letter to Rabin after the March 1975 breakdown in shuttle diplomacy (which was in turn followed by the letter of support for Israel from 76 Senators) may have been the opening shot at the onset of such a confrontation. More recently The Christian Science Monitor in a page one lead story stated bluntly, "There is a crisis in relations between Israel and the United States," and went on to suggest that a new U.S. policy toward the PLO may well be the next step in the U.S. march toward gradual imposition of a settlement.⁴³

However, since it is in the interests, so far, of both Israel and the U.S. to minimize differences, the battle is largely being fought with forced smiles and within diplomatic circles.

7. U.S. Strategy Dominant

Of all the parties with interests and influence in the region, the U.S. still remains the most powerful. And it is the U.S. choice of strategy that consequently may well determine the outcome of Israel's struggle for existence as well as of the Soviet-American competition for regional supremacy. While some have concluded that the Kissinger implementation of even-handedness is a forward-looking policy, others continue to insist that only a return to firm U.S. support for Israel and a determined attitude toward both the Kremlin and the Arab states can actually maximize U.S. long-term interests while assuring Israel's long run survival. Only then, it is argued, would a U.S. willingness to guarantee Israel really be both meaningful and credible.

What is so paradoxical is that even among those with manifestly divergent assessments of what should be U.S. Middle East strategy, there appears to be agreement on the notion that a U.S. guarantee for Israel is desirable and possibly essential. This is a paradox best explained by considering more closely the different perceptions and assumptions which

lead the pessimists as well as the optimists to propose a U.S. guarantee.

At the conclusion of this chapter, the position of those who can generally be considered optimists and who view a guarantee in the framework of an imposed settlement will be considered. In the next chapter a new school of deterrence-guarantee advocates, led by Richard H. Ullman at the Council on Foreign Relations, will be considered.

8. Advocates of an Imposed Settlement with Guarantees

Unlike Kissinger, many American strategists who have recently formulated proposals for the Middle East have more candidly discussed the centrality of guarantees as compensation to Israel for a more vulnerable situation after an imposed or reluctantly-agreed-to settlement. The American military alert and heightened fear of a future U.S.-Soviet confrontation are uppermost in mind for many personages who have recently joined the advocates of an imposed settlement with guarantees. Many of them have actually done so as critics of Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy. Nevertheless, they are united with Kissinger in that they feel pressure must be applied upon Israel and in the belief that guarantees may simply have to substitute for a direct settlement.

For instance, former Under Secretary of State George Ball has written:

The major nations of the world have an obligation not to stand passively by while a new war flames in one of the world's most sensitive strategic areas.... The danger that the Middle East could become a Balkan-like situation involving the superpowers in a nuclear confrontation cannot be lightly dismissed.

Ball's conclusion is that an imposed settlement should be "guaranteed jointly by the U.S. and the Soviet Union."⁴⁴

Taking much the same approach, Professor William Griffith of the M.I.T. Center for International Studies warns that

Unless the United States takes immediate steps to force an Arab-Israeli settlement, the explosion of a fifth war in that tragic area seems

inevitable -- along with a new and tougher oil squeeze, widespread financial chaos and the most serious threat to world peace in decades.

For him, "The key issue involves the territories that Israel conquered in the 1967 war." He too favors compensation to Israel in the form of guarantees which would, he claims, "only formalize a long-standing commitment." "The U.S.," he writes,

should sign a formal military pact with Israel, making it clear that we would regard an attack on Israel proper as an attack on the U.S. and that we would send American troops to defend Israel.... Come what may, we should never abandon Israel. But defending its conquests is quite another matter.⁴⁵

Professor Nadav Safran of Harvard writes "A resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict has become...an imperative necessity for all the outsiders that have been involved in it," and he renews his 1971 call for a "mutual defense treaty" to be entered into "after Israel and the Arab states had signed a peace treaty based essentially on the Arabs' own proposals; and it would be seen as the means by which Israel was brought to agree to those proposals."⁴⁶

A Harvard colleague, Professor Robert Bowie, concurs. "A continuing stalemate is dangerous to everyone," he argues.

A new outbreak of hostilities would not only disrupt the region, it would once more risk U.S.-Soviet confrontation, jeopardizing the flow of oil, and split the U.S. and its allies.... Thus an outside initiative seems both necessary and proper.... Some will, of course, strongly object to 'imposing' a settlement on the parties. The objection seems to me unjustifiable.⁴⁷

Columbia University's Zbigniew Brzezinski reaches similar conclusions though with greater circumspection. "The need to solve that conflict is now more acute than ever, not only because of its threat to world peace, but because of its polarizing effect on American relations with the rest of the world." Brzezinski explains that his approach, in which the guarantees are somewhat disguised, would only follow a real settlement. Essentially, however, his guarantee proposal

too is also designed to render ineffective Israeli protests -- for it should be obvious that any U.S. itemizing in public of what should be done by Israel borders on imposition upon Israel. The choice would be between agreement and complete isolation. And so, Brzezinski prescribes, "It would be advisable, and timely, for the U.S. to spell out openly what it considers to be the general outlines of a desirable settlement and to indicate that it would be prepared to guarantee it."⁴⁸

The boundary line, in fact, between the imposition approach and the earlier U.S.-Israeli relationship, based on the two U.N. resolutions with only supplementary guarantees, is difficult to draw. But it can be said to be where the U.S. might attempt to persuade Israel to follow certain policies but would refrain from acting independently and placing tremendous pressure upon Jerusalem.

Still, many of those who are hesitant to directly impose a settlement upon Israel do appear to be leaning toward coercing the parties into a settlement which would be anchored in guarantees of one kind or another. Professor Stanley Hoffman, for instance, believes that "The settlement itself will not be negotiable by the parties alone; other powers will have to play brokers and put pressures on the parties. If there should be a settlement, it will require external enforcement and protection also."⁴⁹

9. U.S. Rethinking After the October War

U.S. policy after the Yom Kippur War is, it is true, partly the result of Israel's failure to show a way out of the Middle East deadlock. It is part of the political price Israel is still paying for the military failure to repel the Arab armies on 6 October. The post-1973 situation as generally perceived in the U.S. is one, to again use Stanley Hoffman's words, in which

A return to the earlier policy was impossible: merely to provide Israel with weapons without pressing toward a settlement would have meant the certainty of more wars, new confrontations with Moscow, a splendid opportunity for the Soviets to expand their influence in the Middle East, a widening breach with Western Europe and Japan (i.e. no possibility of a common oil strategy under U.S. leadership) and the sacrifice of U.S. positions in friendly Arab countries.⁵⁰

As well, of course, the new U.S. strategy is premised on the hope that Arab moderation will someday soon result in truly significant political and military concessions to Israel. But this premise remains controversial for the Arabs know that the scales are now beginning to be heavily weighted on their side. Though territorial withdrawal to the 1967 lines is beyond question the primary Arab goal at this time, what will result after such an Israeli retreat is open to question.

The Arabs have succeeded in making the "return of all territories" appear to be the only major central issue, and they have, as a result, succeeded in branding Israel rather than themselves as intransigent. Few stop anymore to ask what the central issue was in 1967 when there were no "occupied territories." Few understand such pleas as that by Lord Caradon, principal author of Resolution 242 and one known for pro-Arab attitudes, who insisted in Lebanon last year that "had we requested [in 242] the return to the 1967 lines, we would have been wrong. I know these lines. They are not feasible. They must be modified."⁵¹ Few realize that the 1967 lines are merely the unintended result of 1949 developments and are aptly described in Israel as a "strategist's nightmare."

As for the Palestinian problem, there is, worldwide, an undeniable belief that a Palestinian state is a just demand and that territorial withdrawal might open the door to such a development. There is much optimism that such a two-state formula might actually evolve into a real compromise between Jewish and Palestinian nationalism. Consequently, few ponder what is implied historically by the phrase "restoration of the full national rights of the Palestinian people" or the talk of a "Palestinian entity" acceptable "for now."

The historical conflict between Zionism and Palestinian Arab nationalism is dimly understood outside the actual arena of conflict. Those close to the conflict seem more pessimistic than those who view it from afar. For the U.S., how much better an imposed "peace" than the continuing deadlock. For the Israelis, an imposed "peace" may well be no peace and reliance on the United States may well prove less satisfactory than reliance on a weakened self.

The 1975 reassessment of American Middle East policy was actually an attempt to formalize and publicly present the new American approach to the entire conflict. The "re-assessment" was the result of alleged Israeli stubbornness

during a round of shuttle diplomacy, but it was also in anticipation of either a resumed Geneva Conference or continuing bilateral agreements brought about through the good offices of the United States. Though the Israeli lobby delivered the "coup de grace"⁵² to this first reassessment, little has really changed in the conditions which brought it about. There may well be a second and a third, each time initiated by a specific act of Israeli refusal but each stemming from larger considerations of fundamental American interests.

10. Guarantees: Now Central to U.S. Policy?

The role of guarantees in this fundamentally altered post-1973 American strategy is much more crucial than at any time in the past. It might even be fair to conclude that the guarantee plan has become a central feature of American policy, though no doubt a feature Secretary Kissinger will deliberately continue to obscure.

This focus on guarantees potentially renders ineffective Israel's two uncompromisable requirements: first, that there be specific deeds and major concessions, in addition to rhetoric, leading to an end to the state of war; and, second, that the Arabs be willing to enter into direct negotiations leading to a compromise territorial settlement and a mutually acceptable solution to the Palestinian problem.

Theodore Draper sums up the meaning of the contemporary focus on guarantees quite succinctly:

Let us be clear about one thing; the issue... is not whether Resolutions 242 and 338 are good or bad. The issue is whether they are being gutted... It should now be sufficiently clear why a guarantee has, in some minds, been promoted from a supplement to a substitute. It has emerged as the most seductive way of getting around the conditions set forth in Resolutions 242 and 338... While everyone continues to pay lip-service to both resolutions, they are in danger of being eviscerated. Neither resolution said anything about guarantees.* If the resolutions were lived up to, guarantees would not be so urgent or would at most be regarded as useful reinforcements. The new prominence of guarantees is a sure sign that the balance

* Draper is in error. Resolution 242 does mention guarantees in an ambiguous way.

of the resolutions has in practice tipped drastically against Israel and that something has to be improvised that would appear to right the balance.⁵³

Those who view current developments in this way insist that what is popularly perceived as Israeli intransigence is in fact the direct result of Arab intransigence. The Arabs, having apparently convinced U.S. leaders that the only U.S. policy capable of furthering U.S. geo-political and economic interests is one which forces Israel to accept far less than what she would be entitled to if Israeli security were paramount, believe they need not be generous with their concessions. Again, according to Draper,

The old concept used to be that there could be no peace in the Middle East unless Israelis and Arabs come to terms with each other. The new concept is for both of them to come to terms with the U.S. It is only one step from this to the concept that the U.S. must come to terms with them by, if necessary, imposing its terms on them....

It was Sadat's strategy to make the U.S. the center of the struggle.... An American guarantee is perfectly acceptable to him because it shifts attention away from anything resembling an Arab guarantee.... What starts as a guarantee to Israel ends in reality as a guarantee to Egypt. In the event of default, Israel has no claim on Egypt; it must come to the U.S. with its complaint, as it did, fruitlessly, before.

And so, "The U.S. has become the main front in the Arab-Israeli conflict."⁵⁴

Though many of the American strategists pursuing this imposition through guarantees approach may not fully agree with this chapter's interpretation of policies and events, it is likely most of them are aware of the risks Israel is being pressured to assume. For many other Americans, whose first priority in the Middle East is the security and welfare of Israel, these risks seem far too great. And for still others, morally committed to Israel yet quite concerned about U.S.-Arab relations, there is a belief that Washington should actually strengthen the commitment to Israel, building at the

same time sound relationships with the Arab states on mutually understood terms rather than relationships based on expectations of more and more U.S. "even-handedness" gradually weakening the Israel-U.S. alliance.

The paradox, mentioned earlier, is that some of these firm supporters of Israel are themselves promoting a U.S. guarantee for Israel, though it is a very different approach which they take, with different assumptions and a basically different strategy.

CHAPTER IV
THE DETERRENCE APPROACH

1. The Attack on Kissinger

Within a few months of the Kissinger-Nixon changes in U.S. Middle East policy in late 1973, substantial opposition began to emerge. Professor Hans Morgenthau was for a time the most vocal academic critic. U.S. policy, he asserted in an open letter to Kissinger, was propelling the "U.S. into pressing Israel to make ever more far-reaching concessions until its very existence would be jeopardized." The U.S., he cautioned Kissinger, "must refrain from exerting pressures which can only lead to Israel's piecemeal dismemberment."⁵⁵ Questioned by William Buckley less than two months after the war "Are you predicting the end of Israel?", Morgenthau responded with typical realpolitik detachment.

I do not predict it, but I think it is more possible now than it ever was since Israel was founded as an independent state.... I'm not serene about it but I have tried to accustom myself to facing the facts as they are, however disagreeable they may be in terms of my preferences.⁵⁶

Central to Morgenthau's perspective is the belief that "The unchanged objectives of all Arab states, moderate as well as radical, [is] to destroy Israel."⁵⁷

This view is widely shared in Israel where

The basic assumption underlying the Israeli political-military doctrine is the understanding that the central aim of the Arab countries is to destroy the state of Israel whenever they feel able to do so, while doing everything to harass and disturb its peaceful life.⁵⁸

2. The Theory of Stages

Whereas the imposed settlement school downplays the Arab theory of the elimination of Israel by stages, the advocates of the deterrence approach fear that a major part of stage one is in fact to lull Western public opinion into a belief that further stages are not contemplated. They

further fear that this has already been partially accomplished.

For these more cautious strategists, the Declaration that emerged from the Algiers Summit Conference soon after the October 1973 War was in effect a cryptic restatement of the theory of stages which originated in the aftermath of the Six Day War of 1967 as the preferred manner to continue the pursuit of Israel's eventual defeat. In Algiers, the assembled Arab leaders declared

The struggle against Zionist invasion is a long haul, [an] historic responsibility.... The process of Arab liberation [is] 1. Evacuation by Israel of the occupied Arab territories and first of all Jerusalem. 2. Re-establishment of the full national rights for the Palestinian people. So long as these two conditions have not been met, it will be illusory to expect in the Middle East anything but a continuation of unstable and explosive situations and new confrontation.⁵⁹

Of course the Rabat conference in 1974 and the "Zionism is racism" resolution in 1975 have only served to confirm, for many, this ominous interpretation of the Algiers summit.

With Arab commentators continually predicting eventual victory over Israel, and with Yassir Arafat's PLO unyielding in its public position that the Palestinian Arabs will eventually rule over all of historic Palestine, the theory of stages appears to many a rather reasonable explanation of current Arab policies. The most recent restatement of this theory by a high Egyptian official was in Lebanon in April 1974. There Dr. Kamel Abu al-Majd, then Egyptian Minister for Youth, announced that

Egypt is now conducting a multi-stage policy, that is to say, the first stage is to achieve the removal of the consequences of the 1967 aggression, then we shall bring about the removal of the 1956 aggression, and in the third stage we will act so as to remove the 1948 aggression.⁶⁰

Another source of evidence, Kissinger's critics insist, is Mohammed Hussanein Heikal, the Arab world's best-

known journalist. He believes that "total withdrawal" would in fact "pass sentence on the entire state of Israel." He may even share the widespread perception within the Arab world that the Yom Kippur War marked the beginning of the end of Zionism. As Heikal put it during the war,

The matter no longer concerns the liberation of the Arab territories occupied after June 5, 1967, alone, but also poses a deep and severe blow to Israel's future, although this is not evident now. For if the Arabs succeed in liberating the territory occupied after 5 June 1967 by armed forces, what will prevent them in a later stage from liberating Palestine itself by armed force?⁶¹

In 1971, Heikal was even more specific.

There are only two specific Arab goals at present, elimination of the consequences of the 1967 aggression through Israel's withdrawal from all the lands it occupied in that year, and elimination of the consequences of the 1948 aggression through the eradication of Israel. The second goal is not, in fact, specific, but abstract.... We should learn from the enemy how to move step by step.⁶²

Most recently, in his book The Road to Ramadan, Heikal concludes that future war "is inevitable."⁶³

When considering the theory of stages, it is instructive to recall that Bernard Lewis as early as 1964 outlined the basic goals of Arab diplomacy regarding the Jewish State. Unlikely to achieve Israel's liquidation by military force alone, the Arabs have been consistently demanding, Lewis then pointed out, even before there were any post-1967 "occupied territories," "an imposed settlement by the great powers -- a kind of compulsory surgery on the conference table in which, perhaps, Soviet arms would wield the knife, while Western diplomacy administers the anaesthetic."⁶⁴ In this sense, guarantees today are designed, many have concluded, as the method of restraining the patient (victim) while the anaesthetic takes effect.

Many of those opposing the new U.S. diplomacy clearly believe that Arab aims have not basically changed concerning

Israel and that the U.S. is becoming an accomplice to a weakening of Israel which might, in time, prove to be fatal.⁶⁵ This view is actually quite widespread and accounts for pollster Lou Harris's findings that "American Jews now seem totally possessed of a doomsday vision of what will happen to Israel and what might happen to Jews in this country."⁶⁶

3. Urging Return to Resolutions 242 and 338

The policy response to such a "doomsday" vision has usually been to urge a return to the earlier U.S. policy of firm insistence that the Arabs reach a compromise settlement with Israel, including directly negotiated borders and security arrangements, and that in the meantime the U.S. continue to supply Israel with the weapons necessary for deterrence as well as defense. In effect, opponents of the new American approach have repeatedly insisted that 242 and 338 be the only basis for American policy. As Draper recently indicated in the pages of Commentary magazine,

What is desperately needed is an unflinching American determination to see the Middle East conflict through on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338.... If American pressure is designed to extort substantial concessions only from the Israelis, it will not result in a durable and peaceful compromise.⁶⁷

The trouble with simply arguing for a return to earlier policies today is that there is considerable opposition even within the U.S. Such earlier policies seem to offer very little hope for anything but war. Furthermore, the Arabs, having tasted U.S. "even-handedness" and the possibility, some have concluded, of actually neutralizing Israel's only remaining protector, will continue to levy economic and political pressure upon the Americans. The Israelis, fearful of U.S. unwillingness to fully back Israel, will prepare for the worst and will remain determined to trade territory only for real political concessions which are unlikely to be forthcoming. As for acceptance of a West Bank plus Gaza Strip Palestinian state, Israelis still seem totally unwilling, largely for security reasons, to tolerate the idea.⁶⁸

A U.S. return to the earlier policy, after all that has occurred, will no longer offer the hope of creating a stable political-military foundation from which moderate Israelis and

truly moderate Arabs will be able to make progress. It is too late to return to policies applicable only before the events brought about by the Yom Kippur War and before American and Israeli interests became so clearly divergent.

4. Richard Ullman's Outlook

In this context the paradox that a U.S. guarantee for Israel is also promoted by some of those who oppose an imposed peace with guarantees can be understood. The primary apostle to date of a U.S. guarantee for Israel to deter future war is Princeton University's Professor Richard H. Ullman, a past member of the National Security Council staff and currently director of the "Foreign Policy in the 1980's" project of the Council on Foreign Relations.⁶⁹

In Ullman's view, American diplomacy since the Yom Kippur War "is likely to produce the worst possible outcome -- a war in which the Israelis might suffer drastically and in which the U.S. might very well find itself, willy-nilly, involved." For Ullman, Morgenthau, and other critics, the very ambiguity of current U.S. policy only encourages the Arab stage-by-stage planning while creating ever greater fears in Israel. What Ullman sees as likely to happen during the coming years is a situation where the Arab states, after continuing to apply increasing pressure upon the U.S. with oil, petrodollars, propaganda, and a possible turn toward Moscow again, and after forcing the U.S. to apply ever increasing pressure for concessions from Israel, might resort to war.

Rather than U.S. "even-handedness" leading to peace, it is more likely to lead the Arabs to see in American wavering and Israeli weakness potential victory -- or at least the possibility of further gains through war. At the point of a future conflagration, the U.S. would be more than ever required to intervene on Israel's side and this could result in the collapse of all the carefully cultivated American gains in the Arab world.

Better now, the deterrence approach argument goes, to make the Arab states unequivocally aware of the unyielding American commitment to Israel and then attempt to gain Arab friendship, rather than allowing that friendship to develop under the false illusion that the U.S. can eventually be turned away from Israel. As Ullman puts it,

The relatively ambiguous nature of the present American commitment encourages the Palestinians along the road of irredentism... induces Israeli military leaders and politicians alike to think in terms of worst-case scenarios...and...does not deter those in the Soviet Union who would pursue adventurist courses.

5. Premises of the Deterrence Camp

Advocates of a U.S. treaty alliance with Israel, an alliance which would by necessity include the stationing of some U.S. forces in Israel to demonstrate the validity of this commitment (to the Americans themselves as well as to the Arabs and the Israelis), do foresee Israeli territorial concessions. In fact, in Ullman's second major article which appeared in the summer of 1975,⁷⁰ he implied that Israel would have to agree to eventually withdraw to approximately the 1967 boundaries for the guarantee to become effective.

But the motivating concepts of those who support Ullman's analysis are quite different from the perceptions of the situation held by those in the imposition school. The deterrence approach is based upon a number of differing premises:

A. An imposed peace would be highly unstable and would probably only encourage Arab dreams of eventual victory over Israel. Arab aims of some day destroying Israel have not changed, they have only been stretched out in time and become much more sophisticated in design. An imposed peace would be seen as proof of the effectiveness of the 1973 war and the use of Arab economic and political power.

B. To be fully credible, a guarantee for Israel must be given because the U.S. positively decides to do so, not because of a negative, reluctant decision to do so because it is the only way to coerce Israeli concessions and accomplish at least a quasi-settlement in the region.

C. Only an unequivocal U.S. guarantee can create on both sides the realization that Israel's destruction is not a realistic possibility now or in the future, thereby establishing the long-term basis for a true compromise settlement.

As Ullman puts it,

My proposal...is aimed not at achieving 'peace' in the sense of formal recognition and treaties -- at least in the short run. It is aimed at creating a foundation of security upon which, eventually, formal peace might be built. It is aimed at taking the possibility of Israel's destruction out of the day-to-day politics of the Arab states, so that Arab leaders who want to coexist with Israel will not always feel forced to escalate their anti-Israel rhetoric to combat that of rival politicians.

D. Israel has become something of a dependency of the U.S. and this new post-Yom Kippur War relationship requires something more than the earlier political support and arms sales. In short, Israel's ability to deter Arab attack short of nuclear weapons is now something determined as much in Washington as in Jerusalem. The more essential American resolve for Israel's survival, the more that resolve needs to be demonstrated unambiguously.

The first premise has already been discussed. The difference between those of the imposition/justification school and those advocating a deterrence-motivated guarantee is one of perceptions regarding Arab aims, expectations of the stability of an imposed settlement, views on the state of American credibility and resolve, and outlook as to what further Soviet initiatives can be expected in the region.

The second premise has much to do with Israeli apprehensions as well as with the interpretations that will be made of such a U.S. guarantee by both the Soviet Union and the Arabs. If a U.S. guarantee comes about as a means of forcing Israel into withdrawal it lacks the sense of permanence which is vital to its role. A guarantee to be effective must be unalterable over time and sure in its application. It must be the product of desire by both parties involved. If given out of consideration for the ties that exist between two countries and after a careful process of deliberation then it is much more likely to be the kind of guarantee that will be both effective and persuasive and Israel is much more likely to find it acceptable.

As for the third premise, here is the main divergence

in perspective between the imposition proponents and the deterrence believers. Ullman believes that peace is not possible at this moment ("the dynamics of politics on both sides" make peace "very nearly impossible in present circumstances") precisely because the Arabs are not convinced that they have to live with Israel and the Israelis are not convinced that they can always count on American support. By altering these doubts on both sides the conditions for moderate leaders to make the compromises necessary for real peaceful co-existence might become reality. "The purpose of outside guarantees, therefore, would in effect be to remove the issue of Israel's 'existence' from the politics of the Arab world by confronting with force majeure those who would deny it."

Those optimists who favor imposing a settlement believe that the Arabs will acquiesce and accept Israel once there is a return to the 1967 lines, that the conflict today stems from the "occupied territories." Why the Arabs continue to stress "restoration of the full national rights of the Palestinian people" even after such a return of territories is not adequately explained since under such circumstances the Arabs themselves could decide about a West Bank State if that is what they are willing to settle for. The basic difference is that the imposition group sees peace possible now if Israel would just make concessions, while the deterrence school advocates see peace as only possible in the future and only then if the U.S. makes unequivocal its commitment to prevent Israel's military collapse.

6. Israeli Dependence

The fourth premise deserves special attention. If the strategic and psychological arguments are unconvincing to Israeli skeptics concerning even the deterrence approach to a U.S. guarantee, it is possible that stark economic and military analysis might be more successful.

Israel in a sense now lives through a de facto American guarantee. The 1973 war terminated Israeli independence considerably more than the Israelis are usually willing to recognize. In the past two years Israel has become something of an American protectorate. This is harsh reality for a people whose nationalism has its origins in the desire for independence and self-reliance after centuries of oppression and domination. But, in three senses, it is true: psychologically,

militarily, and economically. It is in this context that a formal treaty alliance is advocated.

With the collapse of Israel's purposefully fostered image of invincibility, her position in the Middle East has become one in which future battles against her can be realistically begun with hopes of partial political and military success. For three decades Israel has strived to prevent just such perceptions by her enemies. But, as New York Times military editor Drew Middleton puts it, "Israel's power is no longer great enough to deter the Arabs.... We may have seen the last limited war in the Middle East.... In the future, the military odds against Israel will be longer than they have been since 1948."⁷¹

Many take issue with this view and obviously the Israelis themselves will not publicly concur. Nevertheless, Rabin's talk of an agreement to refrain from striking at each others cities and the references by both Rabin and President Emphraim Katzair to nuclear weapons "if need be" reveal the new anxieties which have gripped Israel. Robert W. Tucker's recent advocacy of Israeli deployment of and reliance upon a nuclear deterrent to free her from dependence on America has added considerably to the debate over how to respond to American pressures.⁷² Deterrence is largely a matter of psychology. Israel lost her ability to totally frighten the Arabs in 1973, and with political forces always sure to prevent an Arab rout, the Arabs are in a much less deterrable posture than before 1973. A nuclear balance of terror may in fact become the result of such a situation, with potentially serious ramifications for Israel.⁷³

As for the objective military balance, Israel is economically being drained for military defenses. For the first time in her history she requires great quantities of military grant aid to keep an adequate balance of forces. A few figures tell the story. Currently, Israel is spending 31 percent of her GNP and approximately 40 percent* of her budget for military purposes. This contrasts with only 9 percent of the GNP in 1963, 16 percent in 1967, 26 percent in 1970, and 45 percent in 1973. For the decade 1963 -1973 Israeli military expenditures rose approximately 26 percent** yearly while her GNP increased 8 percent and her GNP per capita only 5 percent.⁷⁴ As Stanley Hoffman puts it,

* Since another 20 percent must be allocated for servicing debts incurred during the huge military expenditures stemming from the conflicts in 1967 and 1973, it can be said that 60 percent of the Israeli budget goes for military expenditures.

** This figure is somewhat inflated due to high expenditures in 1973.

It is imperative for Israel's own future that the weight of the state-of-war budget and balance payments be reduced. The only alternative is a drastic reduction in the standard of living that would both provoke serious inner tensions if it goes too far and increase the appeal of 'hawkish' solutions.⁷⁵

As for arms aid, in the two decades preceding 1973 the U.S. sold to Israel (mostly through loans) a total of about \$1.2 billion in arms. In 1973 alone the U.S. allocated to Israel over \$2 billion with the majority in the unprecedented form of grant aid. The 1976 allocation to Israel from the U.S. was approximately \$1.5 billion (50 percent in grant form). The Israelis have come to see this figure as a yearly one. Hence when the Ford Administration announced only a \$1 billion arms aid figure for fiscal 1977, Israel considered this a great reduction in American support.⁷⁶

While in earlier years the Diaspora could make contributions that made quite a difference to Israel, now, for every \$1 from American Jewry the U.S. Government gives more than \$3. The U.S. is no longer Israel's arms salesman, she has become Israel's arsenal and military reserve. In addition, the decisions made in Washington concerning military aid for Israel have a tremendous bearing on the funds Israel has for economic growth and social welfare. A cut, for instance, of \$500 million in the aid requested from the U.S. during 1976 could have resulted in approximately ten thousand additional unemployed in Israel, a rise of more than 25 percent.

The economic situation is potentially disastrous, especially should constant amounts of U.S. aid not be forthcoming. As Finance Minister Yehoshua Rabinowitz recently stated before a workers audience, "You must wake up and realize what has happened to this nation in the two years since the Yom Kippur War.... Let's face it: we must all drop to a lower standard of living."⁷⁷

What all this means is simply that Israel has now become a U.S. dependent both militarily and economically as well as politically. Under such conditions, discussions of a formal U.S. guarantee for Israel take on a different complexion than they did before the October disaster. Even if Israel were to reach the 50 percent level of domestic arms production, a goal set during 1975 by Defense Minister Peres, the dependence on the U.S. will continue to grow and the need for an

arms airlift in the event of a major war will not disappear. The Kfir fighter plane is really more of a spiritual lift than a means of shifting the arms balance away from unprecedented dependency. It is unlikely as well that a nuclear deterrent will suffice to alter the situation. Such a strategic deterrent might prevent defeat but it would not be effective against terrorist attacks or conventional wars of attrition.⁷⁸ As for her economy, Israel's coming years will be successively trying and the need for even larger amounts of American aid may soon become apparent.

7. Deterrence School Disciples

Ullman is not alone in promoting the deterrence approach to a U.S. guarantee for Israel. Over two years ago William Buckley suggested, in his characteristically semi-serious manner, that Israel become the 51st state. Today, Buckley's underlying analysis of the need to assure Israeli security seems of considerable relevance.

More recently, former Naval chief-of-staff, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, suggested what he termed a "practical, workable" solution to head off a potential superpower confrontation. He advocated the stationing of troops in Israel and the creation of something resembling the dominion status now enjoyed by Puerto Rico. During 1975 Hans Morgenthau joined the Ullman way of thinking, at least to the extent of suggesting the basing of part of the Sixth Fleet in Israeli ports. He remains, however, extremely skeptical about any "guarantees," fearing all such schemes too easily manipulable by those who advocate imposing terms upon Israel.

During the later part of 1975, Ray S. Cline, former Deputy Director of the C.I.A. and former Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, advocated inclusion of Israel within a new alliance network designed to restore U.S. world posture and credibility.⁷⁹

And after returning from a visit to Israel sponsored by the American Professors for Peace in the Middle East, chairman of the Department of Government at Georgetown University, Dr. William O'Brien, told a gathering of Jewish students at his university, "In the long run there needs to be a new, revived commitment to Israel.... A U.S. guarantee is obviously essential." It will be a "major job," he continued, "selling the American people about the necessity for a guarantee based on a credible deterrent."

8. Opposition by Israel

But even though the deterrence approach to guaranteeing Israel is one far less odious to those concerned with Israel's security, it has not gained the backing of Israel and her American supporters. Though it is possible to consider such a U.S. guarantee, if approved by Congress in the form of a treaty; a Zionist triumph -- ranking with the Balfour Declaration and the U.N. vote to legitimize a Jewish State in Palestine -- this is definitely not how the proposal is viewed by those who see themselves as the main supporters of Israel. There are a number of reasons to explain this reluctance to seriously contemplate even this approach to a U.S. guarantee.

First, the differences in concepts and motivations are not all that clear in the various approaches. A guarantee is a guarantee, with its strengths and weaknesses, regardless of why it is promoted. Especially since Ullman has himself hinted at how his proposal would "make possible" Israeli territorial withdrawals, his idea seems to melt all too readily into those put forward by the imposition advocates. The variable factors are what would be required of Israel to gain the guarantee and what the Arabs would be expected to give before Israel would be expected to withdraw from most of the territories. Had Ullman clearly stated that he favored granting, independently of other considerations, a unilateral guarantee for Israel -- while also returning to U.S. insistence on direct negotiations leading to territorial compromise and full implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338 -- then possibly the deterrence approach would have been clearly demarcated from the others. Ullman's failure to do so and his uncertain position on many of the ideas of the imposition school make his guarantee idea far too ambiguous, especially when contemplating what happens to subtle differences when ideas are put before the public or into negotiating agendas.

Second, Israel faces at this moment in history serious political and public relations problems in determining her negotiating stance at any future Geneva Conference. What is surely feared is that by supporting any kind of guarantees -- even the supplementary or deterrence kind -- Israel will find herself at Geneva facing a barrage of pleadings that she is intransigently risking both regional and world peace with semantic obstinacy about the type of guarantees she is willing to accept. The boundaries between imposition of a settlement built squarely around guarantees, supplementing a real settlement with outside guarantees, and creating the conditions for

a future settlement through deterrence-motivated guarantees are subject to considerable confusion, especially in public forums. With Geneva a forum "to exert Soviet-Arab pressure on Israel, and perhaps on the U.S. as well, to achieve an imposed solution that would contain neither peace nor security," in the words of Prime Minister Rabin, interest in any guarantee proposals is all too likely to only increase the chances of an imposed settlement coupled with Israeli political isolation.

Third, political conditions within the U.S. are hardly receptive to the rather bold idea of a true deterrence commitment to Israel in the form of a treaty plus troops. Though America is reassessing her Middle East policy, she is no longer certain about her role in world affairs. So why, under these circumstances, give any support to a possibly unworkable idea, and risk having such support misunderstood as acceptance of the overall guarantee approach to a Middle East settlement? Besides, what is crucial now is not public Israeli support for the idea, but a broad-based realization in the U.S. of the need for strengthening the U.S.-Israel coalition to prevent further Middle East fighting and to allow America to build Arab-American relations on a mutually understood basis.

The Israelis seem absolutely convinced that the guarantee idea under current circumstances and however presented is a dangerous one for them. Lately, though, there has been some recognition in the U.S. of the need to strengthen, especially in Arab eyes, the American commitment to Jewish independence. But, attempting to do so with a guarantee seems far more risky than potentially fruitful. As Professor Amos Perlmutter concluded shortly after the Yom Kippur War,

Perhaps there is a need for an explicit security guarantee from the United States -- but it would be insufficient by itself as a condition for Israeli withdrawal.... No guarantee by the U.S. could be a substitute for a substantive open change in the Arab attitude and their trend of thought concerning the political integrity and independence of Israel. The past history of international relations shows that the guarantee of big powers to small countries has never served effectively as a substitute for the security of the small states -- and in the end result, they were not honoured, either.⁸⁰

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

1. The Israeli Predicament

Faced with an eroding, defensive political posture, Israel is not looking forward to an easy time at Geneva or wherever else the Middle East debate is resumed. From the point of view of most Israelis, maybe the best that can be hoped for is that the U.S. will remain unwilling or unable to publicly consummate its new imposition strategy. Negotiations then might remain deadlocked. Few in Israel, and only a minority in the U.S., really believe an overall settlement is reachable. U.S. efforts to impose a quasi-settlement remain strongly opposed. There is worry, however, that there is serious potential for increased political isolation of Israel. Considerable public opinion slippage is possible, and even potential American neutralization is no longer unthinkable.

The Arabs may well use stalemate this year as the platform upon which to re-launch a campaign for Israel's expulsion from the U.N. This could be followed by another war with the Arabs hoping for even more world acquiescence and U.S. "even-handedness." The war could be said, after all, to be justified by Israeli refusal to compromise and by various United Nations resolutions, and the Arabs would have quite a few supporters -- certainly more than ever before.

In anticipation of such ominous developments, the third approach to an American guarantee for Israel -- the deterrence approach -- might be deserving of further thought. How can Israel turn the guarantee idea to her advantage? How can the U.S. most credibly assure Israel's survival and defuse the Middle East's potential for world cataclysm?

The belief seems to be growing, even in Israel, that the Jewish State needs desperately to go on the diplomatic offensive. A plan for "a sweeping Israeli initiative," as outlined by Stanley Hoffman and others, combined with interest in an Ullman-type guarantee, might succeed in throwing the Arabs on the defensive and turn the tide of the diplomatic battle. These moves might also strengthen the hand of those in the PLO arguing for a compromise settlement rather than perpetual conflict.

There would be risks in such an initiative. Most worrisome, the Arabs might only appear to fulfill certain Israeli requirements leaving Israel with unreliable guarantees and a

vulnerable geo-political situation. But the political risks of Israeli inaction are also growing.

It seems imperative for Israel to reverse the diplomatic pressure and regain a greater measure of unwavering public support if she is to lessen the dangers of renewed warfare and derail what is sure to be the greatest effort since her creation to impose an unacceptable formula. Risks now seem greater in attempting to maintain the status quo than in making broad proposals for peace and at least encouraging a rethinking of guarantees more along the lines of the deterrence approach. Even should Israel decide she cannot or should not back these proposals publicly, she might consider attempting to foster this approach within the American polity.

2. The U.S. Quandary

The American guarantee idea is, in the words of a Brookings Institution study titled "Toward Peace in the Middle East," "perhaps the most controversial aspect of the U.S. role" in the region. The 16 persons who formed the study group, all well-known and influential, concluded however that

The Congress might...consider favorably some form of guarantee of a comprehensive peace.... If at any time it should appear that a supplementary unilateral guarantee to Israel alone or to other parties as well were essential to the conclusion of a settlement, we believe such a guarantee would be in the U.S. interest.⁸¹

But there is a basic and fundamental contradiction in this way of presenting the "guarantee idea." It is the very contradiction which has allowed advocates to be lumped together when in fact there are at least three distinct approaches and strategies to the proposal. For a guarantee cannot be both "supplementary" and "essential" at the same time. This kind of confused thinking explains why Robert Tucker insists that "There is no escape from the conclusion that an American guarantee is either a deception, however unconscious, or a very serious undertaking."⁸² Clearer and more searching thinking is imperative in the U.S. about the realities of guarantees and the responsibilities they entail.

These realizations should become the starting point for all future discussions concerning a potential American guarantee for Israel.

FOOTNOTES

1. Malcolm H. Kerr, President of the Middle East Studies Association during 1971-1972, writes in the introduction to one of the most useful new books on the Middle East imbroglio that "The best way to begin a book about peace in the Middle East is to acknowledge that this is not a promising subject. Everything in the historical record must encourage the most pervasive pessimism." See Malcolm H. Kerr, editor; The Elusive Peace in the Middle East (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), p. 1.

Even Lord Caradon, author of Resolution 242, and a statesman well-known for his optimism, has concluded that "It will be something of a miracle if another Middle East war is prevented. And no one doubts that the next war will be far more disastrous in bloodshed and devastation than the previous quick conflicts in 1967 and 1973." See Lord Caradon, "Can Another Middle East War Be Prevented," The Times (London), July 1, 1975.

2. President Sadat's total break with the Soviet Union in March 1976 is clearly significant incentive for the U.S. to end its special relationship only with Israel and force Israeli territorial withdrawal in hopes of consolidating a lasting relationship with moderate Arab leaders. U.S. willingness to sell arms to Egypt will have both practical and symbolic importance. Hence the extraordinary importance of the current debate over selling six C-130 cargo planes.
3. See Robert W. Tucker, "Israel and the United States: From Dependency to Nuclear Weapons," Commentary, November 1975, p. 30. Here Tucker asserts that "The congruence of interests that might make so increasingly dependent a relationship tolerable [between Israel and the U.S.]...no longer exists. Indeed, it has never really existed.... Today, it is to indulge in nothing less than sheer delusion to speak of a congruence of interests between the two states."
4. Theodore Herzl, The Jewish State (Tel Aviv: Rohald Press, 1956), p.66.
5. For documents on the Middle East conflict a new three-volume reference work titled The Arab-Israeli Conflict sponsored by The American Society of International Law and edited by John Norton Moore is of special importance. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). For the Tripartite Declaration see Volume III, pp. 574-5.

6. Moore, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 643-651 (the address by President Eisenhower on the Middle East, February 20, 1957). The actual commitment to the "independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East" and the "use of armed forces to assist any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism" came in a Congressional Joint Resolution on March 9, 1957. See Vol. III, pp. 675-677.
7. Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 637-9 ("Dulles Aide Memoire to Eban"); and Vol. III, pp. 667-674 (Statement of Fourteen Maritime States).
8. Shlomo Slonim, "United States - Israel Relations 1967-1973: A Study in the Convergence and Divergence of Interests," Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems #8, The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, September 1974, p. 19.
9. See Moore, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1024-1033, for the December 9, 1969 speech by Secretary of State Rogers which outlined the "Rogers Plan."
10. See Slonim, op. cit., pp. 19-34.
11. Alan Dowty, "The Role of Great Power Guarantees in International Peace Agreements," Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems #3, The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, February 1974, p. 27.
12. Michla Pomerance, "American Guarantees to Israel and the Law of American Foreign Relations," Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems #9, The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, December 1974, pp. 5, 37.
13. "What Value are Guarantees?" Jewish Observer and Middle East Review (London), April 11, 1975, p. 11.
14. See James Reston, "Guarantee for Israel?" New York Times, February 21, 1975; and "Second Thoughts on U.S. Guarantees," Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, February 28, 1975.
15. This is a particularly controversial subject and one which remains in the diplomatic closet. See, however, the front-

page Washington Post story by Marilyn Berger, "U.S. Precedent Seen in Pact," September 4, 1975. There is now considerable evidence Kissinger strongly opposed sending American technicians to the Sinai, but gave in to Israeli insistence. See Edward R. F. Sheehan, "How Kissinger Did It," Foreign Policy, #22, Spring 1976, p. 61. Additionally, Sheehan quotes a senior Kissinger aide to the effect that in mid-1975, in negotiations over the then secret "Memorandum of Understanding" to accompany the second-stage Sinai withdrawal, early Israeli drafts "amounted to a formal political and military alliance between Israel and the United States." See p. 60.

16. This has been so true that many commentators on the January 1976 resolution (which was vetoed by the U.S.) mistakenly noted the "new" mention of "guarantees."
17. Department of State Bulletin, September 5, 1955, pp. 379-380.
18. Department of State Bulletin, March 8, 1971, p. 293.
19. Sheehan, op. cit., p. 9.
20. Department of State Bulletin, March 9, 1971, p. 438.
21. Department of State Bulletin, January 24, 1972, p. 91.
22. J. William Fulbright, "Getting Tough With Israel," Washington Monthly, February 1975. For Fulbright's original proposal of a guarantee see Congressional Record, August 24, 1970, p. 29805; and "Fulbright's Proposals," The New Republic, October 10, 1970.
23. Charles W. Yost, "Mideast: Is It Peace or War Ahead?" Christian Science Monitor, August 7, 1975.
24. "Sen. Sparkman: Israeli Pullback in Return for Big Power Guarantees," Jerusalem Post Weekly, January 28, 1975, p. 2.
25. See Tucker, op. cit., p. 30, where he concludes that "The logic of [step-by-step] diplomacy is inevitably to make Israel more dependent.... The American government has abandoned its former support of the concept whereby peace in the Middle East would have to come through a process of direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs.... For an indefinite period...the diplomatic reality will be

an America that negotiates with the parties to the conflict and to whom the parties must in practice bring their complaints." Tucker's comments further support the conclusion that the U.S. has become something akin to an "umpire" in the Middle East.

26. Israel's willingness to have the U.S. pursue with the Arab states the possibility of ambiguously ending "the state of belligerency" rather than totally normalizing relations is an indication that both Israel and the U.S. are sensitive to how difficult acceptance of Israel's "legitimacy" will be for many years to come. Malcolm H. Kerr (op.cit., p. 14) insists "there is no getting around the fact that any Arab recognition of Israel under any circumstances would engage a powerful and damaging symbolism of failure and dishonor...it would mean a bitter conflict amongst the Arabs themselves: between conservatives and radicals, between Arab governments and the Palestinian liberation movement, between those Palestinians who are ready to settle for half a loaf and those who are not." Also see Dan Kurzman, "Peace Policy Shift Splits Israelis," The Washington Star, February 27, 1976, p. 4; and David Landau, "Haggling Away Peace," The Jerusalem Post, February 27, 1976.
27. This monograph was completed before the appearance in Foreign Policy magazine of Edward R. F. Sheehan's article "How Kissinger Did It" in the Spring 1976 issue. Sheehan's research lends considerable support to the view that U.S. policy has dramatically altered since the October 1973 war. Further, the concept of guarantees as a means of both imposing and justifying some kind of a settlement upon the Israelis apparently has been specifically on Kissinger's and Ford's agenda.

According to Sheehan, the early 1975 "reassessment" of Middle East policy led to three policy options. The first and preferred was as follows: "The United States should announce its conception of a final settlement in the Middle East, based on the 1967 frontiers of Israel with minor modifications, and containing strong guarantees for Israel's security. The Geneva conference should be reconvened; the Soviet Union should be encouraged to cooperate in this quest to resolve all outstanding questions (including the status of Jerusalem) which should be defined in appropriate components and addressed in separate subcommittees."

"It was the Israeli lobby," Sheehan writes, "that dealt reassessment its coup de grace." Resuming step-by-step was then the only choice and Kissinger decided to reserve the option "that at some future date, when the President was stronger, when his prospects were more auspicious, he might go to the people with a plan for peace based upon the first option."

"In formulating the first option," Sheehan discovered, "Kissinger's advisers envisioned Ford going to the American people, explaining lucidly and at length on television the issues of war and peace in the Middle East, pleading the necessity of Israeli withdrawal in exchange for the strongest guarantees." pp. 54-59.

28. "Meet the Press" Transcript, February 23, 1975, pp. 1-2.
29. James Reston, "Guarantee For Israel?" New York Times, February 21, 1975.
30. Marilyn Berger, "U.S. Precedent Seen in Pact," Washington Post, September 4, 1975, p. 1.
31. See, for instance, the charge by Yuval Ne'eman, past President of Tel Aviv University and former adviser to the Ministry of Defense, that "We have lost even the shadow of being an independent, self-respecting state having its own national interest." Jerusalem Post Weekly, February 10, 1976, p. 2. See also Wolf Blitzer, "The View from Washington: A Tense and Nervous Mood," Jerusalem Post Weekly, January 21, 1976; "Anxiety and Frustration: Mood of Israel Today," U.S. News & World Report, February 9, 1976, pp. 32-34; "Ultimatum Unveiled," Jerusalem Post editorial, January 29, 1975.
32. In a speech in February 1976 to the 25th Communist Party Congress, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev indicated that his country is ready "to participate in international guarantees of the security and inviolability of the frontiers of all Middle East countries, either in the U.N. framework or on some other basis." Jerusalem Post, February 25, 1976, p. 1.
33. See Nahum Goldmann, "The Time for Peace," Journal of Palestine Studies #14 (Beirut), Winter 1975, p. 120; and George Ball, "Kissinger's Paper Peace: How Not to Handle the Middle East," Atlantic Monthly, February 1976.

34. Joan Peters, "A Conversation With Dayan," Harper's, November 1975, p. 74.
35. This statement has been termed by Congressman Lee Hamilton as "the most comprehensive statement I have ever seen by the U.S. Government" on the Palestinian problem. It was originally delivered on November 12, 1975 by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Harold Saunders, before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the House. "In many ways," Saunders said, "the Palestinian dimension of the conflict is the heart of the conflict." The Israeli Foreign Ministry was enraged and the Israeli Cabinet met to denounce the statement. Nevertheless, the Department released the document as an official statement of "Current Policy" and then, in the December 1, 1975 Department of State Bulletin ("the official weekly record of United States foreign policy"), published the document under the heading "Department gives position on Palestinian issue." See SWASIA, December 19, 1975 and December 26, 1975.
36. Sheehan, op. cit., p. 5. See also Diodotus, "Playing to the PLO, The New U.S. Policy in the Middle East," The New Leader, January 5, 1976, pp. 4-5; and Mark Bruzonsky, "The U.S., the PLO, and Israel," Commonweal, April 1976.
37. Sheehan, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
38. J. W. Fulbright, "Beyond the Sinai Agreement," Worldview, November 1975, p. 9.
39. See discussion pp. 33-35 this monograph.
40. "U.S. Policy in the Middle East December 1973 - November 1974," Department of State publication 8799, January 1975, p. 17.
41. "Mideast Peace?" The New Republic, March 8, 1975, p. 8.
42. Theodore Draper, "The U.S. and Israel: Tilt in the Middle East?" Commentary, April 1975, p. 23.
43. "Israel Grows Wary U.S. May Desert It," Christian Science Monitor, December 4, 1975, p. 1.
44. George Ball, "The Coming War in the Middle East and How

- to Avert It," Atlantic Monthly, January 1975, p. 6.
45. William E. Griffith, "It's Our Move in the Middle East," Reader's Digest, February 1975, p. 72.
46. Nadav Safran, "The War and the Future of the Arab-Israeli Conflict," Foreign Affairs, January 1974, p. 215; and Nadav Safran, "Middle East: The Fleeting Opportunity," The Nation, April 5, 1971, p. 425.
47. Robert R. Bowie, "For a New Mideast Strategy," Christian Science Monitor, April 2, 1975, p. 27.
48. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Unmanifest Destiny: Where Do We Go From Here?" New York Magazine, March 3, 1975, p. 51.
49. Stanley Hoffman, "A New Policy for Israel," Foreign Affairs, April 1975, p. 420.
50. Stanley Hoffman, "Tiptoeing Toward Peace in the Middle East," Harvard Political Review, Spring 1975, p. 33.
51. Interview with Lord Caradon, Journal of Palestine Studies #13, August 1974, p. 198.
52. Sheehan, op. cit., p. 56.
53. Draper, op. cit., Commentary, April 1975, p. 39.
54. Ibid., pp. 29, 41.
55. See Congressional Record, April 30, 1974, p. H3404.
56. "The Middle East Explosion and American Detente," Firing Line (Public Broadcasting System Transcript), November 25, 1973, p. 6. See also Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Geo-Politics of Israel's Survival," The New Leader, February 4, 1974; and Hans J. Morgenthau, "An Intricate Web," The New Leader, December 24, 1973.
57. Hans Morgenthau, Congressional Record, April 30, 1974, p. H3404.
58. Michael I. Handel, Israel's Political-Military Doctrine, Occasional Paper #30, Harvard University Center for International Affairs, July 1973, p. 64. See also Matti Golan, The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger (New York: Quadrangle, 1976) for an Israeli interpretation of Kissinger's failure to understand Arab intentions and Kissinger's "perfidy" in dealing with Israel.

59. New York Times, November 29, 1973.
60. Al-Anwar (Beirut daily), April 10, 1974, reprinted in Near East Report, June 26, 1974, p. 149.
61. Al-Ahram (Cairo), October 19, 1974.
62. Al-Ahram, during 1971.
63. Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle, 1975), preface.
64. Quoted in Gil Carl AlRoy, "Do the Arabs Want Peace?" Commentary, February 1974, p. 59.
65. See Gil Carl AlRoy, The Kissinger Experience -- American Policy in the Middle East (New York: Horizon, 1975); and Gil Carl AlRoy, Behind the Middle East Conflict (New York: Capricorn, 1975).
66. Louis Harris, "Oil or Israel?" New York Times Magazine, April 6, 1975, p. 21.
67. Draper, op. cit., Commentary, April 1975, pp. 43-44.
68. For an exceptionally straight-forward article see "An Interview With Professor Yuval Ne'eman, President of the Tel Aviv University," Ma'ariv, June 19, 1974. There are important exceptions however. A new committee in Israel led by Arie Lova Eliav, former secretary-general of Israel's major party, is willing to consider total Israeli territorial withdrawal and the possibility of a Palestinian state. See "Israel Group Urges Palestinian Talks," New York Times, January 13, 1976. Also see the pamphlet "Israel and the Palestinians: A Different Israeli View," (New York: Breira, 1975).
69. See Richard H. Ullman, "After Rabat: Middle East Risks and American Roles," Foreign Affairs, January 1975, p. 284; and "Mr. Ullman Replies," Foreign Affairs, April 1975, p. 579. All quotations are from these two articles. Also see Mark A. Bruzonsky, "The U.S. and Israel: Proposals to Avert Another Middle East War," International Problems, Fall 1975, p. 30.
70. Richard H. Ullman, "Alliance With Israel?" Foreign Policy, #19, Summer 1975, p. 18.

71. Drew Middleton, "Who Lost the Yom Kippur War?" Atlantic Monthly, March 1974, p. 45.
72. See Robert Tucker, op. cit., p. 24.
73. See Mark Bruzonsky and Israel Singer, "Dependent Israel: The Two Options," Worldview, April 1976, p. 42. The recent revelation by the CIA that Israel may have as many as 20 nuclear weapons indicates that movement toward a regional "balance of terror" has already begun.
74. Figures compiled from World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade 1963 - 1973, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
75. Hoffman, op. cit., Foreign Affairs, p. 420.
76. It is too early to say whether Israel can successfully turn to Congress for "restoration" of aid to the previous year's amount. There are, however, signs this will not be fully possible even if funds for the special "transitional quarter" in 1977 are approved.
77. "Wake Up to Fiscal Facts or Face Disaster: Rabinowitz," Jerusalem Post Weekly, December 2, 1975.
78. See the debate over Tucker's November 1975 Commentary article in the February 1976 issue of Commentary.
79. Ray Cline, World Power Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies; Georgetown University, 1975).
80. Amos Perlmutter, Ma'ariv, February 7, 1974.
81. "Toward Peace in the Middle East," (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 22-23.
82. Tucker, op. cit., p. 37.

APPENDIX A

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242

November 22, 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all member states in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter.

1) Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2) Affirms further the necessity

a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3) Requests the Secretary General to designate a special representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4) Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the special representative as soon as possible.

APPENDIX B

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338
October 22, 1973

The Security Council

1) Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy.

2) Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3) Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties condemned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

APPENDIX C

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
VETOED BY THE U.S. ON
January 26, 1976

The Security Council,

Having considered the item entitled "The Middle East Problem including the Palestinian Question," in accordance with resolution 381 (1975) dated 30 November, 1975,

Having heard the representatives of parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, representatives of the Palestinian people,

Convinced that the question of Palestine is the core of the conflict in the Middle East,

Expressing its concern over the continuing deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, and deeply deploring Israel's persistence in its occupation of Arab territories and its refusal to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions,

Reaffirming the principles of inadmissibility of acquisition of territories by the threat or use of force,

Reaffirming further the necessity of the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region based on full respect for the Charter of the United Nations as well as for its resolutions concerning the problem of the Middle East including the question of Palestine,

1) Affirms:

a) That the Palestinian people should be enabled to exercise its inalienable national right of self-determination, including the right to establish an independent state in Palestine in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

b) The right of the Palestinian refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors and the right of those choosing not to return to receive compensation for property;

c) That Israel should withdraw from all Arab territories occupied since June 1967;

d) That appropriate arrangements should be established to guarantee, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;

2) Decides that the provisions contained in paragraph one should be taken fully into account in all international efforts and conferences organized within the framework of the United Nations for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

3) Requests the Secretary General to take all the necessary steps as soon as possible for the implementation of the provisions of this resolution and to report to the Security Council on the progress achieved;

4) Decides to convene within a period of six months to consider the report by the implementation of this resolution, and in order to pursue its responsibilities regarding such implementation.